Many influential leaders in Maharashtra and Gujarat during 1990s had developed close relations with underworld don Dawood Ibrahim and his henchman Iqbal Mirchi. This assertion was officially put down on paper when the N.N. Vohra committee submitted its report to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in 5 October 1993, roughly three months after it was established on 9 July 1993 in the aftermath of the 12 March 1993 Bombay bomb blasts.

Vohra was then the Union Home Secretary. While the contents of the report, that was subsequently made public on 1 August 1995 in Parliament, were only limited to 11 pages, it is a part of the government’s own records that the finding of the report, in total, was close to 100 pages. It is these 100 pages that were never made public, that have now become relevant, almost three decades after they were brought into existence.

The inputs given by the agency, at the time, had stated that there was a “definite” nexus between Dawood and a very big leader of Maharashtra since the late 1970s and as per their findings, this very prominent leader of the state got almost Rs 70 crore from Dawood till the 1993 blasts. The reports also mentioned how Rs 5 crore was given to another politician through hawala to help him in contesting the 1990 elections. The report also had the name of a “former CM”. Another input that is a part of the annexures of the Vohra committee report, showed how two tranches of Rs 5 crore each was given by Dawood in 1992 to a relative of a Chief Minister who later himself became a politician. The annexures, as the officials recall, have prominently mentioned the name of a very powerful leader from the Congress, who at that time was a mid-level operative, but is now among the top ten.

A former top IB officer said: “Gujarat-based leaders were prominently mentioned in the annexures. If the Home Minister decides to summon these annexures, if he has not seen them till now, he will find very familiar names in them. Every leader comes and makes statements on Dawood and Mirchi. The real test of intent is whether they have the guts to take action on the basis of what they already have the findings of the Vohra committee that are encompassed in the annexures.”

VOHRA REPORT AND AFTER

The Vohra Committee report has highlighted the manifold dimensions of the malaise of criminalisation of politics. The germs of this malaise took birth in 1969 when there was a split in the Congress and the guiding motto became the pursuit of power. The demand of money for party funds to contest elections paved the way, as was inevitable, to political corruption. The two vicious offshoots of the demand for money in the garb of election funds were the malady of political corruption and the scourge of black money. Political corruption acts as the foster-mother of administrative corruption. Corruption has the vicious tendency of percolating. Once it is there at the top, it is bound to filter down, spread wide and become ubiquitous. When an outcry was raised by some public men about the menace of corruption and its immensity, they were sought to be silenced on the ground that corruption prevailed in all countries. The fact that the extent of corruption in our country was much larger was simply brushed under the carpet. As things stands today, corruption has befouled the entire political and administrative apparatus of the country. Undoubtedly, earlier also, there was corruption but it was confined to officials at the lower level and the scale of corruption was also not high. As against that the malaise has now affected also those at the higher rung of administration and all factions of the State.

Subsequently, the criminals and mafia leaders felt that if they could get other elected, why should they not with, their grip and hold over a section of the population seek election for themselves. The result was that many of them contested elections and quite a number of them were elected. Some of them also came to occupy ministerial chairs. Things came to such a pass that according to newspaper reports, about 45 per cent of members of one State Legislature were those who were history-sheeters on the police records. Another fallout of criminalisation of politics has been the havoc brought in the administration of criminal justice. As things are, it has become most difficult, if not impossible, to secure the conviction of major culprits accused of serious offences such as murder, homicide, grievous hurt, intimidation and kidnapping. This is so because of interference by the political bosses in the investigation of crimes. As a result, effective investigation has to take a back seat and no serious effort is made to procure incriminating pieces of evidence. The question then arises on how to break the nexus between the criminals and politicians. It is thus necessary to evolve a code of conduct for the political parties so that they may not in the selection of candidates for election choose anyone with shady antecedents. The code of conduct, if it is not to remain a collection of pious sentiments, must be given some teeth. We should therefore give thought to (he idea of giving legal sanction to the prescribed code of conduct to prevent its violation and infraction,

Even in the absence of legal sanctions public opinion, reinforced by vigilant media, should be built up to impel the parties to adhere to the code of conduct in the selection of candidates. Denunciation of the malady of criminalisation of politics would remain confined to the theoretical plane, unless the identity of the politicians having close links with criminals Is brought out. The Vohra Committee has done the basic spade work and pointed out the various facets and dimensions of this malady of criminalisation of politics and how the mafia network was virtually running a parallel Government. The Government has, as a follow up action, appointed a Committee of Secretaries to look further into the matter with the help of intelligence services. This is bound to operate as a cover up. It would be wholly unrealistic and an exercise in sheer naivete to think that a committee of serving civil servants, however upright they may otherwise be, to name the politicians some of whom may be Ministers having close nexus with criminals. If we are earnest in the matter, the further task should be entrusted to a body of independent persons not subordinate to the Government. Indeed, the present attempt to cover up the identity of the culprits remains one of an earlier attempt which was made at the highest political level to cover up die identity of the recipients of kickbacks of the Bofors gun transaction. The attempts then being made to find out the identity of the recipients of that tainted money were sabotaged at the highest political level when our then External Affairs Minister accompanying the Prime Minister to Switzerland told the Swiss Government to go slow. As regards the malady of the money power, the need of the hour is to ensure audit of party funds by an independent agency such as the Comptroller & Auditor-General India. A system of the audit of party funds by -an independent agency already exists in countries such as Germany and ensures transparency of the monetary affairs of political parties. The country today is passing through moral crises because of the doings of politicians. This is so, despite the presence in the political arena of a number of persons of the highest integrity, attached to moral values, although unfortunately they belong to a diminishing tribe.

POLITICS & CRIME

Beyond Vohra Committee ( Report P. R. Dubhashi ) The Vohra Committee report on the criminalization of politics in India has been variously described as "a damp squib" and "a cat out of the bag". A damp squib, because it did not reveal any specific names of politicians but only stated in a general manner what has already been widely known and talked about for several years now. At the same time, it was "a cat out of the bag" because it was for the first time that an official report clearly brought out that (a) crime syndicates and mafia organizations have developed significant muscle and money power and (b) they were virtually running a parallel government pushing the State apparatus into irrelevance. This is a frightening admission to make for an official committee but it does not state how to "bell the cat", how the situation has to be dealt with, how criminalization of politics and government can be overcome and ultimately eliminated. All that it suggests is the setting up of a nodal agency which will provide one place where the intelligence and information relating to the activities of crime syndicates and mafia organizations gathered by different agencies like the Intelligence Bureau, Central Bureau of Investigation and various agencies under the Department of Revenue could be brought together and monitored, Lack of coordination between various administrative agencies is a well-known shortcoming of our administrative system and this holds good in our system of intelligence gathering also. An internal coordinating agency should be looked upon as a normal internal device of day-today working of administration and that such a device did not exist and had lo lie suggested by a committee is a sad reflection on the state of our administration. But we have to go beyond intelligence gathering. 'The purpose of intelligence gathering is to plumb the depths of criminalization, unravel its genesis, lay bare the root causes and work out comprehensive measures to root out corruption and criminalization in politics, government and administration. The Vohra Committee report does not indicate how this can be accomplished. The first step is to see that candidates who stand for elections to Parliament and Legislative Assemblies do not use the money and muscle power of criminals to get elected; nor criminals allowed to stand for election. The strict enforcement of the electoral code of conduct during the last State elections did serve this purpose, to a considerable extent, of curbing use of money and muscle power. Voters at large have welcomed this development and expect that this gain should be consolidated through similar strictness in future elections as well. The electoral law should be further strengthened so as to debar criminals from standing for elections. The strict enforcement of the electoral code of conduct is but part of the strict enforcement of the law of the land in every other sphere - whether urban building activity, trade, business and industry, working of banking and financial institutions, imports and exports or use of arms. These are spheres in which illegal activity by gangs of criminals has flourished during the last several years with the complicity of politicians in power and the civil servants. It is the duty of the civil servants to enforce law. If they do not do so, it is because they are pressured by corrupt politicians who are in league with criminals or have themselves become corrupt and join hands with criminal elements, In the latter case, they should be brought to book by the Vigilance Commissioner or Lokayukta who are appointed in several Stales. The vigilance machinery should be strengthened.

But honest civil servants are sometimes prevented from proper enforcement of the law and taking decisions in the public interest. Where the officers refuse to be pressured, they are subjected to abrupt and vexations transfers taking a heavy toll of their family lives. Governed by the rules of a strict code of conduct and discipline, the honest officer finds himself helpless, it is idle to talk of professionalism in such an environment. If the nation wants civil servants to be honest and play their role in a professional manner, they need more protection than is available now. They should not he exposed to arbitrary 'transfers and their careers should no! be ruined or jeopardized just for doing their duty. The public at large should also appreciate the importance of honest and strict administration, it should have its own autonomy and should function without political interference. Needless to say. that strict administration does not mean non-responsive administration.

Political interference on behalf of criminal elements is at present a worrisome feature of, our administration. It is necessary, therefore, to go beyond civil service and police reforms and extend the reforms process to political parties as well. At present political parties seem to be beyond the pale of any framework of rules and regulations. Taking advantage of this, criminal elements enter into and later dominate the affairs of political parties. Their youth wings seem to be especially vulnerable to the criminal and aggressive elements. How can the political parties be reformed? Neither the Constitution nor any law prescribes how they should function. The time has now come for laying down' broad norms for composition and functioning of political parties in the country. No less than a chapter in Constitution itself on the code of conduct of political parties can serve the purpose. Such a code of conduct could be on the lines of the prescriptions of the Nolan Committee in Britain - honesty, integrity, objectivity, openness and accountability. Honest administration can bring the culprits to book and prosecute them in courts of law - no matter who the culprits are and what positions they hold in public life. It is only through the relentless pursuit of criminal politicians by the honest prosecutors and intrepid judges that criminalization of politics has been halted in Italy. The crusades of those judges are a reflection of the public disgust and frustration of having to put up with corrupt politicians for so long. The trial of the former Prime Minister, Chiton Andreotti, for collusion with the mafia is the culminating point of this crusade. This powerful politician, 31 times Minister and seven times Prime Minister, is charged with having ordered the assassination of an over zealous journalist and colluded with mafia chiefs, even sending birthday and marriage presents to members of their families. The Italian case should provide an excellent example of how we should proceed to eliminate criminalization of politics in our own country. The ultimate remedy is. of course, awakening of the spirit of the people against criminalization of politics and government so that they do not fear criminals in politics and society and stand hold against them and their crimes, the time has now come to demand the setting up of a National Commission on ethics of public life for making comprehensive recommendations regarding an agenda of reform

Mafia running parallel Government

The Vohra Committee report tabled in Parliament on 1st August 1995: The Government had established a committee comprised as below, to take stock of all available information about the activities of crime syndicates mafia organization which had developed links with and were being protected by Government functionaries and political personalities. Based on the recommendations of the committee, Government shall determine the need, if any, to establish a special organization/agency to regularly collect information and pursue cases against such elements: Home Secretary Chairman: Secretary (R) Member: DIB Member: Director CBI Member and JS(PP) MHA Member Secretary. The Committee was authorized to invite senior officers of various concerned Departments to gather the required information. The Special Secretary (Internal Security & Police), MHA, was subsequently added as a Member of the Committee. The committee was desired to submit its report within 3 months. In the first meeting of the committee (held on 15th July ’93), the Government had established the committee after seeing the reports of our intelligence and investigation agencies on the activities/linkages of the Dawood Ibrahim gang, consequent to the bomb blasts in Bombay in March 1993. From these various reports, it was apparent that the activities of the Memon brothers and Dawood Ibrahim had progressed over the years, leading to the establishment of a powerful network. This could not have happened without these elements having been protected by the functionaries of the concerned Government departments, especially Customs, Income Tax, Police and others. It was, therefore, necessary to identify the linkages and to also determine how such information could be timely collected and acted upon in the future. In the course of the discussions, some of the Members appeared to have some hesitation in openly expressing their views and also seemed unconvinced that the Government actually intended to pursue such matters.

Accordingly, the various offices abroad of this Agency have a limited strength and are largely geared to the collection of militaries, economic, scientific and political intelligence. R&AW monitor the activities of certain organizations abroad only insofar as they relate to their involvement with narco-terrorist elements and smuggling arms, ammunition, explosives etc. into the country. It does not monitor the activities of criminal elements abroad which are mainly confined to “normal smuggling without any links to terrorist elements.” The present strength of the Agency’s offices abroad would not permit to enlarge its field of activities. If, however, there is evidence to suggest that these organizations have links with Intelligence agencies of other countries, particularly Pakistan, and that they are being used or are likely to be used by such countries for de-establishing our economy, it would become R&AW’s responsibility to monitor their activities as is being done by this Agencies to collect vital information in regard to the investigations in the Bombay bomb blasts case. The creation of a nodal agency to collect information regarding the activities of mafia organizations is very essential. All the existing information/data available with R&AW, IB and CBI could be made available to this nodal agency. R&AW will nominate an officer of suitable rank to liaise with the nodal agency on a regular basis to enable expeditious follow up action. Crime Syndicate A report on the nexus between the Bombay city police and the Bombay under-world was prepared by CBI in 1986. It would be useful to institute a fresh study by CBI, on the basis of which appropriate administrative/legal measures could be initiated. An organized crime syndicate/mafia generally commences its activities by indulging in petty crime at the local level, mostly relating to illicit distillation/gambling/organized satta and prostitution in the larger towns. In port towns, their activities involve smuggling and sale of imported goods and progressively graduate to narcotics drug trafficking. In the bigger cities, the main source of income relates to real estate - forcibly occupying lands/buildings, procuring such properties at cheap rates by forcing out the existing occupants/tenants etc. over time, the money power thus acquired is used for building up contacts with bureaucrats and politicians and expansion of activities with impunity. The money power is used to develop a network of muscle-power which is also used by the politicians during elections.

The CBI has reported that all over India crimes syndicates have become a law unto themselves. Even in the smaller towns and rural areas, muscle-men have become the order of the day. Hired assassins have become a part of these organizations. The nexus between the criminal gangs, police, bureaucracy and politicians has come out clearly in various part of the country. The existing criminal justice system, which was essentially designed to deal with the individual offences/crimes, is unable to deal with the activities of the mafia: the provisions of law in regard to economic offences are weak: there are insurmountable legal difficulties in attaching/confiscation of the property acquired through mafia activities. It has been suggested that the menace has first to be tackled at the local level where the agencies of the State and the concerned Central Enforcement Agencies like Customs and Exercise, Income Tax would be required to take effective action. In case where a crime syndicate has graduated to big business, it would be necessary to conduct detailed investigations into its assets, both movable and immovable. It has been stressed that when such action is not timely and effectively taken, the lower functionaries of the concerned State and Central Departments/organizations start overlooking the activities of the crime syndicates.

To elucidate the point, the Director CBI has given the example of Iqbal Mirchi of Bombay who, till the late 80’s was merely a visitor to passenger and carrier ships to obtain liquor and cigarettes for selling the same at a profit. In the last 3-4 years, Mirchi acquired real estate valuing crores of rupees; he has many bank accounts and has been paying lakhs of rupees to his careers. The growth of Mirchi is due to the fact that the concerned Enforcement agencies did not take timely action against him and, later, this perhaps became difficult on account of the enormous patronage that he had developed. If Mirchi is investigated, the entire patronage enjoyed by him and his linkages will come to light. The Director, CBI has observed that there are many such cases, as that of Mirchi where the initials failure has led to the emergence of Mafia giants who have become too big to be tackled. The CBI director has stated that the main mode of communications/contacts of the mafias operating at the international level is through telephonic communications. Referring to the useful leads emerging from the investigations into the activities of Dawood Ibrahim, a mafia leader, the director. CBI has stated that the effective monitoring of the telephone calls made from India/received from abroad would yield useful information and, for this being done, the Government may grant sanction to monitor certain telephone connections. The assistance of banks is an essential input. The Bank Managers can be placed under obligation to render reports on all heavy transactions and suspicious accounts to the Enforcement agencies. Such a practice obtains in U.K. Concluding his analysts, the Director, CBI has made the following suggestions to bring under control the activities of the criminal syndicates: identification of offences and award of deterrent punishments, including preventive detention: trial procedures should be simplified and hastened: surveillance should be carried out through finger printing, photographs and dossiers; monitoring mechanisms should be established at the State and Central levels; establishment of Special Cells in the State CIDs and CBI: suitable amendments should be introduced in the existing laws to more effectively deal with the activities of mafia organizations, etc., this would also include review of the existing laws and a detailed case study of 10-15 cases would provide useful information regarding the administrative/legal measures which would be required to be taken to effectively tackle the functioning of mafia organizations.

The DIB has reported that due to the progressive decline in the values of public life in the country “warning signals of sinister linkages between the underworld politicians and bureaucracy have been evident with disturbing regularity as exemplified by the exposures of the networks of the Bombay blast case”. He has recommended immediate attention to: identification of the nexus between the criminals/mafias and anti-national elements on the one hand and bureaucrats, politicians and other sensitively located individuals on the other; identification of the nature and dimensions of these linkages and the modus operandi of their operations: assessment of the impact of these linkages of the various institutions viz. the electoral, political, economic, law and order and the administrative apparatus: nexus, if any, between the domestic linkages with foreign intelligence; necessary action to show effective action to counteract/neutralize the mafia activities and political and legal constraints in dealing with the covert/illegal functioning of the linkages. Like the Director, CBI, the DIB has also stated that there has been a rapid spread the growth of criminal gangs, armed senas, drug mafias, smuggling gangs, drug peddlers and economic lobbies in the country which have, over the years developed an extensive network of contacts with the bureaucrats/Government functionaries at the local levels, politicians, media persons and strategically located individuals in the non-State sector. Some of these syndicates also have international linkages, including the foreign intelligence agencies. In this context, the DIB has given the following examples: in certain States, like Bihar, Haryana and U.P., these gangs enjoy the patronage of local level politicians, cutting across party lines and the protection of Government functionaries. Some political leaders become the leaders of these gangs/armed senas and over the years, get themselves elected to local bodies, State Assemblies and the national Parliament. Resultantly, such elements have acquired considerable political clout seriously jeopardizing the smooth functioning of the administration and the safety of life and property of the common man, causing a sense of despair and alienation among the people: the big smuggling syndicates, having international linkages, have spread into and infected the various economic and financial activities, including hawala transactions, circulation of black money and operations of a vicious parallel economy causing serious damage to the economic fiber of the country. These syndicates have acquired substantial financial and muscle power and social respectability and have successfully corrupted the Government machinery at the levels and yield enough influence to make the task of Investigating and Prosecuting agencies extremely difficult; even the members of the judicial system have not escaped the embrace of the mafia: certain elements of the Mafia have shifted to narcotics, drugs and weapon smuggling and established narco-terrorism networks, specially in the States of J& K, Punjab, Gujarat and Maharashtra. The cost of contesting elections has thrown the politician into the lap of these elements and led to a grave compromise by officials of the preventive/defective system. The virus has spread to almost all the centers in the country: the costal and the border States have been particularly affected: the Bombay bomb blast case and the communal riots in Surat and Ahmedabad have demonstrated how the Indian underworld had been exploited by the Pak, ISI and the latter’s network in UAE to cause sabotage, subversion and communal tension in various parts of the country.

The investigations into the Bombay bomb blast cases have revealed extensive linkages of the underworld in the various governmental agencies, political circles, business sector and the film world. The DIB has stated that the network of the mafia is virtually running a parallel Government, pushing the State apparatus into irrelevance. It is thus most immediately necessary than an institution is established to effectively deal with the menace. In this connection, the DIB has stated: presently, there is no system/mechanism which is specifically designated to collect and collate intelligence pertaining to the linkages developed by crime syndicates mafia with the Government set up. Nonetheless, the various intelligence/investigation/enforcement agencies collect, in the normal course of their functioning, information about the nexus between the bureaucracy and politicians with the mafia gangs, smugglers and the underworld. These agencies use such available inputs “only within the narrow confines of their work charter and choose not to take undue cognizance and follow-up action, leave alone sharing with any other agencies.” Thus, all these agencies “functioning within their own cocoons, with the result that a plethora of information falls to get specific and purposeful attention needed for the exposure of the linkages.” It is, therefore, necessary to immediately have an institutionalized system which “while giving total freedom to the various agencies pursue their charter of work, would simultaneously cast on them the onus of sharing such inputs to a nodal outfit whose job will be to process this information for attention of a single designated authority.” This will enable the Nodal Group to provide useful leads to the various to the various agencies and, over time, a progressive data base will get generated “to facilitate periodic reviews and analysis which could then be passed to a designated body.”

Central Board of Excise & Customs (CBEC) Interalia, CBEC is responsible for the prevention of smuggling. In this and other tasks, it is assisted by the Director General of Revenue Intelligence (DGRI) and the Director General of Anti-Evasion (DGAE). The DGRI deals with the evasion of customs duties: the DGAE with Excise duty evasion. Income Tax Department administers the Income Tax Act, Wealth Tax Act, etc. The CEIB is responsible for coordinating and strengthening the intelligence gathering activities and the investigative and enforcement actions of the various agencies responsible for investigation into economic offences and the enforcement of economic laws. The CEIB is responsible for maintaining liaison with the concerned Departments/Directorates both at the Center and at the State levels and is expected to provide overall direction to the investigative agencies under the Department of Revenue. The CEIB is expected, interalia, to attend to the following tasks: Identification of major sources generation black money: directing and developing intelligence about such sources: planning and coordinating action and operations against such sources. Assisting the various enforcement agencies in strengthening the intelligence gathering infrastructure and building up their capability for storage and retrieval of intelligence. Conducting investigative and analytical studies in difficult areas of black money operations and monitoring indicators thereof. This Directorate is concerned with the enforcement of the investigation and penal provision of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act; collection of intelligence relating to foreign exchange offences; enquires into suspected violations of the provisions of FERA etc. Narcotics Control Bureau The NCB is responsible for the administration of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Act. It is responsible for coordination with different Central and State Government Departments/Ministers and the various Central and State law enforcement agencies for the implementations of the NDPS Act. I explained to Secretary (Revenue) the broad considerations on account of which the Government had set up a committee to look into the linkages developed by the mafia elements. He informed me that he had recently held a meeting with senior representatives of the RBI, the Chairman CBEC, Chairman CBDT and the Economic Intelligence Council in the Department of Revenue, and readily agreed with my request to attend a meeting of the committee along with his concerned officers for a full discussion on the issue before the committee.

Accordingly, a meeting of the Committee (30th Aug. ’93) to hear the views of Secretary (Revenue), who was accompanied by chairman CBDT, DGRI, Members (Customs) and Director (Enforcement). During the course of the discussion with Secretary (Revenue) and his aforesaid principal officers, the following significant observations were made: In the normal course of his work, to detect violations of Customs & Exercise laws, the DGRI comes across information on linkages between crime Syndicates and governmental functionaries etc. As following up of such information is not within the charter of duties of DGRI, his officers focus primarily on the information relating to the violation of the laws relating to their charter. As in the case of DGRI, indirect information also becomes available to the CBDT about linkages. Here again, not being directly relating to their charter of responsibilities, the CBDT do not follow up such leads. While the NCB is specifically responsible for booking drug traffickers, with the increasing importance being given to Narco-terrorism, the NCB has been asked to gather further information so that the real kingpins in the narcotics trade can be apprehended. The Directorate of Enforcement comes across information on linkages and passed it on to the CBI and IB.

Of late, currency amounting to crores of rupees is being seized, invariably paced in suit-case and gunny bags. The Banks are reluctant to pass on information about account holders to CBDT and do not allow their officers to hold exploratory requires. While a certain amount of information is shared between the various organization under the Department of Revenue, and those under the MHA and Cabinet Secretariat, the exchanges are sporadic and limited. This is perhaps due to the fact that each concerned organization/agency is anxious to protect its sources and is apprehensive that a full sharing of all information might jeopardize its operations, on account of premature leakage of information. While DGRI, Director (Enforcement) and DG NCB are authorized to undertake phone tapping of suspected offenders, the DGRI has not Page 28 of 28 been allowed to enforce surveillance on the telephonic communications of political personalities. Senior police officers, even in the border States, are not trained or adequately informed of the work done by the Directorate of Enforcement, specially in regard to money laundering operations, information about the activities of drug traffickers is passed on by DG NCB to the concerned State Governments and their agencies. However, niggardly responses by the latter and prolonged delays in the disposal of cases before the Courts seriously hampers the effective functioning of the NCB. While the NDPS act prescribes the award of deterrent punishments to offenders the results are to the contrary. It is necessary that the directorates of prosecution in the State Governments are urgently brought under the control of the State Police. The Secretary (Revenue) stated that the field officers of his various Departments were faced with various problems, amongst which are: The utter inadequacy of the criminal justice system: cases are not heard timely: functioning of the Government lawyers is grossly inadequate: all this results in a low percentage of convictions and mild punishments. Unless the criminal justice system is geared up, the work of the enforcement agencies cannot be effective, the field officers of the various agencies of the Revenue Dept. are often pressurised by senior Government functionaries/political leaders, apparently at the behest of crime Syndicates/Mafia elements. Unless the field level officers are offered effective protection, they cannot be expected to maintain interest in vigorously pursuing action against the activities of such elements.

The Chairman, CBDT stated that the functioning of his officers is concerned, whenever they come into possession of any information regarding the violation of any other law, the pass it on the concerned agency. He suggested that, if the information available with the other agencies is passed on to him, his officers could pursue the same. As a result of the discussions held by the committee with the Secretary (Revenue) and his principal officers, it is evident that: While in the course of their normal activities, information on the linkages of the crime syndicates sometimes becomes available such information is not pursed on the score that is not directly related to offences falling within the laws administered by these agencies; such information is occasionally passed on by these agencies to the CBI and or IB; the various agencies under the Department of Revenue do not specifically search out information on the linkages of crime Syndicates. Consequent to the committee’s discussions with the Secretary (Revenue) and his principal officers held a series of further personal discussions with the Secretary (Revenue). At my request, Secretary (Revenue) gave me a personal note indicating his views, which are briefly as below. The information gathered by the various agencies under the Revenue Department, while gathering intelligence on offences relating to the laws administered by them, is generally not put to any use unless it is required to be passed on to other intelligence agencies outside the Department of Revenue. The linkages developed by crime Syndicates get generally confirmed when pressure is mounted on the concerned agencies not to take action against the offenders or to go slow in the case against them. Such pressures are amounted either immediately after a raid is conducted or at the time when prosecution is about to be initiated. Pressure is also exerted whenever corrupt and undesirable officers are shifted from sensitive assignments (Preventive Customs Divisions at the Airports, sensitive Collectorate in the Central Excise etc.) In the narcotics arena, which includes cultivation of opium, manufacture of alkaloids, prevention of narcotics, smuggling etc, the final stakes, are astronomically high.

Consequently, the level of corruption is a very high order in this area of functioning and enormous pressures are brought to bear even when subordinate officials are posted away, specially when the shift of an officer adversely affects the interests of those who are making easy money. Narcotics trade has world-wide network of smugglers who also have close links with terrorists. Terrorists indulge in narcotics trade to amass huge funds in various foreign currencies from which they source their procurement of weapons etc. While the Department of Revenue, has initiated a member of steps to deal with the activities of smugglers and to plug loop-holes in the system the Secretary (Revenue) has stated that a possible approach to effectively liquidating the linkages developed by the crime Syndicates would be to mercilessly prosecute the offenders without succumbing to any pressure whatsoever. He is of the view that once the offenders are deterrently punished under the law, their influence and strength will start declining, as also of all those who support them, wherever located. He has emphasized that for the objectives being achieved it will be extremely necessary that: the center governmental machinery involved in taking action against the crime Syndicates is allowed to perform its duties with total freedom; officer with impeccable integrity should be posted to head the various organizations, which are responsible for taking action against tax offenders, smuggling etc., such officers should be selected with utmost care and provided sufficiently long tenures, giving them the clear mandate to ruthlessly punish the offenders: action must be taken to ensure the objective functioning of Courts which deal with the trial of economic offences; all cases before the Courts should be speedily concluded without the judicial officers coming under any pressure or succumbing to temptations; insufficient and corrupt elements in the various organizations must be weeded out and Government should take stringent action against officers who seek to the exert political pressure for securing postings and appointments of their choice.

From the above narrated analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn: On the basis of the extensive experience gained by our various concerned intelligence, investigative and enforcement agencies, it is apparent that crime syndicates and mafia organizations have established themselves in various parts of the country. The various crime syndicates/mafia organizations have developed significant muscle and money power and established linkages with governmental functionaries, political leaders and others to be able to operate with impunity (as recently exemplified by the activities of the Memon Brothers and Dawood Ibrahim). While the CBI and IB and the various agencies under the Department of Revenue, in their normal course of functioning come across information relating to the linkages of crime syndicates/mafia organizations, there is presently no system under which they are expected to pass on such information to an identified nodal agency. Sharing of such information is presently of an occasional nature and no evidence is available of the same having been put to any operational use (the only mentionable exception perhaps relates to the recent investigations into the activities of Memon Brothers and the Dawood gang on which several of our agencies were put to work collectively). Even where an agency comes across certain information about the linkages of crime Syndicates, it has no mandate to immediately pass it on to one or more agencies. An agency which comes across information regarding linkages is also apprehensive that the sharing of such information may jeopardize its own functioning through premature leakage. In sum, the various agencies presently in the field take care to essentially focus on their respective character of duties, dealing with the infringement of laws relating to their organizations and consciously putting aside any information on linkages when they may come across. In the discussions in the committee, I asked each of the members as well as the Secretary (Revenue) and his principal officers about their views regarding the establishment of a Nodal Page 30 of 30 Agency for the collection, collation and operationalization of all information relating to the activities of crime Syndicates. Broadly, the following approaches have been mooted. The DIB has stated that while considering the establishment of any nodal mechanism, it must be appreciated that the problems have enormous impact on national security and is indeed highly political in nature. In this context, he has suggested that the nodal set up should be under the IB which is even otherwise engaged in monitoring various political activities having a bearing on national security. He has recommended that an exclusive Top-Secret Cell be established security in the IB to function as the Nodal Group for receipt of inputs from various operating difficulties could be sorted out their periodic meetings among the heads of these organization.

Reported by Padma Bhushan P. R. Dubhashi, IAS Retd.

Many influential leaders in Maharashtra and Gujarat during 1990s had developed close relations with underworld don Dawood Ibrahim and his henchman Iqbal Mirchi. This assertion was officially put down on paper when the N.N. Vohra committee submitted its report to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in 5 October 1993, roughly three months after it was established on 9 July 1993 in the aftermath of the 12 March 1993 Bombay bomb blasts.

Vohra was then the Union Home Secretary. While the contents of the report, that was subsequently made public on 1 August 1995 in Parliament, were only limited to 11 pages, it is a part of the government’s own records that the finding of the report, in total, was close to 100 pages. It is these 100 pages that were never made public, that have now become relevant, almost three decades after they were brought into existence.

The inputs given by the agency, at the time, had stated that there was a “definite” nexus between Dawood and a very big leader of Maharashtra since the late 1970s and as per their findings, this very prominent leader of the state got almost Rs 70 crore from Dawood till the 1993 blasts. The reports also mentioned how Rs 5 crore was given to another politician through hawala to help him in contesting the 1990 elections. The report also had the name of a “former CM”. Another input that is a part of the annexures of the Vohra committee report, showed how two tranches of Rs 5 crore each was given by Dawood in 1992 to a relative of a Chief Minister who later himself became a politician. The annexures, as the officials recall, have prominently mentioned the name of a very powerful leader from the Congress, who at that time was a mid-level operative, but is now among the top ten.

A former top IB officer said: “Gujarat-based leaders were prominently mentioned in the annexures. If the Home Minister decides to summon these annexures, if he has not seen them till now, he will find very familiar names in them. Every leader comes and makes statements on Dawood and Mirchi. The real test of intent is whether they have the guts to take action on the basis of what they already have the findings of the Vohra committee that are encompassed in the annexures.”

VOHRA REPORT AND AFTER

The Vohra Committee report has highlighted the manifold dimensions of the malaise of criminalisation of politics. The germs of this malaise took birth in 1969 when there was a split in the Congress and the guiding motto became the pursuit of power. The demand of money for party funds to contest elections paved the way, as was inevitable, to political corruption. The two vicious offshoots of the demand for money in the garb of election funds were the malady of political corruption and the scourge of black money. Political corruption acts as the foster-mother of administrative corruption. Corruption has the vicious tendency of percolating. Once it is there at the top, it is bound to filter down, spread wide and become ubiquitous. When an outcry was raised by some public men about the menace of corruption and its immensity, they were sought to be silenced on the ground that corruption prevailed in all countries. The fact that the extent of corruption in our country was much larger was simply brushed under the carpet. As things stands today, corruption has befouled the entire political and administrative apparatus of the country. Undoubtedly, earlier also, there was corruption but it was confined to officials at the lower level and the scale of corruption was also not high. As against that the malaise has now affected also those at the higher rung of administration and all factions of the State.

Subsequently, the criminals and mafia leaders felt that if they could get other elected, why should they not with, their grip and hold over a section of the population seek election for themselves. The result was that many of them contested elections and quite a number of them were elected. Some of them also came to occupy ministerial chairs. Things came to such a pass that according to newspaper reports, about 45 per cent of members of one State Legislature were those who were history-sheeters on the police records. Another fallout of criminalisation of politics has been the havoc brought in the administration of criminal justice. As things are, it has become most difficult, if not impossible, to secure the conviction of major culprits accused of serious offences such as murder, homicide, grievous hurt, intimidation and kidnapping. This is so because of interference by the political bosses in the investigation of crimes. As a result, effective investigation has to take a back seat and no serious effort is made to procure incriminating pieces of evidence. The question then arises on how to break the nexus between the criminals and politicians. It is thus necessary to evolve a code of conduct for the political parties so that they may not in the selection of candidates for election choose anyone with shady antecedents. The code of conduct, if it is not to remain a collection of pious sentiments, must be given some teeth. We should therefore give thought to (he idea of giving legal sanction to the prescribed code of conduct to prevent its violation and infraction,

Even in the absence of legal sanctions public opinion, reinforced by vigilant media, should be built up to impel the parties to adhere to the code of conduct in the selection of candidates. Denunciation of the malady of criminalisation of politics would remain confined to the theoretical plane, unless the identity of the politicians having close links with criminals Is brought out. The Vohra Committee has done the basic spade work and pointed out the various facets and dimensions of this malady of criminalisation of politics and how the mafia network was virtually running a parallel Government. The Government has, as a follow up action, appointed a Committee of Secretaries to look further into the matter with the help of intelligence services. This is bound to operate as a cover up. It would be wholly unrealistic and an exercise in sheer naivete to think that a committee of serving civil servants, however upright they may otherwise be, to name the politicians some of whom may be Ministers having close nexus with criminals. If we are earnest in the matter, the further task should be entrusted to a body of independent persons not subordinate to the Government. Indeed, the present attempt to cover up the identity of the culprits remains one of an earlier attempt which was made at the highest political level to cover up die identity of the recipients of kickbacks of the Bofors gun transaction. The attempts then being made to find out the identity of the recipients of that tainted money were sabotaged at the highest political level when our then External Affairs Minister accompanying the Prime Minister to Switzerland told the Swiss Government to go slow. As regards the malady of the money power, the need of the hour is to ensure audit of party funds by an independent agency such as the Comptroller & Auditor-General India. A system of the audit of party funds by -an independent agency already exists in countries such as Germany and ensures transparency of the monetary affairs of political parties. The country today is passing through moral crises because of the doings of politicians. This is so, despite the presence in the political arena of a number of persons of the highest integrity, attached to moral values, although unfortunately they belong to a diminishing tribe.

POLITICS & CRIME

Beyond Vohra Committee ( Report P. R. Dubhashi ) The Vohra Committee report on the criminalization of politics in India has been variously described as "a damp squib" and "a cat out of the bag". A damp squib, because it did not reveal any specific names of politicians but only stated in a general manner what has already been widely known and talked about for several years now. At the same time, it was "a cat out of the bag" because it was for the first time that an official report clearly brought out that (a) crime syndicates and mafia organizations have developed significant muscle and money power and (b) they were virtually running a parallel government pushing the State apparatus into irrelevance. This is a frightening admission to make for an official committee but it does not state how to "bell the cat", how the situation has to be dealt with, how criminalization of politics and government can be overcome and ultimately eliminated. All that it suggests is the setting up of a nodal agency which will provide one place where the intelligence and information relating to the activities of crime syndicates and mafia organizations gathered by different agencies like the Intelligence Bureau, Central Bureau of Investigation and various agencies under the Department of Revenue could be brought together and monitored, Lack of coordination between various administrative agencies is a well-known shortcoming of our administrative system and this holds good in our system of intelligence gathering also. An internal coordinating agency should be looked upon as a normal internal device of day-today working of administration and that such a device did not exist and had lo lie suggested by a committee is a sad reflection on the state of our administration. But we have to go beyond intelligence gathering. 'The purpose of intelligence gathering is to plumb the depths of criminalization, unravel its genesis, lay bare the root causes and work out comprehensive measures to root out corruption and criminalization in politics, government and administration. The Vohra Committee report does not indicate how this can be accomplished. The first step is to see that candidates who stand for elections to Parliament and Legislative Assemblies do not use the money and muscle power of criminals to get elected; nor criminals allowed to stand for election. The strict enforcement of the electoral code of conduct during the last State elections did serve this purpose, to a considerable extent, of curbing use of money and muscle power. Voters at large have welcomed this development and expect that this gain should be consolidated through similar strictness in future elections as well. The electoral law should be further strengthened so as to debar criminals from standing for elections. The strict enforcement of the electoral code of conduct is but part of the strict enforcement of the law of the land in every other sphere - whether urban building activity, trade, business and industry, working of banking and financial institutions, imports and exports or use of arms. These are spheres in which illegal activity by gangs of criminals has flourished during the last several years with the complicity of politicians in power and the civil servants. It is the duty of the civil servants to enforce law. If they do not do so, it is because they are pressured by corrupt politicians who are in league with criminals or have themselves become corrupt and join hands with criminal elements, In the latter case, they should be brought to book by the Vigilance Commissioner or Lokayukta who are appointed in several Stales. The vigilance machinery should be strengthened.

But honest civil servants are sometimes prevented from proper enforcement of the law and taking decisions in the public interest. Where the officers refuse to be pressured, they are subjected to abrupt and vexations transfers taking a heavy toll of their family lives. Governed by the rules of a strict code of conduct and discipline, the honest officer finds himself helpless, it is idle to talk of professionalism in such an environment. If the nation wants civil servants to be honest and play their role in a professional manner, they need more protection than is available now. They should not he exposed to arbitrary 'transfers and their careers should no! be ruined or jeopardized just for doing their duty. The public at large should also appreciate the importance of honest and strict administration, it should have its own autonomy and should function without political interference. Needless to say. that strict administration does not mean non-responsive administration.

Political interference on behalf of criminal elements is at present a worrisome feature of, our administration. It is necessary, therefore, to go beyond civil service and police reforms and extend the reforms process to political parties as well. At present political parties seem to be beyond the pale of any framework of rules and regulations. Taking advantage of this, criminal elements enter into and later dominate the affairs of political parties. Their youth wings seem to be especially vulnerable to the criminal and aggressive elements. How can the political parties be reformed? Neither the Constitution nor any law prescribes how they should function. The time has now come for laying down' broad norms for composition and functioning of political parties in the country. No less than a chapter in Constitution itself on the code of conduct of political parties can serve the purpose. Such a code of conduct could be on the lines of the prescriptions of the Nolan Committee in Britain - honesty, integrity, objectivity, openness and accountability. Honest administration can bring the culprits to book and prosecute them in courts of law - no matter who the culprits are and what positions they hold in public life. It is only through the relentless pursuit of criminal politicians by the honest prosecutors and intrepid judges that criminalization of politics has been halted in Italy. The crusades of those judges are a reflection of the public disgust and frustration of having to put up with corrupt politicians for so long. The trial of the former Prime Minister, Chiton Andreotti, for collusion with the mafia is the culminating point of this crusade. This powerful politician, 31 times Minister and seven times Prime Minister, is charged with having ordered the assassination of an over zealous journalist and colluded with mafia chiefs, even sending birthday and marriage presents to members of their families. The Italian case should provide an excellent example of how we should proceed to eliminate criminalization of politics in our own country. The ultimate remedy is. of course, awakening of the spirit of the people against criminalization of politics and government so that they do not fear criminals in politics and society and stand hold against them and their crimes, the time has now come to demand the setting up of a National Commission on ethics of public life for making comprehensive recommendations regarding an agenda of reform

Mafia running parallel Government

The Vohra Committee report tabled in Parliament on 1st August 1995: The Government had established a committee comprised as below, to take stock of all available information about the activities of crime syndicates mafia organization which had developed links with and were being protected by Government functionaries and political personalities. Based on the recommendations of the committee, Government shall determine the need, if any, to establish a special organization/agency to regularly collect information and pursue cases against such elements: Home Secretary Chairman: Secretary (R) Member: DIB Member: Director CBI Member and JS(PP) MHA Member Secretary. The Committee was authorized to invite senior officers of various concerned Departments to gather the required information. The Special Secretary (Internal Security & Police), MHA, was subsequently added as a Member of the Committee. The committee was desired to submit its report within 3 months. In the first meeting of the committee (held on 15th July ’93), the Government had established the committee after seeing the reports of our intelligence and investigation agencies on the activities/linkages of the Dawood Ibrahim gang, consequent to the bomb blasts in Bombay in March 1993. From these various reports, it was apparent that the activities of the Memon brothers and Dawood Ibrahim had progressed over the years, leading to the establishment of a powerful network. This could not have happened without these elements having been protected by the functionaries of the concerned Government departments, especially Customs, Income Tax, Police and others. It was, therefore, necessary to identify the linkages and to also determine how such information could be timely collected and acted upon in the future. In the course of the discussions, some of the Members appeared to have some hesitation in openly expressing their views and also seemed unconvinced that the Government actually intended to pursue such matters.

Accordingly, the various offices abroad of this Agency have a limited strength and are largely geared to the collection of militaries, economic, scientific and political intelligence. R&AW monitor the activities of certain organizations abroad only insofar as they relate to their involvement with narco-terrorist elements and smuggling arms, ammunition, explosives etc. into the country. It does not monitor the activities of criminal elements abroad which are mainly confined to “normal smuggling without any links to terrorist elements.” The present strength of the Agency’s offices abroad would not permit to enlarge its field of activities. If, however, there is evidence to suggest that these organizations have links with Intelligence agencies of other countries, particularly Pakistan, and that they are being used or are likely to be used by such countries for de-establishing our economy, it would become R&AW’s responsibility to monitor their activities as is being done by this Agencies to collect vital information in regard to the investigations in the Bombay bomb blasts case. The creation of a nodal agency to collect information regarding the activities of mafia organizations is very essential. All the existing information/data available with R&AW, IB and CBI could be made available to this nodal agency. R&AW will nominate an officer of suitable rank to liaise with the nodal agency on a regular basis to enable expeditious follow up action. Crime Syndicate A report on the nexus between the Bombay city police and the Bombay under-world was prepared by CBI in 1986. It would be useful to institute a fresh study by CBI, on the basis of which appropriate administrative/legal measures could be initiated. An organized crime syndicate/mafia generally commences its activities by indulging in petty crime at the local level, mostly relating to illicit distillation/gambling/organized satta and prostitution in the larger towns. In port towns, their activities involve smuggling and sale of imported goods and progressively graduate to narcotics drug trafficking. In the bigger cities, the main source of income relates to real estate - forcibly occupying lands/buildings, procuring such properties at cheap rates by forcing out the existing occupants/tenants etc. over time, the money power thus acquired is used for building up contacts with bureaucrats and politicians and expansion of activities with impunity. The money power is used to develop a network of muscle-power which is also used by the politicians during elections.

The CBI has reported that all over India crimes syndicates have become a law unto themselves. Even in the smaller towns and rural areas, muscle-men have become the order of the day. Hired assassins have become a part of these organizations. The nexus between the criminal gangs, police, bureaucracy and politicians has come out clearly in various part of the country. The existing criminal justice system, which was essentially designed to deal with the individual offences/crimes, is unable to deal with the activities of the mafia: the provisions of law in regard to economic offences are weak: there are insurmountable legal difficulties in attaching/confiscation of the property acquired through mafia activities. It has been suggested that the menace has first to be tackled at the local level where the agencies of the State and the concerned Central Enforcement Agencies like Customs and Exercise, Income Tax would be required to take effective action. In case where a crime syndicate has graduated to big business, it would be necessary to conduct detailed investigations into its assets, both movable and immovable. It has been stressed that when such action is not timely and effectively taken, the lower functionaries of the concerned State and Central Departments/organizations start overlooking the activities of the crime syndicates.

To elucidate the point, the Director CBI has given the example of Iqbal Mirchi of Bombay who, till the late 80’s was merely a visitor to passenger and carrier ships to obtain liquor and cigarettes for selling the same at a profit. In the last 3-4 years, Mirchi acquired real estate valuing crores of rupees; he has many bank accounts and has been paying lakhs of rupees to his careers. The growth of Mirchi is due to the fact that the concerned Enforcement agencies did not take timely action against him and, later, this perhaps became difficult on account of the enormous patronage that he had developed. If Mirchi is investigated, the entire patronage enjoyed by him and his linkages will come to light. The Director, CBI has observed that there are many such cases, as that of Mirchi where the initials failure has led to the emergence of Mafia giants who have become too big to be tackled. The CBI director has stated that the main mode of communications/contacts of the mafias operating at the international level is through telephonic communications. Referring to the useful leads emerging from the investigations into the activities of Dawood Ibrahim, a mafia leader, the director. CBI has stated that the effective monitoring of the telephone calls made from India/received from abroad would yield useful information and, for this being done, the Government may grant sanction to monitor certain telephone connections. The assistance of banks is an essential input. The Bank Managers can be placed under obligation to render reports on all heavy transactions and suspicious accounts to the Enforcement agencies. Such a practice obtains in U.K. Concluding his analysts, the Director, CBI has made the following suggestions to bring under control the activities of the criminal syndicates: identification of offences and award of deterrent punishments, including preventive detention: trial procedures should be simplified and hastened: surveillance should be carried out through finger printing, photographs and dossiers; monitoring mechanisms should be established at the State and Central levels; establishment of Special Cells in the State CIDs and CBI: suitable amendments should be introduced in the existing laws to more effectively deal with the activities of mafia organizations, etc., this would also include review of the existing laws and a detailed case study of 10-15 cases would provide useful information regarding the administrative/legal measures which would be required to be taken to effectively tackle the functioning of mafia organizations.

The DIB has reported that due to the progressive decline in the values of public life in the country “warning signals of sinister linkages between the underworld politicians and bureaucracy have been evident with disturbing regularity as exemplified by the exposures of the networks of the Bombay blast case”. He has recommended immediate attention to: identification of the nexus between the criminals/mafias and anti-national elements on the one hand and bureaucrats, politicians and other sensitively located individuals on the other; identification of the nature and dimensions of these linkages and the modus operandi of their operations: assessment of the impact of these linkages of the various institutions viz. the electoral, political, economic, law and order and the administrative apparatus: nexus, if any, between the domestic linkages with foreign intelligence; necessary action to show effective action to counteract/neutralize the mafia activities and political and legal constraints in dealing with the covert/illegal functioning of the linkages. Like the Director, CBI, the DIB has also stated that there has been a rapid spread the growth of criminal gangs, armed senas, drug mafias, smuggling gangs, drug peddlers and economic lobbies in the country which have, over the years developed an extensive network of contacts with the bureaucrats/Government functionaries at the local levels, politicians, media persons and strategically located individuals in the non-State sector. Some of these syndicates also have international linkages, including the foreign intelligence agencies. In this context, the DIB has given the following examples: in certain States, like Bihar, Haryana and U.P., these gangs enjoy the patronage of local level politicians, cutting across party lines and the protection of Government functionaries. Some political leaders become the leaders of these gangs/armed senas and over the years, get themselves elected to local bodies, State Assemblies and the national Parliament. Resultantly, such elements have acquired considerable political clout seriously jeopardizing the smooth functioning of the administration and the safety of life and property of the common man, causing a sense of despair and alienation among the people: the big smuggling syndicates, having international linkages, have spread into and infected the various economic and financial activities, including hawala transactions, circulation of black money and operations of a vicious parallel economy causing serious damage to the economic fiber of the country. These syndicates have acquired substantial financial and muscle power and social respectability and have successfully corrupted the Government machinery at the levels and yield enough influence to make the task of Investigating and Prosecuting agencies extremely difficult; even the members of the judicial system have not escaped the embrace of the mafia: certain elements of the Mafia have shifted to narcotics, drugs and weapon smuggling and established narco-terrorism networks, specially in the States of J& K, Punjab, Gujarat and Maharashtra. The cost of contesting elections has thrown the politician into the lap of these elements and led to a grave compromise by officials of the preventive/defective system. The virus has spread to almost all the centers in the country: the costal and the border States have been particularly affected: the Bombay bomb blast case and the communal riots in Surat and Ahmedabad have demonstrated how the Indian underworld had been exploited by the Pak, ISI and the latter’s network in UAE to cause sabotage, subversion and communal tension in various parts of the country.

The investigations into the Bombay bomb blast cases have revealed extensive linkages of the underworld in the various governmental agencies, political circles, business sector and the film world. The DIB has stated that the network of the mafia is virtually running a parallel Government, pushing the State apparatus into irrelevance. It is thus most immediately necessary than an institution is established to effectively deal with the menace. In this connection, the DIB has stated: presently, there is no system/mechanism which is specifically designated to collect and collate intelligence pertaining to the linkages developed by crime syndicates mafia with the Government set up. Nonetheless, the various intelligence/investigation/enforcement agencies collect, in the normal course of their functioning, information about the nexus between the bureaucracy and politicians with the mafia gangs, smugglers and the underworld. These agencies use such available inputs “only within the narrow confines of their work charter and choose not to take undue cognizance and follow-up action, leave alone sharing with any other agencies.” Thus, all these agencies “functioning within their own cocoons, with the result that a plethora of information falls to get specific and purposeful attention needed for the exposure of the linkages.” It is, therefore, necessary to immediately have an institutionalized system which “while giving total freedom to the various agencies pursue their charter of work, would simultaneously cast on them the onus of sharing such inputs to a nodal outfit whose job will be to process this information for attention of a single designated authority.” This will enable the Nodal Group to provide useful leads to the various to the various agencies and, over time, a progressive data base will get generated “to facilitate periodic reviews and analysis which could then be passed to a designated body.”

Central Board of Excise & Customs (CBEC) Interalia, CBEC is responsible for the prevention of smuggling. In this and other tasks, it is assisted by the Director General of Revenue Intelligence (DGRI) and the Director General of Anti-Evasion (DGAE). The DGRI deals with the evasion of customs duties: the DGAE with Excise duty evasion. Income Tax Department administers the Income Tax Act, Wealth Tax Act, etc. The CEIB is responsible for coordinating and strengthening the intelligence gathering activities and the investigative and enforcement actions of the various agencies responsible for investigation into economic offences and the enforcement of economic laws. The CEIB is responsible for maintaining liaison with the concerned Departments/Directorates both at the Center and at the State levels and is expected to provide overall direction to the investigative agencies under the Department of Revenue. The CEIB is expected, interalia, to attend to the following tasks: Identification of major sources generation black money: directing and developing intelligence about such sources: planning and coordinating action and operations against such sources. Assisting the various enforcement agencies in strengthening the intelligence gathering infrastructure and building up their capability for storage and retrieval of intelligence. Conducting investigative and analytical studies in difficult areas of black money operations and monitoring indicators thereof. This Directorate is concerned with the enforcement of the investigation and penal provision of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act; collection of intelligence relating to foreign exchange offences; enquires into suspected violations of the provisions of FERA etc. Narcotics Control Bureau The NCB is responsible for the administration of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Act. It is responsible for coordination with different Central and State Government Departments/Ministers and the various Central and State law enforcement agencies for the implementations of the NDPS Act. I explained to Secretary (Revenue) the broad considerations on account of which the Government had set up a committee to look into the linkages developed by the mafia elements. He informed me that he had recently held a meeting with senior representatives of the RBI, the Chairman CBEC, Chairman CBDT and the Economic Intelligence Council in the Department of Revenue, and readily agreed with my request to attend a meeting of the committee along with his concerned officers for a full discussion on the issue before the committee.

Accordingly, a meeting of the Committee (30th Aug. ’93) to hear the views of Secretary (Revenue), who was accompanied by chairman CBDT, DGRI, Members (Customs) and Director (Enforcement). During the course of the discussion with Secretary (Revenue) and his aforesaid principal officers, the following significant observations were made: In the normal course of his work, to detect violations of Customs & Exercise laws, the DGRI comes across information on linkages between crime Syndicates and governmental functionaries etc. As following up of such information is not within the charter of duties of DGRI, his officers focus primarily on the information relating to the violation of the laws relating to their charter. As in the case of DGRI, indirect information also becomes available to the CBDT about linkages. Here again, not being directly relating to their charter of responsibilities, the CBDT do not follow up such leads. While the NCB is specifically responsible for booking drug traffickers, with the increasing importance being given to Narco-terrorism, the NCB has been asked to gather further information so that the real kingpins in the narcotics trade can be apprehended. The Directorate of Enforcement comes across information on linkages and passed it on to the CBI and IB.

Of late, currency amounting to crores of rupees is being seized, invariably paced in suit-case and gunny bags. The Banks are reluctant to pass on information about account holders to CBDT and do not allow their officers to hold exploratory requires. While a certain amount of information is shared between the various organization under the Department of Revenue, and those under the MHA and Cabinet Secretariat, the exchanges are sporadic and limited. This is perhaps due to the fact that each concerned organization/agency is anxious to protect its sources and is apprehensive that a full sharing of all information might jeopardize its operations, on account of premature leakage of information. While DGRI, Director (Enforcement) and DG NCB are authorized to undertake phone tapping of suspected offenders, the DGRI has not Page 28 of 28 been allowed to enforce surveillance on the telephonic communications of political personalities. Senior police officers, even in the border States, are not trained or adequately informed of the work done by the Directorate of Enforcement, specially in regard to money laundering operations, information about the activities of drug traffickers is passed on by DG NCB to the concerned State Governments and their agencies. However, niggardly responses by the latter and prolonged delays in the disposal of cases before the Courts seriously hampers the effective functioning of the NCB. While the NDPS act prescribes the award of deterrent punishments to offenders the results are to the contrary. It is necessary that the directorates of prosecution in the State Governments are urgently brought under the control of the State Police. The Secretary (Revenue) stated that the field officers of his various Departments were faced with various problems, amongst which are: The utter inadequacy of the criminal justice system: cases are not heard timely: functioning of the Government lawyers is grossly inadequate: all this results in a low percentage of convictions and mild punishments. Unless the criminal justice system is geared up, the work of the enforcement agencies cannot be effective, the field officers of the various agencies of the Revenue Dept. are often pressurised by senior Government functionaries/political leaders, apparently at the behest of crime Syndicates/Mafia elements. Unless the field level officers are offered effective protection, they cannot be expected to maintain interest in vigorously pursuing action against the activities of such elements.

The Chairman, CBDT stated that the functioning of his officers is concerned, whenever they come into possession of any information regarding the violation of any other law, the pass it on the concerned agency. He suggested that, if the information available with the other agencies is passed on to him, his officers could pursue the same. As a result of the discussions held by the committee with the Secretary (Revenue) and his principal officers, it is evident that: While in the course of their normal activities, information on the linkages of the crime syndicates sometimes becomes available such information is not pursed on the score that is not directly related to offences falling within the laws administered by these agencies; such information is occasionally passed on by these agencies to the CBI and or IB; the various agencies under the Department of Revenue do not specifically search out information on the linkages of crime Syndicates. Consequent to the committee’s discussions with the Secretary (Revenue) and his principal officers held a series of further personal discussions with the Secretary (Revenue). At my request, Secretary (Revenue) gave me a personal note indicating his views, which are briefly as below. The information gathered by the various agencies under the Revenue Department, while gathering intelligence on offences relating to the laws administered by them, is generally not put to any use unless it is required to be passed on to other intelligence agencies outside the Department of Revenue. The linkages developed by crime Syndicates get generally confirmed when pressure is mounted on the concerned agencies not to take action against the offenders or to go slow in the case against them. Such pressures are amounted either immediately after a raid is conducted or at the time when prosecution is about to be initiated. Pressure is also exerted whenever corrupt and undesirable officers are shifted from sensitive assignments (Preventive Customs Divisions at the Airports, sensitive Collectorate in the Central Excise etc.) In the narcotics arena, which includes cultivation of opium, manufacture of alkaloids, prevention of narcotics, smuggling etc, the final stakes, are astronomically high.

Consequently, the level of corruption is a very high order in this area of functioning and enormous pressures are brought to bear even when subordinate officials are posted away, specially when the shift of an officer adversely affects the interests of those who are making easy money. Narcotics trade has world-wide network of smugglers who also have close links with terrorists. Terrorists indulge in narcotics trade to amass huge funds in various foreign currencies from which they source their procurement of weapons etc. While the Department of Revenue, has initiated a member of steps to deal with the activities of smugglers and to plug loop-holes in the system the Secretary (Revenue) has stated that a possible approach to effectively liquidating the linkages developed by the crime Syndicates would be to mercilessly prosecute the offenders without succumbing to any pressure whatsoever. He is of the view that once the offenders are deterrently punished under the law, their influence and strength will start declining, as also of all those who support them, wherever located. He has emphasized that for the objectives being achieved it will be extremely necessary that: the center governmental machinery involved in taking action against the crime Syndicates is allowed to perform its duties with total freedom; officer with impeccable integrity should be posted to head the various organizations, which are responsible for taking action against tax offenders, smuggling etc., such officers should be selected with utmost care and provided sufficiently long tenures, giving them the clear mandate to ruthlessly punish the offenders: action must be taken to ensure the objective functioning of Courts which deal with the trial of economic offences; all cases before the Courts should be speedily concluded without the judicial officers coming under any pressure or succumbing to temptations; insufficient and corrupt elements in the various organizations must be weeded out and Government should take stringent action against officers who seek to the exert political pressure for securing postings and appointments of their choice.

From the above narrated analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn: On the basis of the extensive experience gained by our various concerned intelligence, investigative and enforcement agencies, it is apparent that crime syndicates and mafia organizations have established themselves in various parts of the country. The various crime syndicates/mafia organizations have developed significant muscle and money power and established linkages with governmental functionaries, political leaders and others to be able to operate with impunity (as recently exemplified by the activities of the Memon Brothers and Dawood Ibrahim). While the CBI and IB and the various agencies under the Department of Revenue, in their normal course of functioning come across information relating to the linkages of crime syndicates/mafia organizations, there is presently no system under which they are expected to pass on such information to an identified nodal agency. Sharing of such information is presently of an occasional nature and no evidence is available of the same having been put to any operational use (the only mentionable exception perhaps relates to the recent investigations into the activities of Memon Brothers and the Dawood gang on which several of our agencies were put to work collectively). Even where an agency comes across certain information about the linkages of crime Syndicates, it has no mandate to immediately pass it on to one or more agencies. An agency which comes across information regarding linkages is also apprehensive that the sharing of such information may jeopardize its own functioning through premature leakage. In sum, the various agencies presently in the field take care to essentially focus on their respective character of duties, dealing with the infringement of laws relating to their organizations and consciously putting aside any information on linkages when they may come across. In the discussions in the committee, I asked each of the members as well as the Secretary (Revenue) and his principal officers about their views regarding the establishment of a Nodal Page 30 of 30 Agency for the collection, collation and operationalization of all information relating to the activities of crime Syndicates. Broadly, the following approaches have been mooted. The DIB has stated that while considering the establishment of any nodal mechanism, it must be appreciated that the problems have enormous impact on national security and is indeed highly political in nature. In this context, he has suggested that the nodal set up should be under the IB which is even otherwise engaged in monitoring various political activities having a bearing on national security. He has recommended that an exclusive Top-Secret Cell be established security in the IB to function as the Nodal Group for receipt of inputs from various operating difficulties could be sorted out their periodic meetings among the heads of these organization.

Reported by Padma Bhushan P. R. Dubhashi, IAS Retd.