China has enjoyed showing its thumb to the world and in a brazen display of insensitivity, it recently allowed a mass beach party to take place in the city of Wuhan, the epicentre of the contagion that is ravaging the lungs of people across the world as well as the global economy. Stock markets worldwide are in a tumble once again as renewed curbs across Europe, following a resurgence of the pandemic, cast a shadow on economic activity that was picking up pace. The cascading impact hit D Street, too, as foreign portfolio investors and domestic institutions dumped shares, plunging graphs southwards. And although our market has recovered by about 50 per cent from the lows of March, it is still patchy and any decelerator sends it crashing too. Large countries like the UK as well as several cities and states across the US are being forced into another round of lockdown to prevent a devastating “second wave,” which means shuttering businesses that had opened. In India, while numbers have stabilised, albeit with lower testing numbers as well as evidence that district and city level officials are restricting testing deliberately, the pandemic appears to have become a fact of life with most cities whirring back. In Kerala, the State Government is allowing asymptomatic workers to return to their jobs in a secluded work zone. Yet, full steam ahead is quite a way off. While the impending festive season and the action in the Indian Premier League (IPL) will bring a spending boost, the levels will be nowhere close to those of past years. The problem is while businesses aren’t completely dysfunctional, allowed as they are to operate freely in non-restricted areas, they are inter-connected to supply and distribution chains across States. Stalling of operations in one hub in a badly-hit State is bound to affect others as the cascading effect slows down the sector a particular business is into, and thereby grunts the overall economy. With attendance and production capacity affected by restrictions, some sectors cannot even take off optimally. Bengaluru is a prime example. With most IT workers having left the city through a series of lockdowns, they returned in waves, thereby, slowing down the  desired momentum for recovery. All such micro-blocks are threatening to disrupt the little gains made in reviving the economy. A slew of economic relief measures, too, has failed to inspire confidence among businesses as corporate finances remain squeezed, sales have not regained momentum and demand remains low. Even the amount allocated for bailing out MSMEs remains largely undistributed.

As some have described it, 2020 is a lost year, a year spent bleeding and that can only stop next year. Anyway the process of full recovery will not start before 2022. That said, others are still quite hopeful of a rebound economy and while expecting numbers to be lower than before, they feel they would be fairly decent. Many of these people are seen in the stock exchanges betting big. The rise in the price of many major stocks despite the lost first and insipid second quarters of the year was a sign that some would hold out long-term. As long as COVID-19 is around, there will be a continuing drop in demand and supply chain inconsistencies. Besides, there are sectoral spurts while the economy as a whole needs to stabilise. Given the Government’s long-range structural reforms, stimulus and relief by RBI, many investors are still using the volatility to their advantage by focussing on long-term prospects and asset allocation and choosing to build a solid portfolio. While many Indians do not have a choice but to live with the virus, some nations might prioritise differently. That said, it appears that the virus will keep on coming back. If we are to learn anything from the 1919-1920 Spanish flu epidemic, it is that it just took time to eliminate it. Vaccines did not exist then. But a price of asking for time will be that the economic bleeding might last longer and many worry that a body without any blood is not worth saving. So, will 2021 also be frightening year? It is a question worth asking now. Global ratings agency Fitch has already estimated that the Indian economy is expected to contract by 10.5 per cent in 2020-21. And while industry federations are hopeful that growth can be expedited through continued government support and hand-holding of businesses during this crisis, they are still cautiously optimistic about full capacity utilisation. This is going to be a long road to recovery.

(Courtesy: The Pioneer)

Responding to the pandemic, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had “permitted” banks to grant moratorium on payment of instalments of term loans due after March 1 up to August 31. A similar dispensation was “allowed” on recovery of interest on working capital. The moratorium was initially permitted up to the end of April and 55.1 per cent of customers of Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs), accounting for 50 per cent of outstanding credit, had availed this facility. In Public Sector Banks (PSBs), 80.3 per cent of all individual customers, accounting for 80 per cent of total outstanding individual loans, opted for the moratorium. A whopping 74 per cent of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) borrowers and 28.8 per cent of corporate borrowers, covering 81.5 per cent and 58 per cent (by outstanding amount in category loans), availed the facility.

For private banks, 41.8 per cent of individual customers, accounting for 80 per cent of outstanding individual loans, and 20.9 per cent of all MSME customers opted for moratoriums, comprising 42.5 per cent of outstanding loans to MSMEs. About 21.6 per cent of corporate borrowers, covering 19.6 per cent of total outstanding corporate loans, had availed the facility.

The Supreme Court has extended the moratorium and the Central Government has appointed an expert panel to look into the issue. Exactly how many loans accounts and what loan amount is under moratorium are not known. Some borrowers may have decided against seeking the moratorium facility due to uncertainty about relief on interest. Had the interest relief been announced upfront, almost all borrowers would have instantly opted for the moratorium, except possibly for borrowers too proud of their financial standing to seek any relief.

Since the verdict of the apex court was not available by August 31, it was the borrowers’ call to take a wager on the verdict and decide whether to opt for a moratorium or not. It is unclear if the relief, if and when granted, would be available only to those availing of the moratorium. Overall, the system lacks incentives for those remaining fully compliant while the non-compliant people may hope to get some relief. Had the interest relief been a matter of legal right under the Banking Regulation or Disaster Management Acts, it would have been through by now. The Disaster Management Act (DMA), empowering the Government to take immediate relief and rescue measures, cannot be over-read to give it unfettered powers to deal with the full economic fallout of the disaster. It certainly does not empower the Government to alter terms of private contracts on jobs, rentals, sales, lending and so on. That explains why the tone and tenor of parts of the “orders” issued under the DMA is not peremptory, prescriptive, definitive but indicative, persuasive and advisory in nature. Hence, legally binding orders regarding timely payment of full salaries, non-recovery of rent and school fees and so on could not be issued for this reason. Appeals to good conscience is a different matter.

Likewise, the Banking Regulation Act (BR Act) would by itself not confer any rights on the RBI to mandate any alteration in individual contracts entered into by the banks unless supplemented with legal remedies under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act (SARFAESI Act) or the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). Appropriately, the RBI has “permitted” grants of moratorium while extending regulatory forbearance on recognition of the non-performing asset (NPA).  The BR Act does not empower the RBI to mandate changing loan terms already contracted. Loan contracts can be changed only on the orders of insolvency courts. Mandatory moratorium requires more than the BR Act.

There are no free lunches in economics except those paid for by others. If borrowers get interest relief during the moratorium period, bank investors and depositors would stand to lose unless compensated by the Government, like it happens in farm loan waivers. Charity at others’ expense is systemic. Relief to borrowers at the expense of depositors is akin to relief to consumers ending up suppressing remunerative market prices for farmers.The bank depositors are also adversely impacted by the pandemic-induced fall in interest rates that stand to benefit new borrowers as well as the borrowers who are able to refinance high-cost old loans. The post-outbreak rate cuts and liquidity infusion by the RBI, aided by rising foreign exchange reserves, has caused a precipitous fall in interest rates. Some are offering record-low home loan interest rates under seven per cent per annum with new products of repo-linked home loans on offer. Low interest rates bring cheer to borrowers but gloom to depositors.

There are no fiscal guarantees to depositors on minimum interest rates and the IBC haircuts have been too costly in some cases. When corporate borrowers get a tax reduction bonanza, they don’t share the booty with lenders as they are not obliged to. When farm loans are waived, Governments provide fiscal support to banks but at present the Centre does not seem able and willing to compensate the banks for interest relief.

In the absence of fully disaggregated data on different types of loans under moratorium, a back-of-the-envelope quantification of the impact of interest relief can be Rs 1 lakh crore per month, assuming interest relief to be about one per cent per month on total pre-pandemic outstanding credit of about Rs 100 lakh crore. Even direct fiscal relief to the general population is not of this magnitude.

Financial stakes on the Supreme Court’s verdict are very high. The interest relief has been sought from the highest court of justice precisely because it is not a legal right. The golden balance of justice is being watched by distressed borrowers and anxious depositors. All borrowers are not equally distressed by the pandemic. Some differentiating criterion based on quantum of liability outstanding on March 1 and  purpose of loan (whether educational; for first home/car or second one, for the Economically Weaker Section or affordable housing, past credit history) and proven impact of the contagion on income can be evolved to give relief to a truly needy class of borrowers. The relief even to this subset should not be entirely a burden on bank depositors. Ideally such relief is best provided by governments under fiscal stimulus paid by taxpayers, current or future.

The need to maintain the health of banks can hardly be overemphasised. Deep-rooted socio-cultural beliefs stigmatising indebtedness (indebted person embarrassed and lenders reviled ) continue to change worldwide.

Post World War, the wheels of growth are lubricated by the continuous supply of credit. India joined the borrow/spend bandwagon in the 80s. Lending by Scheduled Commercial Banks rose from Rs 8,64,300 crore (30 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product [GDP]) at the end of March 2004 to Rs 67,35,200 crore at the end of March 2014 (60 per cent of the GDP). At present, bank lending is only about 50 per cent of the GDP.

As on July 31, the total deposits of SCBs were Rs 141,61,689 crore (Rs 127,44,583 crore a year ago); outstanding credit was Rs 102,65,888 crore (Rs 97,29,002 crore a year ago) and investments were Rs 42,78,294 crore (Rs 35,57,063 crore a year ago). The combined effect of risk aversion of banks to lend and predominantly domestic financing of fiscal deficit is that only about two-third of deposits get lent to non-Government entities.

We have made great strides in terms of expanding the reach of banking services and financialisation of savings but high-profile delinquencies by those who can afford to pay continue to eclipse these achievements.

The gross NPA of SCBs that had peaked to 11.2 per cent in 2017-18 has been brought down to 8.5 per cent by March. This achievement is at great cost to bank investors/depositors on account of hefty haircuts following not-so-competitive slump sales of distressed companies under the conventional, single round bidding system being followed under the IBC. The RBI has assessed that the gross NPA of all SCBs may increase from 8.5 per cent in March to 12.5 per cent by March 2021 and even to 14.7 per cent if the adverse economic impact of the pandemic is very severe. Seeing the plight of forecasting tools, the economic fallout of the contagion is hard to predict and measure.

Since bank lending is only about 50 per cent of the GDP and post-pandemic recovery would require a heavy dose of credit, it is imperative to maintain incentives for financial savings.

Erosion of bank profitability runs the risk of dire consequences of de-finacialisation or informalisation of savings, derailing the hard-won recovery. The banking system needs calibrated support to prevent relapse into transmitted sickness.

(The writer is a retired IAAS officer and former  Special Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry.)

Patients who have ostensibly recovered from a bout of Covid-19 are reporting strange traits. CNN’s flamboyant business correspondent Richard Quest, who fought off the disease during its initial days, recently said that he has not felt quite the same. The virus might have made him more clumsy. Others tormented by the disease are reporting reduced lung function, some have been left diabetic and yet others afflicted with brain damage. But what about the patient called the Indian economy? Although mortality rates, we are told, are under check, it seems those hit by the economy going into a tailspin will soon outnumber those directly impacted by the disease. With demand taking a tumble, economic activity in the first quarter of the current fiscal dropped a scarcely believable 23 per cent.

Were matters made worse by the seeming ineptitude of the doctors treating the economy? To be fair, no doctor, medical or economic, has really managed to conquer the disease and its effects, but some have dealt with it better than others. Could those overseeing the Indian economy have done a better job? Much has been written about this and many constructive as well as several idiotic suggestions have been made. However, it is no secret that our economy was already close to stalling before the virus from Wuhan spread across the world. While Narendra Modi’s appeal remains strong with the masses, there is a growing degree of frustration among many about the handling of the economy by him and his team of ministers, bureaucrats and even bankers. Make no mistake, the Reserve Bank of India, by holding onto its cash reserves, even though what the economy is going through is the archetypal definition of a ‘rainy day’, has not helped the situation.

Yes, there has been an uptick in demand in July and August and some believe that by the end of September we will get a clearer idea of the situation for better or for worse. Wholesale dispatches by the larger automobile manufacturers have picked up of late. While the retail offtake has remained steady, the expectation is the festive season will see a pick-up in consumer demand powered by the rural economy. But even then, the damage might be long-lasting. Millions of white collar and blue collar workers from the formal economy have lost their jobs and many of those will not return, as some sectors such as aviation and hospitality are almost certain to require years to recover to 2019 levels. Others like the media might never be the same again. That said, there is opportunity in adversity. After all, a bounce-back in 2021 even to 2019 levels will mean that the 23 per cent decline might become a 30 per cent climb next year. It is darkest before the storm ends.

Courtesy: Editorial: The Pioneer

The idea of ending fratricidal tax competition among States and creating a common market in India across State borders was mooted by the Bhairon Singh Shekhawat Committee (1995). If sovereign nations of Europe could do it, we could do as well. So the Goods and Services Tax (GST) was implemented from July 2017 with the underlying vision of “one nation, one tax, one nation, one market.” The States had agreed to an all-India common slab for particular items, thereby surrendering the power to tax the items at a rate of their own choice.

GST changed the principle of indirect taxation from originating/producing States to the destination/consuming States. The benefit of GST collection accruing to the State, where the final sale takes place, was seen as a loss by the producing States. The GST took so long to materialise mainly because the States were apprehensive not just about the loss of power to tax but also of revenue. It was challenging to convince all the Governments to agree to a common tax rate on a particular item, superseding multiple Central/State/local taxes like Central Excise Duty, Central Sales Tax, Value Added Tax, Sales Tax, Purchase Tax, Tax on Works Contracts, Entry Tax, Octroi and so on, which were discontinued and subsumed in GST.

To assuage the anxieties about potential loss of revenue, a revenue protection guarantee backed by law was agreed to. The revenue to be protected is calculated by assuming 14 per cent per annum growth over the tax collection in 2015-16 from the taxes subsumed in the GST. Accordingly, the GST (Compensation to States) Act, 2017 mandates the Centre to levy a GST compensation cess over and above the GST. The cess is at present levied on certain luxury and sin goods such as cigarettes and tobacco products, paan masala, caffeinated beverages, high-end passenger vehicles and so on. The guaranteed compensation period is five years from the commencement of GST (July 1, 2017).

In 2018-19, the Centre had collected Rs 4,57,535 crore as Central GST, Rs 28,947 crore as Integrated GST and Rs 95,081 crore as GST compensation cess. For 2019-20, the corresponding figures (all provisional) are Rs 496,699 crore, Rs 9,186 crore and Rs 95,551 crore. A total amount of  Rs 81,141 crore was released as compensation to States in 2018-19 but the compensation requirement for 2019-20 has nearly doubled to Rs 1,65,000 crore. GST revenue was already below target even before Covid-19 and the pandemic is set to further enhance the compensation requirement for 2020-21 and beyond. The States’ monthly protected revenue, which was Rs 49,020 crore for 2018-19 and Rs 55,882 crore for 2019-20, has risen to Rs 63,706 crore in 2020-21.

A prolonged lockdown, suspension of train, metro and air services, and subsequent behavioural changes are expected to seriously dent demand for goods and services in various sectors, especially exports, tourism, hospitality and outdoor entertainment. Estimates of likely compression of demand vary widely depending on the observer’s outlook, pessimistic or optimistic.

The Government expects to collect a total GST of over Rs 1,00,000 crore per month but GST collections during April-July have been Rs 32,172 crore, Rs 62,151 crore, Rs 90,917 crore and Rs 87,422 crore. In FY21, GST shortfall left uncovered by existing compensation cess is assessed to be Rs 2,35,000 crore. The scope for an extraordinarily large increase in GST compensation cess to cover the whole GST revenue loss is limited as it may adversely affect sales.

When the States were given a five-year revenue protection guarantee in 2017 with an assured 14 per cent increase, such a large reduction in revenue could not have been foreseen. Hence, it can be argued that Covid-19 is an “Act of God” and the States should not insist on getting fully compensated.

In the law of contracts, the courts refuse to enforce a contract when the performance becomes “impossible” (Section 32 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872). What is impossible is open to judicial interpretation. In the Tsakiroglou vs Noblee Thorl case, defendants had contracted to supply Sudanese peanuts to Hamburg but the Suez Canal was closed, blocking the customary shipping route (In July 1956, the Egyptian government nationalised the Canal earlier owned by UK and France causing a crisis). The defendants sought to renege on supply commitment, citing the canal closure. The House of Lords held that peanuts could have been transported via the Cape of Good Hope, a four-time longer alternative route. It would have become commercially onerous but not impossible! In the Alopi Parshad & Sons, Ltd vs Union of India case, the Supreme Court did not allow a supplier of ghee to wriggle out of his pre-war contract merely because World War II had upset his whole economics. Increased commercial difficulty did not amount to impossibility to perform, the court held.

Most contracts, therefore, have a standard clause of “force majeure” detailing extreme situations of war, natural calamities, change of laws or other governmental actions and so on. But the compensation to States for GST revenue shortfall is not part of any contract and not amenable to examination with the lens of “force majeure.” It is basically a legal commitment arising out of a political settlement to arrive at a common taxation framework in a federal polity. The obligation flows from an Act of Parliament. The Parliament can very well change, prospectively or retrospectively, or even scrap the 2017 Compensation Act. The amended law can reduce 14 per cent assured growth to a lower level or introduce additional fiscal measures to compensate the States.

In the present circumstances, a review of the 2017 Act could theoretically be an option but that can potentially re-open settled issues on GST.

The financial interests of the Centre and States are not adversarial but closely inter-connected. The States’ dependence on Central financial support is significant. Central transfers to States constitute about 20 per cent of total Central government expenditure. In 2017-18, the combined expenditure of Centre and States was about Rs 45 lakh crore — Rs 21 lakh crore by Centre (including transfers to State governments of Rs 4 lakh crore) and Rs 28 lakh crore by the States (including expenditure against transfers from Centre of  Rs 4 lakh crore). States realise that the Centre itself is facing financial crunch and insisting on full GST compensation as promised can potentially mean cut in other discretionary Central assistance to States if the Centre is asked to go beyond compensation cess to cover the shortfall.

On August 27, the GST Council discussed the vexed issue of compensation to States for huge loss of GST revenue. States have been given two options to borrow additional money. Borrowing is nothing but deferred taxation. Today’s government borrowing is tomorrow’s tax. May be tomorrow’s tax will become tomorrow’s borrowing and day after tomorrow’s tax and so on. More than 20 per cent of total government expenditure is financed through borrowings. This is how the governments have been piling mountains of debt and there is no visible exit from this trap, not in the immediate future, certainly not in crisis time. Crisis justifies borrowings, to be repaid/serviced in better times.

If GDP at factor cost (proxy for total base of indirect taxes) is assumed to be Rs 160 lakh crore and 60 per cent of this GDP pays average GST of 15 per cent, then the GST revenue should be Rs 1.2 lakh crore per month, almost 10 per cent of GDP. The revenue from taxes subsumed in the GST was about six per cent of GDP in 2016-17. Obviously, GST revenue is below expectation and potential. Strong facilitation and anti-evasion measures can reduce the revenue loss and concomitant compensation requirements.

The great federal bargain on GST among governments is facing an acid test. The hard-won political consensus needs to be preserved and nurtured and no cost is big enough to make GST a grand success, by removing the pending irritants, mostly on the implementation side.

(The author is an IAAS officer, superannuated as Special Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry)

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has recommended to the Centre a reduction in shareholding of the latter in six top Public Sector Banks (PSBs), namely the State Bank of India (SBI), Punjab National Bank (PNB), Bank of Baroda (BOB), Canara Bank, Union Bank of India (UBI) and Bank of India (BOI) to 51 per cent in the next 12-18 months. At a recent meeting with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the RBI had argued for reduction in stake to 26 per cent. But, observing that this might not be possible in the near term for now, it has settled for lowering the Government’s shareholding to 51 per cent. Given its precarious financial position and looking for all possible avenues for increasing revenue, the Narendra Modi Government has promptly latched on to the idea. It is aiming to garner about Rs 25,000 crore by shedding its stake in the six banks which could even go up to Rs 43,000 crore (according to an estimate).

The PSBs in question have already started gearing up for this as they have decided not to take any lumpy credit exposure and are taking steps to reduce their non-performing assets (NPAs) by one-third by the end of the current financial year March 31, 2021 — all aimed at improving their valuation and getting a good price from the sale. The Centre (besides, the RBI) is closely monitoring the situation. At the end of the day, it may re-fill its denuded coffers somewhat. But the larger question still remains unanswered.

Is the Modi Government really serious about bringing down its stake in PSBs to as low as 26 per cent? Is it committed to their privatisation? Does it have anything credible to show? The idea was first mooted by the NDA dispensation under the then Prime Minister AB Vajpayee (1999-2004). It had proposed reduction in the Government’s shareholding in PSBs to less than 50 per cent initially and eventually to 33 per cent. That remained on paper.

In 2015, a RBI committee headed by P Nayak made sweeping recommendations to bring about structural reforms of PSBs in sync with the requirements of an economy on an accelerated growth trajectory and to make it globally competitive. It recommended (i) setting up of an autonomous Bank Boards Bureau (BBB) with a mandate to select the top management; (ii) setting up of a bank investment company (BIC) where all Government shares in PSBs will be vested and (iii) divestment of its shareholding in all PSBs to below 50 per cent.

The committee had contemplated the Board as an interim arrangement — to serve as a precursor to the BIC. In 2016, the Government approved the constitution of the BBB as a body of eminent professionals and officials to make recommendations for appointment of whole-time directors and non-executive chairpersons of PSBs and State-owned financial institutions (FIs). The BBB was also mandated to engage with the board of directors of all PSBs to formulate appropriate strategies for their growth and development besides, encouraging them to restructure their business strategy and suggest ways for their consolidation and merger with other banks based on requirement. Initially headed by Vinod Rai, former Comptroller and Auditor-General (CAG) till April 2018, the BBB has been under a part-time chairman (a retired bureaucrat) and other part-time members. Recently, the term of the BBB was extended for a period of two years beyond April 11 or until further orders, whichever is earlier. How much importance does the Government give to the BBB? Being headed by a part-time chairman and part-time members, this by itself conveys a lot. On the other two recommendations, while (ii) is not even on the radar, as regards (iii), the only action seen thus far is the Government’s decision to divest its majority stake in IDBI Bank. 

But things didn’t work out as planned and during 2018-19, the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) was roped in to acquire 51 per cent controlling stake in IDBI Bank. The acquisition was completed on January 21, 2019 with LIC being re-classified as promoter of the bank with management control and the Centre continuing to be the co-promoter without management control. While it is normal to see LIC in the role of a financial investor, for it to be owning and running a business enterprise is anomalous.

Meanwhile, most of the ills that go with majority ownership of the Government continue to afflict PSBs. The political brass appoints the CMD/MD and deputes bureaucrats as its nominee on the bank board. For appointment of directors, until last year, the nomination and remuneration committee (NRC) included the Centre’s nominee. In August, 2019, the RBI tightened the fit-and-proper criteria to exclude him/her. But, this is only cosmetic with CMD and MOF nominee — both handpicked by the Government — calling the shots when it comes to taking policy decisions or even in its day-to-day running.

In the past, meddling in the affairs of the PSBs took the form of what came to be known as the cult of “crony capitalism.” The businessmen patronised by the ruling establishment managed loans on considerations other than merit and got them ever-greened (taking a new loan to pay back the earlier one). Neither the banks insisted on repayment, nor the defaulters had any sense of fear as those who were expected to take action chose not to act. The political brass also rides piggyback on PSBs for absorbing liabilities created by populist policies such as supplying power to farmers and households at subsidised rates (or even free in some States).

Be it a spate of bailout packages given to power distribution companies (four bailouts have been granted so far) or loan waiver given to farmers and now moratorium on loan repayment extended to all and sundry, all have inflicted heavy losses on PSBs.

No wonder the country is grappling with high NPAs. In March 2018, gross NPAs (GNPAs) had reached a high 11.5 per cent (14.5 per cent for PSBs). These declined to 8.5 per cent as of March; courtesy a number of measures, including resolution of accounts under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). But the ratio may worsen to 12.5 per cent by March 2021 under the optimistic baseline scenario (14.7 per cent under a severely-stressed one). For PSBs, it would be much higher at 15.2 per cent (16.3 per cent under severely-stressed). 

The Government has put investigation and prosecution agencies in top gear to nab fraudsters and the Prime Minister is allegedly against “crony capitalism.” But these exhortations and central agencies seen in action mode do not seem to be yielding the desired result. The proof of the pudding is in eating. To get a sense, we only need to look at the value of bank frauds in recent years. During 2014-15 and 2015-16, the value of bank frauds was Rs 17,000 crore each. During 2016-17 and 2017-18, this went up to Rs 20,500 crore and Rs 22,500 crore respectively. Thereafter, the value galloped to Rs 64,000 crore during 2018-19 and further to Rs 110,000 crore during the first six months of 2019-20.   

The message is loud and clear. The ailments afflicting PSBs won’t go away so long as majority ownership and control remain with the Government. There is a dire need to unshackle them and grant autonomy to the management. The RBI’s recommendation that the Government’s stake in six PSBs be reduced to 51 per cent won’t achieve the desired objective. To get the intended results, the Nayak Committee’s prescription should be adopted in totality.   

The Government should set up a BIC with eminent professionals as members. While the position of chairman should go to a professional, the member-secretary can be drawn from the bureaucracy. All of the shareholding of the Centre in all PSBs should be transferred to the BIC.

The company should be given necessary authority to take all decisions on behalf of the sovereign Government and allowed to work with full autonomy — at arm’s length from the latter.  

The BIC should guide the management of individual banks to improve their working, prepare the roadmap for divestment of majority ownership and control and see through its execution. It should determine the timing of sale so as to realise maximum value. The shares should be so distributed as to avoid concentration in a few hands and ensure greater accountability to the public.

It is also crucial for the RBI to strengthen its “supervision” over banks to guard against irregularities and mismanagement to prevent the fiasco of the kind we have seen in the case of Yes Bank — a private bank. It should maintain strict vigil over the auditors to ensure that they do their job diligently.

(The writer is a New Delhi-based policy analyst)