Despite the recent events, India must do all it can to prevent Pakistan from using the Kartarpur corridor to revive pro-Khalistan sentiments
The freedom to practise one’s faith and seek succour at shrines dedicated to it has been a challenge for nation states that are in conflict with each other but share a religious and cultural heritage beyond borders. However, as this is a UN-mandated human rights issue, every nation has tried to work out a protocol, Israel and Palestine being prime examples of ensuring cross-flow of pilgrims to shrines on each side despite the attendant security imperatives, oppressive herding drills and the overarching shroud of politics. So it has taken really long for both India and Pakistan to agree to open a special border crossing linking Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Pakistan’s Kartarpur – the final resting place of Guru Nanak Dev – to Dera Baba Nanak shrine in India’s Gurdaspur district. However, given the heightened tension between both neighbours over the Pulwama terror attacks and the Balakot airstrikes, and now Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar protected by a Chinese hold at the UN, the talks to work out the modalities were undoubtedly under a cloud. But as the government has set a new paradigm in counter-terrorism strategies with pre-emptive strikes on terror camps, it has also laid a new template for shared shrines by delinking it completely from diplomacy, categorically saying that this common interest, while allowing people-to-people contact, could in no way be interpreted as a thaw in relations or a resumption of bilateral dialogue. In that sense, it would be just business as usual in helping cross-border families get on with their daily lives like the Samjhauta Express. However, for all the show of bonhomie, there were some glitches too — India wants visa-free access to at least 5,000 pilgrims per day but Pakistan wants a permit issued and a limit on numbers. India also reminded that the spirit of the pilgrimage should be honoured, making Pakistan responsible for any disruptive or militant activity. But overall, the meeting remained cordial with both sides determined to address their domestic constituency and claim the moral high ground.
No matter how hard India may try, the fact is that Pakistan’s encouraging moves on the Kartarpur corridor are not entirely free of politics. Pakistan seized the first mover’s advantage in propaganda by declaring its intention to operationalise it soon after Punjab Chief Minister Amarinder Singh blamed it and the ISI for the grenade attack on a Nirankari gathering near Amritsar. India had no choice but to get into the act immediately before it could assess if it was another attempt by Pakistan to woo the Sikh community, revive the hardline Khalistan sentiment and eventually create unrest in Punjab. Pilgrimages between India and Pakistan are governed by the 1974 Protocol on Visits to Religious Shrines, but Kartarpur being not on that list needs a separate code of engagement, one where both sides will jostle for a say. Besides, India has to be alert that the base camp on the Pakistan side doesn’t become a hotbed for Khalistani propaganda and meetings in the name of allowing faith congregations. Pakistan’s haste in pushing the corridor now after years of dilly-dallying does raise questions about its intentions. The first demand for a visa-free access was made in 1999 by the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. In 2004, Dr Manmohan Singh suggested a corridor as Prime Minister. On both occasions, there was no positive response from Pakistan. However, the very day Imran Khan took oath as Prime Minister, the message for opening the corridor was conveyed by Pakistan Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa to Punjab Minister and Congress leader Navjot Singh Sidhu, knowing full well the latter’s flamboyance and ability to shoot off his mouth, which he did, catching India completely off guard. The “deep state” had succeeded in championing a delicate cause for the Sikhs. And yet again, as General Bajwa stood in Kartarpur, shaking hands with a known Khalistani face, Gopal Singh Chawla, the visual added to our worries. Pakistan could still use this people-to-people contact to pressure India into resuming comprehensive dialogue and appear altruistic and big-hearted in the process. But India cannot afford to let down guard on isolating Pakistan diplomatically over its sponsorship of terror factories that impact us. Kartarpur should remain a matter of faith and not a political tool.
Writer & Courtesy: The Pioneer
The conspicuous absence of internationally recognised Ghani regime raises questions about who is deciding Afghanistan’s future. Afghan President is convinced the US-led endeavour is made in hurry
The US-led war in Afghanistan has completed over 17 years by now. It started on October 7, 2001, less than a month after the dastardly terror attack on the heart of America on September 11 the same year. This historic campaign, internationally known as the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) was launched by then US President George W Bush.
It was named “Operation Enduring Freedom” after Mullah Mohammad Omar-led Taliban Government refused to hand over to the US the 9/11 mastermind, Osama bin Laden, who was hiding in Afghanistan. Since then, Afghanistan has witnessed chaos, leading to loss of lives, resources, but more precisely the very Afghan sense of liberty and pride.
Today, the Afghan war, by all indications, is coming to an end. The current Afghan peace talks in Qatar is sending out positive signals so far despite off and on Taliban attacks either on the US forces or on the Afghanistan Government forces in the country.
Amid longing for peace, the most disturbing issue is that the Taliban have refused to have any direct talks with the current Afghan Government of Ashraf Ghani. To Taliban, the Government based in Kabul is a “puppet” of the Western powers. But then, the Taliban representatives have indicated that after the withdrawal of US troops from their country, they will start negotiation with the Government.
Critical actors and their independent roles in this conflict may jeopardise the Afghan peace process. Hence, it is not the Taliban and the US Government that alone could put an end to this chaos. Regional stalwarts such as India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and China have carved out their own spheres of influence in this protracted war game, largely supported by an absence of a long historical narrative of the Cold War era.
Their active engagement in the peace process may mean a permanent guarantee of stability in the post-American Afghanistan.
A hasty US withdrawal from war-torn Afghanistan will be a disaster. Moreover, a namby-pamby Government in the country in a post-American departure might help resurrecting not only Taliban but also all other tribal war lords across the country. Else, the US making an exit without offering a credible solution to this war-ravaged nation would dampen American forces’ superior ability to handle hot conflict zones. Meanwhile lessons learnt from the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan necessitates a peace deal that simply sticks to its principles. Hope, Afghanistan can be saved from turning it into a “graveyard of empires”.
The US and the Taliban negotiators have agreed a draft framework for peace to bring to an end to this protracted crisis. But the talks that continued between US special envoy for Afghan reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad and the representatives of the Taliban have veered around two main issues: Withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan and prohibiting international terror groups from using the Afghan soil.
Meanwhile, amid Helmand attack, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a powerful deputy to the Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhunzada, who was in Pakistan jail, has joined the talks in Doha. It is hoped that his meeting with Khalilzad will help ironing out many hurdles in the coming days. What is bringing positive vibes for the first time is that another top leader Amir Khan Motaqi, chief of the Staff of the Taliban supreme leader, is also attending the talks in Qatar. This demonstrates how seriously the Taliban is viewing the ongoing talks.
However, there are some genuine spoilers that may come on the way. First, what is complicating the negotiation process is the continued violence coming from the Taliban side. Even when the talks are on in Doha this week, the Taliban fighters assaulted a large Army base in the Helmand province where also the US Mariners were present. And, this led to the death of at least two dozen Afghan soldiers. There are such inherent bottlenecks that may further delay the peace talks.
Second, the current India-Pak clashes may directly influence the Afghan peace dialogue. It is learnt that there is very strong likelihood that Pakistani troops would be shifted from the border with Afghanistan to reinforce positions on the border with India. The all too plausible risk is that this spat may finally derail the Afghan peace process. When the Trump Administration tried to lower tensions between India and Pakistan, the latter’s officials conveyed to Washington that if the war continues, it would be difficult for their country to focus on the western border. Some US officials say Pakistan does not have the capability to make peace happen with Afghanistan, but it has the capacity to spoil it for sure.
However, India-Pak tensions are just being overstated by the Pakistani establishment as to downplay the progress of the Afghan peace deal. But then a section of Western diplomats opine that if the Trump Administration pushes Islamabad too far on combating the jihadists, it could lessen its manoeuvering tactics while convincing and taming them.
What Afghanistan fears is that it can be readily used as a proxy for tension between India and Pakistan. India’s sudden air strike on JeM’s terror camps deep inside Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province last month has indeed drawn a “new red line” with Pakistan. Undoubtedly, Pakistan has played a vital role in bringing the Taliban’s to the negotiating table. It was Islamabad that released Taliban leader Baradar in 2018, with the hope that he could play a decisive role in the peace process in Doha.
Finally, trusting the deadly Taliban could be serious mistake on one hand. However, without taking the militants on board which today threaten more than 70 per cent of Afghanistan could be again a tactical mistake for any peace deal for this country and any international mediating group.
Only with guarded optimism, the international peace brokers such as the US could move ahead, else anytime Afghanistan may slip into a war zone like before. Even today regular skirmishes are on between the Taliban and the Kabul establishment, and at times with the US-led NATO troops. But bringing such senior Taliban leaders like Baradar to the negotiating table may be hailed as a record of sort for the US Administration.
America is not only fighting wars outside the precincts of its sovereign borders, but it is also encountering backlashes for its actions back home. It is worth noting here how long-drawn battles such as Afghanistan and Iraq have influenced the US armed forces and its policies.
During Obama’s second term in office, he declared the end of the combat operations in Afghanistan. By September 2014, the Afghan Government signed a treaty with the US and a similar agreement with the NATO which stated that 12, 500 foreign soldiers, of which 9,800 are Americans, will stay in Afghanistan in 2015, after the end of the NATO combat mission at the end of 2014. When Trump came to power, he increased defence spending, especially to the GWOT.
After fighting two most dangerous and long-standing wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq, even the US forces might undergo serious changes in its operational style, tactics and using high-tech gadgets. Defence Secretary Patrick Michael Shanahan is trying to probably prepare the ground for forces’ life and work, after two devastating and tiring wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The National Defence Strategy (NDS) published by the Trump Administration in January 2018 clearly changed its course of direction and decreed that America, henceforth, would focus on “long term strategic competition between nations”, namely China and Russia. In fact, this is for the first time, since the Regan era, America is planning to retool its forces by modernising its fighting architecture and technologies in war. In fact, Shanahan, a former Boeing executive, who has just completed a year in the top job, is truly confident of remoulding more than 700,000 strong armed forces in the years to come.
These are some of the policy changes that are being taken forward under the Trump regime so as to suit the new war games around the world. And, definitely, new plans are afoot to look beyond traditional battlegrounds like Afghanistan and Iraq.
What confuses the international community today is that there are two competing peace deals held on Afghanistan — one led by the US and the other by Russia. And, sadly, the popularly elected Government of Ghani is nowhere involved in these peace talks. How is this possible? Why Washington and Moscow want to sideline Kabul? Or is it the Taliban leaders that purposefully trying to hijack the peace process? Now, the point is that even if the Taliban and their sponsors want them to bypass the Ghani administration, the Mullahs should have never agreed. Again, when the US is pushing too far to conclude a peace deal in the absence of Afghanistan’s “legitimate” Government, it should have convinced the Taliban that such an agreement could spell calamity in the days to come. And, it is well understood that Putin is back in business to flex his muscles once again to demonstrate that Russia could settle the Afghan quagmire.
Nevertheless, it must be highlighted here that the conspicuous absence of internationally recognised Ghani regime. Subsequently, it raises questions about who is deciding Afghanistan’s future; whether Washington’s policy of maintaining forces in Afghanistan until the circumstances are favourable for withdrawal can outlive the bizarre wishes of Trump who desperately wants to pull out; whether we all could seriously trust the reclusive Taliban and their weird promises.
Hence, for now the prospect of these two parallel peace deals is far from clear to the world. Ghani is convinced that the US-led effort is made in a hurry. Afghanistan is an age-old war field. And, both Washington and Moscow are well aware of the consequences of falling apart with the Taliban at this crucial juncture. Equally, Ghani is feeling that Trump is cutting him out of the whole process.
If Trump pays no heed to engage the core stakeholders in Afghanistan’s long road to peace, it would all, but be crystal clear that he is playing with only fire. And, the fire will lit entire Afghanistan once again.
(The writer is an expert on international affairs)
Writer: Makhan Saikia
Courtesy: The Pioneer
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani needs to focus on domestic issues and address the simmering grievances of Iranians so that they feel assured that the ideals of the 1979-Islamic Revolution are not lost
The Islamic Republic of Iran has completed 40 years of its historic 1979 Revolution that brought forth a new era — the beginning of the Khomeini regime and the exit of the Pahlavi dynasty from the political country’s scene.
On February 1, that very year, Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, popularly known as Imam Khomeini landed in Tehran from his long exile in Paris. He is believed to have been received amid revolutionary cheers by one of the largest crowds in history.
With this, what descended in Iran was a brand new rule of the clerics under the guidance of Supreme Leader Khomeini on the basis of the principles of rule by Islamic jurists known as “Velayat-e Faqih”.
The Islamic Revolution gained momentum from January 1978 till February 1979, leading to numerous events aiming to overthrow the pro-western Pahlavi monarchy.
Particularly, the leftists and the liberals who supported the revolutionaries to oust the autocratic Shah, in fact, misjudged Khomeini and his core clerics. He and the rest of his unelected mullahs did never go back to the holy city of Qom permanently as it was expected. During the initial days of his reign, many of the secularists, prostitutes, homosexuals, adulterers and Shah’s officials were executed to clean up the country.
It was all justified in the name of purifying the new revolutionary state. By violating the revered principles of “Vilayat-e Faqih”, he selected then President Ali Khamenei as his successor.
The current Supreme Leader and his regime, which possess enormous powers to directly control the elected President and the rest of the Government agencies, has been keeping a tight rein on the ordinary Iranians.
Thus for many, the commemoration exhortations of the Revolution are simply an annus horribilis. Khomeini and his followers, whom many call as “The Beards”, have changed the course of history of Iran. And they led the country to a direction that provoked sharp western reaction and rivalry in the following years. The defiant clerics indeed set the tone for a new war game on the sectarian lines, claiming Iran as the new leader of the Shias, countering the region’s Sunni leadership headed by Saudi Arabia.
One Saudi journalist once described that these two countries are intractable enemies — “fire and dynamite”.
Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Tehran has made serious attempts to export its revolution in the region. It has been alleged that successive regimes have used diplomacy, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and subordinate organs of the state to spread the Shia doctrine to counter the growing fundamentalist influence propagated by Sunni nations in West Asia.
The IRGC’s wings such as the Baseej and the Quds forces, numbering millions today operate in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. At home, the Guards literally control almost all aspects of society. Its involvement beyond the region is strongly felt, particularly in Central Asia, Latin America and widely in Africa.
It is argued that Iran is using its soft power and substantial resources to expand its zone of influence in reshaping African Islam and the continent’s political climate. Africa is strategically important for Tehran because nearly 45 per cent of its people are Muslims. So to extend the country’s quest for dominance in the Muslim world, engagement with African populace both through religious forays and financial support is a must.
While Iran is celebrating its grand achievements of the Revolution, it is worth looking into the pros and cons of rising protests in the country. Why people are wary of the current political system? Are they searching for an alternative or demanding vital changes in the status quo? Iran has witnessed historic protests, bringing tens of thousands to the streets across the country. These protests have marked the worst scenes of unrest since the controversial elections of 2009 when millions came up and demanded justice known as the Green Movement.
As of now public resentment is primarily vented against the clerical leadership and President Hassan Rouhani’s commitment towards some of the vital foreign policies. Simply put, these outbursts have clearly exposed a political miscalculation by the hardline opponents of President Rouhani who mainly wanted to discredit his economic policies.
But then the public anger has spilled over taking the shape of a second Iranian revolution. What started off as a protest spurred on by deteriorating economic conditions and inflation in prices of basic goods have finally given warning signals both to the current regime and to ageing Khamenei.
Initially, Iranians came up to raise their voices against Rouhani’s plan to raise fuel prices in an attempt to lower Government debts. And this all came on top of increasing unemployment of the young people, estimated to be over 40 per cent across Iran. Set against this downward economic spiral, common people are angry at massive spending on war games around the troubled conflict zones of Syria and in Africa.
Also people are tired of decades of continued support extended to the Lebanese Shia militia group called Hizbollah. The young people are seriously concerned about the high cost of living in Tehran.
It is interesting to note how the rest of the world has reacted to the sudden outbursts of public anger in Iran. Two US Presidents — Barack Obama and Donald Trump — have raised alarms. When the 2009 protests broke out, Obama reacted cautiously saying a forceful American intervention (reviled as the “Great Satan” by the Iranian revolutionaries) could make America, a rallying cause for the clerics. But then the boisterous Trump and his Vice-President took no time to side with the protesters.
Trump and his Administration are gleefully rooting for regime change in Iran, which could be potentially dangerous for the entire region. Beginning of this year, he tweeted, “Iran is failing at every level despite the terrible deal made with them by Obama administration. The great Iranian people have been repressed for many years. They are hungry for food and for freedom. Along with human rights, the wealth of Iran is being looted. Time for change.”
Around the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin says these demonstrations are internal affairs for Iran and external interference is unacceptable.
Those young protesters, who are still treading in that revolutionary vineyard, can definitely find it going tough amid crude repression and severe surveillance of the security forces. Crying foul against Rouhani regime and Khamenei fiefdom may not help the commoners immediately. Rooting for sudden upheaval and change may seem to be dangerous both for the regime and for the ordinary citizens.
Gradual change, probably through all constitutional mechanisms and an electoral victory of the democratic forces might guarantee a safe future for all. But with millions of orthodox followers of Khamenei and an ever strong IRGC, a total recall of the clerical regime could only ensure bloodshed.
What persists today is an apparent confusion that has strongly confronted Iran since 1979 over how to reconcile the inherent contradictions between the Revolution’s ideological moorings and what exactly demands for an efficient domestic governance system and conducting of global diplomacy.
Iran today braces for evolutionary change. Its constant umbrage at the US and its allies in the region will simply deviate it from the primary goals of the Revolution. The days of “Down with America” may not entice as many young Iranians to support the clerics as it desires. These millennials look for jobs, stability and surely, global connectivity. Mullahs need to understand that the world is fast becoming flat with the onset of globalisation.
What is disturbing for the current regime in Iran is that apart from shouting anti-Government slogans, the distraught people are also reported to have circulated videos saying “Death to Khamenei” in public spaces. However, the veracity of such videos is still not verified by any credible media houses.
Democracy promotion in the Arab world normally embitters relations with the monarchies (those which are long standing allies of Washington) in the region, resulting into an isolation of a large chunk of their population who are vying for more freedom and popularly elected governments. Besides, a largely evident Shia-Sunni divide among the nations and their contest for regional dominance either through clerics or with the support of massive wealth has remained a permanent bone of contention. Today Iran’s closer ties with both Russia and China and a gradual withdrawal of American power umbrella from West Asia may further cause instability.
Much beyond Khamenei’s rhetorics against the West, particularly America, Rouhani, being a democratically elected leader, needs to find the roots of long simmering grievances of the people. What he had promised way back in 2013 during his first term in office is long gone. His slogan of “hope and prudence” around which he galvanised support from the Iranians is fast fading. His simply saying, “Iranians have the right to protest legally” and blaming outside influence over the volley of protesters will not bring an end to this problem. Nevertheless, it is good for him to realise that “The space needs to open up for protest and criticism”.
On the other hand, those who want to impose or rather desire to see the emergence of a western style democratic system in West Asia must realise that stability is more important for many than a liberal leviathan. An Arab Spring kind of an upheaval may not be reassuring for a basic guarantee of life, liberty and living for ordinary people. Complete and sudden recantation of the existing system in Iran may lead to a breeding ground for radical Islamic movements such as al-Qaeda and ISIS.
Equally, extolling Khamenei and his ever expanding clerical regime may further anger the commoners and counter-productive for the revolutionary ethos to sustain.
(The writer is an expert on international affairs)
Courtesy: Pioneer
Writer: Makhan Saikia
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has a key role to play in reducing the tensions between the two countries caused by recent events. What is needed is a collective, region-wide campaign against terrorism.
India and Pakistan joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) during its June 8-9, 2017 summit held in Astana, Kazakhstan. Before the addition of the two nations, the members of the SCO included China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The now eight-member SCO also has four observer states, including Afghanistan and six dialogue partners, including Sri Lanka. In total and together, they constitute much of the Asian geography with a population of over three billion people. The foundational purpose of SCO as the largest inter-governmental organisation in the world is to strengthen mutual trust and promote good neighbourly relations among member states. This is to be achieved through gradual but consistent efforts by SCO member states to engage in multi-faceted cooperation to advance their collective and common interest in the sustainable human and protective security of the SCO space. Parallel to this, the SCO seeks to establish a more democratic and rational world order.
Because sustainable peace makes sustainable development possible in Asia and the rest of the world, the SCO summits continue emphasising the importance of results-driven security cooperation among its member states, observer states and dialogue partners. The addition of India and Pakistan was widely welcomed as a significant opportunity for the SCO to address lingering security threats of terrorism, extremism and separatism in South and Central Asia. Same intertwined threats have provided an enabling environment for organised criminality, while also deepening poverty that denies the youthful populations of Asia the socio-economic opportunities and facilities they need to contribute to the sustainable development and peace of their individual nations and collectively to those of the rest of Asia.
That is why Chinese President Xi Jinping at the 18th SCO Summit in Qingdao called on the SCO’s expanded membership to move from talk to action. He stated: “We need to actively implement the 2019-2021 programme of cooperation for combating ‘the three evil forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism;’ continue to conduct the ‘peace mission’ and other joint counter-terrorism exercises…We need to give full play to the role of SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group to facilitate peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan.”
President Xi added, “Countries are increasingly interdependent today… confronted with many common threats and challenges that no one can tackle alone. Only by enhancing solidarity and partnership, will we be able to achieve lasting stability and development.” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who addressed the summit as a newly admitted member state, echoed his Chinese counterpart, floating the concept of ‘secure’ to underpin the work of SCO: ‘S’ for security for citizens, ‘E’ for economic development, ‘C’ for connectivity in the region, ‘U’ for unity, ‘R’ for respect of sovereignty and ‘E’ for environmental protection. He highlighted instability in Afghanistan as an “unfortunate effect of terrorism”, noting: “I hope the brave steps towards peace taken by President Ghani will be respected by all in the region.”
Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomed the accession of India and Pakistan to the SCO. He stressed that “countering terrorism remains the priority for cooperation within the SCO”, underlining that the three-year programme of action, adopted at the 18th Summit, “envisions holding joint drills and counter-terror operations, streamlining a closer exchange of experience and operational information.” He also encouraged the SCO Youth Council to “actively participate in the work on preventing the recruitment of young people to participate in terrorist activities.”
Building on these and other statements from the SCO member states, calling for quick and concrete action to fight and eliminate terrorism, the Central Military Commission of Russia conducted a six-day joint military exercise from August 22-29, 2018, in Chelyabinsk Oblast, Russia. The joint exercise was initiated by the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of SCO (RATS-SCO), which included tactical operations with a focus on strengthening counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency preparedness, coordination and cooperation among the SCO member states. Around 3,000 soldiers, including 748 from China, 167 from India and 110 from Pakistan, participated in the joint drill.
Indeed, for India and Pakistan, it was their first such joint military exercise since their independence in 1947. And this raised much hopes about the prospect of the two countries participating in the ‘Peace Mission 2018’ and future ones to move beyond decades of routine skirmishes along the Line of Control and to begin building inter-military confidence through SCO measures, thereby easing tensions between the two nations. Commenting on this shortly before the joint exercise, Sun Zhuangzhi, a professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times, “It is a rare opportunity for Pakistan and India, which have long been involved in military conflict, to enhance military exchanges and trust. This could improve regional stability.”
Contrary to these expectations, however, a rapid escalation of violence between India and Pakistan since February 14, 2019, has been a cause for serious concern in the SCO neighborhood and the rest of the world. On February 14, Pakistan-based terrorist group, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), carried out and later claimed a suicide attack on a bus, carrying Indian Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel in Pulwama district of Jammu & Kashmir. The attack killed 44 CRPF men. This unprovoked act of terrorism was internationally condemned with calls on Pakistan to rid its soil of terrorist networks and to dismantle their support infrastructure, including safe havens and training facilities. India promised retaliation and, on February 26, conducted surgical air strikes that hit “the biggest training camp of JeM in Balakot, Pakistan.” Many militants under training at the camp are reportedly to have been killed by India’s air strikes.
Although the international community has called for restraint by India and Pakistan and de-escalation of tensions between them, now is the time for the SCO’s founding member states to act on their often-stated common objectives to restore, ensure and maintain peace, security and stability in the SCO space. In the last SCO Summit, President Putin emphasised that one of the SCO’s key priorities was to assist “in the political and diplomatic settlement of conflicts near the external borders of the organisation’s member states.”
Any escalatory moves by India and Pakistan could lead to the breakout of a larger conflict with far-reaching implications within the SCO’s own borders. The organisation should lose no time in engaging with the two countries to have them refrain from further retaliatory measures in favour of returning to direct dialogue for a resolution of mounting tensions caused by recent developments.
While this should be SCO’s immediate goal, the RATS-SCO should be tasked to identify and assess the presence of major terrorist groups and their support infrastructure throughout the SCO region. Then it should map out a results-oriented counter-terrorism plan of action for adoption by the SCO member states, whose counter-terrorism efforts the RATS-SCO should verify to ensure no distinction between and among terrorist groups. In other words, verification by RATS-SCO should expose for correction duplicitous counter-terrorism policies, which remain an impediment to effective counter-terrorism in South Asia.
As President Ashraf Ghani said while condemning the February 14 terrorist attack in India, “terrorism is a cancer in the region and requires collective efforts to root it out.” The SCO can and should initiate to lead a collective, region-wide campaign to fight and eliminate the cancer before it spreads in multiple destructive ways throughout the SCO region.
Afghanistan has done more than a lion’s share in fighting terrorism with regional and transnational roots. Our full accession to the SCO will only enable us to do a lot more, helping our neighbours, including India, Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran, address the intertwined threats of terrorism, extremism and criminality.
(The writer is the Ambassador of Afghanistan to Sri Lanka as well as Senior International Security Fellow at the New America in Washington, DC)
Courtesy: The Pioneer
Writer: M Ashraf Haidari
At the time of the 1962 war, China’s Air Force could not fly because of a lack of fuel. It possibly got some from Tajikistan, where the superpower is building its new base. Here’s why we must keep a watch.
Some time ago, The Washington Post published an article titled, ‘In Central Asia’s forbidding highlands, a quiet newcomer: Chinese troops’. The article reported: “Two miles above the sea level in the inhospitable highlands of Central Asia, there’s a new power watching over an old passage into Afghanistan: China.” According to interviews, satellite images, photographs and first-hand observations by a Washington Post journalist, it was found that Chinese troops have settled in one of the most strategic areas of central Asia, termed “a choke point in Tajikistan.”
The US newspaper said, “Tajikistan — awash with Chinese investment — joins the list of Chinese military sites that includes Djibouti in the strategic Horn of Africa and man-made islands in the South China Sea, in the heart of Southeast Asia”, adding “the modest facility in Tajikistan — which offers a springboard into Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor a few miles away — has not been publicly acknowledged by any Government. But its presence is rich in significance and symbolism.” The region has been (and is) still highly strategic. Last year, a publication, ‘The 1959 Tibetan Uprising Documents: The Chinese Army Documents’ was released on Kindle. It was a collection of top secret documents of the military intelligence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), dating from the end of the 1950s till the 1962 war with China.
At that crucial time, China had a serious problem — it did not have an Air Force in a position to take on the Indian Air Force. The compiler of the above mentioned paper noted: “Disadvantage of the Chinese Air Force is still a major problem in case of a conflict with India. Indian jets can start at a low altitude with a full load of bombs and plenty of fuel. Also, India has many airports only about a 100 kilometres from the highest peaks of the Himalayas. Short distance and higher bomb load mean each Indian jet is at least twice if not three times more effective than a Chinese aircraft.” Apart from the fact that many airplanes had been sent to the Korean front and that the Soviet Union had stopped supplying spare parts for the MiG fighter planes, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) had a major hurdle: No fuel for its few planes.
The amount of gasoline reaching the plateau from China via the Qinghai-Tibet or the Sichuan-Tibet highways was not enough to maintain a large occupation force on the Tibetan plateau (read the Indian borders) and at the same time, provide the necessary fuel for the PLAAF. One of the published documents mentioned secret statistics for “border trade” and the import of fuel, gasoline and other commodities between 1953 and 1967.
What do the statistics show? In 1958, gasoline of 380 tonnes was imported into Tibet; in 1959, nothing; in 1960, 2,220 tonnes, in 1961, 96 tonnes and in 1962, 30 tonnes. This means that in 1960, there was a huge surge in fuel import. But import from where?
There was no possibility of any gallon passing unnoticed through Nathu-la or Jelep-la — the two main passes between Sikkim and Chumbi Valley (Tibet) — ditto for the passes in Uttarakhand or North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) (Arunachal Pradesh today) or even Demchok in Ladakh, which had been closed for trade by the Chinese.
The author of the publication presumed that “corrupt” Indian officials had let the fuel be smuggled in. That, too, was not possible. First, the officers of the Indian Frontier Administrative Service, posted in these areas, were the most upright people, and in any case, considering that a mule could only carry 40 kg per trip, it would have meant thousands and thousands of mules, which did not exist on the plateau …and they would have to have been transparent.
After pondering over the issue, my conclusion was that this amount of gasoline could not have crossed any Indian or Nepalese border post into Tibet. It left few other possibilities. One was the Soviet Union. Though it had just split with China, relations between Beijing and Moscow had reached a breaking point by 1959.
The only possibility was some under-the-table purchases through corrupt officials in Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan. I got convinced that the gasoline had come from the same area in Tajikistan where China is today building a new base, at the edge of the Wakhan corridor and Xinjiang.
An interesting lead: Tursun Uljabayev, the party secretary of Tajikistan in 1960, was sacked and imprisoned for serious corruption a year later. In all probability, gasoline from Tajikistan was transported to Kashgar (or Tashgurgan) in Xinjiang and then taken over the Aksai Chin to be used in western Tibet. It could have been done at night via the road cutting across Indian territory, which was the best protected artery in China in the 1950s and early 1960s as only the PLA was allowed to use it; the traffic could have gone unnoticed for several months. It was probably why Uljabayev was caught and the import of gasoline into Tibet drastically fell in 1961 …and by 1962 China had no fuel for its aircraft.
The above findings have two important corollaries. One, it confirms that the Chinese had no Air Force in flying condition at the time of the 1962 conflict with India, having no spares and no fuel. This was recently confirmed to this writer by Wing Commander ‘Jaggi’ Nath, who extensively flew over Tibet in secret missions between 1960 and 1962. He was awarded his first Maha Vir Chakra medal for this (he got his second in 1965 for mapping the Pakistani defences).
The second upshot is that the area, where the Chinese are today building their new base, is highly strategic, being a relatively easy link between the oil-rich Central Asia, Afghanistan (through the Wakhan corridor), the restive Xinjiang (the hub of Xi Jinping’s Road and Belt Initiative) and Tibet.
This raises another issue: Why did the Indian Government, which had all the information about the situation in Tibet, the deployments of the PLA on the plateau and the lack of Chinese Air Force (‘Jaggi’ Nath was never attacked or even followed during his regular sorties over Tibet), not use its jets to pound the PLA concentration near the Thagla ridge in the Tawang sector in Walong area of eastern NEFA or in Rezang-la in Ladakh? The only answer is a woeful lack of leadership. Let us hope that the present bosses watch what is happening in this area.
(The writer is an expert on India-China relations)
Courtesy : The Pioneer
Writer : Claude Arpi
Pakistan will remain a preferred Saudi ally given the kingdom’s own priorities and strategic road map imperatives. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad-bin Salman (MbS) is touring the three most important capitals beyond Washington, DC, in his post-Khashoggi phase. The Western capitals were ultimately not amused by MBS’ ingrained feudal instincts in carrying out the rash internal purge, l’affaire Khashoggi and other unwarranted military interventions, after the initial hoopla surrounding the ostensible modernisation drive by the “real power behind the throne.” His initially feted socio-economic promises of “Vision 2030” and steps to liberalise and reform the society were soon undone by reports of increased human rights violations and clumsy interventions in Syria, Yemen and Qatar as also a purported kidnapping of the Lebanese Prime Minister!
However, the crude and brutal assassination of Saudi dissenter Jamal Khashoggi, attributed directly to the recklessness of the young Prince himself, was the last straw for the Western nations in condemning MbS openly. His style of management by intimidation, coercion and “buying out” became obvious as indeed his deep-rooted insecurities and ambition that saw him systematically “neutralise” all opposition.
Recent international opprobrium has led to heightened insecurities and the Saudis have, therefore, made a deliberate outreach towards the alternative global platform of the East as they hope to enhance their economic and geo-political stability with two of their top three export markets, namely China, the biggest, and India, the third biggest revenue generator. However, his pit-stop at Islamabad was, perhaps, the most significant for it addressed the perennial and foremost fear in the minds of the Saudi Royal family — regime change.
Historically, Saudi Arabia’s closest Muslim ally, Pakistan has been the trusted go-to nation for managing all internal and external threats to the vulnerable House of Saud. The role of the Pakistan Army’s Special Services Group (SSG) in overcoming the seizure of the Grand Mosque at Mecca in 1979 typified both the sort of domestic challenges that beset the rule of the Saud family as indeed the faith reposed on Pakistani soldiers.
In the 1970s and 1980s, up to 20,000 Pakistani soldiers were said to be deployed within Saudi Arabia to protect its sensitive spots. With the sixth largest military in the world, reasonable combat-exposure and even nuclear capabilities on Pakistan’s side, the Saudi-Pakistan relationship became more symbiotic, logical and mutually-gratifying.
Custodianship of the two holiest mosques and as the ready ‘investor’ in all domestic urgencies of Pakistan led a former Pakistani Ambassador to Saudi Arabia to famously state that the security of Saudi Arabia was a “personal matter.” It is often claimed that the Saudis had even secretly funded the Pakistani nuclear programme as it allowed them the plausible option of deniability as also ensured the requisite protection via Pakistan in the face of growing threats from its sectarian-nemesis, Iran and also states like Saddam’s Iraq and Israel.
The Saudi funding of the Pakistan-controlled Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s and 1990s is a matter of recorded fact. Today, a leaner Pakistani contingent in the form of “advisors,” trainers and even combat soldiers, ensures the continuity of this crucial comfort-factor for both nations. Deteriorating relationship with the US and parallel growing proximity of both nations with the alternate power centre of China is yet another matter of strategic option and convergence.
The influence that the Saudis can wield on the Pakistani state and also its powerful military was in full display when the Saudi brokered release and exit for the deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in the 1999 military coup by the then Pakistani General, Pervez Musharraf.
Later, the Saudis were able to rope in the just-retired Pakistani Chief of Army, General Raheel Sharif, to head the controversial 41-nation Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Alliance (IMCTA), based out of Riyadh — without General Raheel Sharif completing the mandatory two-year “cool-off” period required before accepting any international assignment.
There was a minor bump in the relationship with Pakistan shying away from committing its military forces in Saudi Arabia’s misguided war in Yemen, owing to sectarian implications within the tinderbox of Pakistan itself. Soon, security desperation for the Saudis and the dire economic desperation for Pakistanis ensured that the two nations perpetuate and strengthen the umbilical cord of quid pro quo.
Expectedly, Pakistan pulled out all stops to roll out the red carpet for MBS and he did not disappoint his hosts with a slew of $20 billion investments for cash-strapped Pakistanis. More pertinently, the loaded statement, suggesting the dissuasion of “politicising the UN listing regime,” when India was in the midst of making international efforts to name and shame Jaish-e-Mohammad’s Masood Azhar, did not go unnoticed in New Delhi. Maturity, gravitas and nuanced diplomacy is not a known MbS strength, and particularly at this moment of vulnerability for himself, he would be driven by the urge to buy out Pakistani guarantees for securing the Kingdom’s worst nightmare — regime change.
No other country of the 41 nation IMCTA grouping has either the quantity or quality of readily-deployable military or is as deeply indebted to Saudi Arabia for its own economic survival (2.5 million Pakistani work in Saudi Arabia) as the Pakistanis — affording a win-win solution for both by deepening ties. Imran Khan’s charm offensives elicited a candid and spontaneous, “Consider me Pakistan’s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,” from MBS.
Therefore, given Saudi Arabia’s own priorities and strategic road map imperatives, Pakistan will remain a preferred ally that will always benefit from a deliberate overlook for any of its misdemeanours as long as they do not harm Saudi Arabian interests directly.
India shares common ground with Saudi Arabia on religious extremism (finally) and on organisations like the Islamic State (IS) or Al Qaeda — though a similar aversion and clamp-down on the subcontinental extremist bodies like the Jaish-e-Mohammad or even the Pakistan-sponsored Taliban, may not be as forthcoming.
On the contrary, equity with the likes of the Afghan Taliban may actually give Saudi Arabia counter-leverage against the US in its battle of wits. Diminishing the Pakistani establishment, especially its military, would be perceived to be extremely counter-productive to Saudi interests, as it risks portents of regime-change in Saudi Arabia — a nightmare that Pakistan willy-nilly guarantees against.
(The writer is former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry)
Courtesy: The Pioneer
Writer: Bhopinder Singh
There have been many lectures in schools around the world on the tale of Doctor Faust. The story of a man who sold his soul to the devil in exchange for untold wealth and power. It is an allegorical tale that casts light on the dangers of giving up on one’s principles and values in a head-long rush to achieve success. Of course, almost every politician anywhere in the world drives a Faustian bargain because they never expect the pigeons will come home to roost, and Imran Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, is possibly the best example of a man who has made such a deal. While he achieved immense success on the cricket field, notably leading his men to the famous victory in the Cricket World Cup in 1992, he entered Pakistani politics in an attempt to clean up the dire state of that country. Yet, as everyone knows, for years, he was but a minor irritant in the Pakistani political arena, dominated as it was by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (PML) in the periods the military was not in power. Seeing himself being sidelined by almost everyone, Imran Khan clearly dealt with the devil, the Pakistani military and its terror factories. Indeed, when Talibani terrorists killed 132 children in a devastating attack, Khan did not outrightly condemn the incident. In retrospect, everyone should have seen the writing on the wall. Khan was propelled to power last year on the back of terrorist factions, including those led by Masood Azhar, and indirectly by the military, the latter going out of its way to hobble Nawaz Sharif’s PML from putting up a fair fight. And even though in his first address after becoming the Prime Minister, Khan sounded conciliatory towards India, that was just a ruse. He had made his deal with the military and the Pakistani deep state and that was made evident by the recent Pulwana attack where several of our jawans paid with their lives.
Khan demanded proof from India for the attack even though Azhar and his terror cohorts had taken responsibility. As we know, India has consistently shared details of Pakistani involvement in terror acts, including the horrific incidents in Mumbai a decade ago. Those ‘dossiers’ must be gathering dust after having being read with some amusement by Pakistan’s terror handlers. Khan has “warned” India against any military adventurism. Although it would not be appropriate for India to go to war just now, it can and must respond to this attack by Pakistan. How it does so will remain to be seen, although Pakistan does a fairly good job of strangling itself. But we should not expect Khan to take any action, no matter how damning the proof we provide. Khan has decided to sleep with the devil and he has made his own bed; announcements of huge planned investments will barely change that nation, which has now been eclipsed by its erstwhile eastern half, Bangladesh, economically. At the end of The tragical History of Doctor Faustus, written by English playwright John Marlowe, Faust was dragged into hell when the devil came to take what is due to him. It would do Imran Khan well to remember this tale.
Courtesy & Writer: The Pioneer
With its economy on a southwards journey and given its failed inter-provincial relationship, Pakistan has no alternative but to spill out, and India seems to be the only destination.
Every week, this is news about how Pakistan is moving towards bankruptcy. While the buzz stands true, several countries such as China and Saudi Arabia have shown sympathy and extended financial aid to the country. However, if Karl Marx were around today, he might have said that loans are the opium of the classes. What could be true of the classes would be true of countries, too. It is too early yet to forget that in 1990, the Reserve Bank of India was sending gold to banks in London as pledge for loans in foreign exchange. The Pakistani crisis is far more serious because not only is there a financial paucity but also an impending economic collapse. The country is still essentially agrarian and feudal, and there has been little development since the British departed in 1947. In the meantime, the population has multiplied to reach nearly 180 million. Moreover, Islam commands a great deal of devotion from its followers but in turn, it does not encourage economic attention in contrast to the Protestant work ethic.
Since the advent of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and SEATO in 1954, Pakistan has been the beneficiary of American military and other such aid, which helped the economy in general and imports in particular. That aid is drying up because of the country’s active association with terrorism, the Taliban and others. Cereals and other basic food items are not a problem yet, but Pakistan has run out of red meat. Way back in the days of Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s presidentship, it could be foreseen that the supply of beef would become a problem. He had, during his time in the mid-sixties, declared one-day a week meatless. Now with the shortage of foreign exchange, how can imports be sustained? All these developments and more are a concern for India, too, not merely out of human sympathy but also on account of self-interest. How? We must anticipate this to plan ahead.
Another grave weakness of Pakistan is its inter-provincial relationship. All the three other Provinces, namely Balochistan, North-West Frontier Province and Sind, resent Punjab, which holds two-third of the population. Punjab dominates, if not monopolises the Army and the bureaucracy. There have been separatist movements in all three smaller Provinces. The Pathans or Pashtuns look to the Afghans as their brothers. Jio Sindh is not active at present but sentiments are alive. Balochs openly say they want to separate and killings take place frequently. Disunity does not augur well for Pakistan. Hence, Islamabad tries to divert everyone’s attention by stoking Kashmir as a daily issue.
India was partitioned in 1947 on demand of most Muslims of the sub-continent, who aspired that their new homeland would become a New Medina. The old Medina was the first Islamic state, founded by Prophet Muhammad in 622 CE after his hijrat or migration from Mecca. When he ascended to heaven, his representatives or Caliphs took over one by one. They were conceptually the spiritual as well as temporal heads of all Islam, effectively the Sunnis, who comprise 90 per cent of the world community, called the ummah. In 1924, Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, the new unquestioned head of Turkey, abolished the Caliphate and exiled the incumbent. That was the end of the symbolic head of all Islam. Muslims everywhere would like that institution to be recreated. The dream of the pre-1947 Muslims of India was that Pakistan would be the cradle of this recreated Medina.
The same sentiment in Arabia is reflected in the Islamic State (IS), which fought in Iraq against Baghdad and against the Syrian Government in the ghastly civil war that has just ended. Sentiment was so strong and widespread in India that Pakistan became a reality even with its two wings, 1,600 kilometres apart. Bangladesh broke away in 1971 and exploded the myth that Islam alone can bind any country together.
The same fissiparousness spread inside the western wing of Pakistan to emphasise that Islam cannot alone be the binding factor of any country or its parts. Followers have been too ambitious to expect religion to be a total prescription for life and not merely a spiritual path to connect man and God.
There must be leaders in Pakistan, who now realise this truth as well as recognise that but unfortunately, no other ideology or political basis has been allowed to sprout and grow. In short, Pakistan has allowed itself to get trapped in a blind alley.
The only way out is to explode and that holds a grave danger for India. If the people have no alternative but to spill out, India is the only destination. What Bangladeshis did to India in yesteryears, Pakistan could do in the years to come. To be deceived once is ignorance but to be deceived again is lunacy. Fencing one’s border is a wise measure. US President Donald Trump is building a wall across the southern border of America against the wishes of the Congress, which refuses to grant him a big enough budget. But how can one fence the sea shores?
Migrations by boat people are legendary, whether in Asia out of Vietnam, into Europe via sea or America from Haiti.
Over and above, to fence the land borders, there has to be alert by internal security who must be helped by watchtowers on the entire border, sea or land. The Aadhaar card is alright as a negative check but all adult citizens must be issued domestic passports to be okayed only after strict inquiries, much stricter than before giving out passports to travel abroad. With a passport, a person can settle in permanently. With India’s diversity, there would be no alternative but comprehensive vigil. Sooner or later, surreptitious infiltration is inevitable in large, medium or small measure.
Hence, above all, supreme deterrence is needed. Remember, Pakistanis would have friends and relatives who have been in India since time immemorial. Very few Bangladeshis had this advantage; their allies were politicians with their eyes on building vote banks.
Further help to the agonised and otherwise helpless people of Sindh, as well as Balochistan, should be contemplated. Remember, Sindhi locals hardly played any part in driving out the Hindus. That unfortunate role was played by the Mohajirs after they landed in Karachi and had to either live in camps or sleep on the streets. In fact, Sindhis were nowhere near the forefront of the demand for Pakistan, and their leadership had wondered as to how their economy could function efficiently without Hindu Amil officials and Bhaiband businessmen.
Balochistan, until late in 1948, had an Embassy in Karachi, which clearly showed that in terms of British tradition, the region had a distinct status and did not need an accession to either dominion, India or Pakistan. Nevertheless, the Khan of Kalat came to Delhi and officially called on Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and requested for Balochistan to be taken over as a part of India. Nehru politely declined. If either or both of these Provinces can release themselves from Islamabad’s clutches and become autonomous again, they can be of much help to New Delhi.
Courtesy: The Pioneer
Writer: Prafull Goradia, a well-known columnist and an author
Before making any outrageous claims on border issues, Chinese officials are better advised to do their homework well about history and geography
Hua Chunying, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, once again exhibited poor knowledge of history and even geography. She repeated her claims that Arunachal Pradesh is a part of Chinese territory. Soon after the Indian Prime Minister visited Arunachal Pradesh, she affirmed: “The Chinese Government has never recognised the so-called Arunachal Pradesh and is firmly opposed to the Indian leader’s visit to the East Section of the China-India boundary.”
True to form, South Block issued a weak rebuttal. One wonders why can’t New Delhi speak of the “so-called Tibetan Autonomous Region” or lodge a strong protest each time China does repair work on the road cutting across the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh? Indian diplomats are probably too shy for this. But we should learn from China to defend our interests more vociferously. Hua’s sharp tongue expressed hopes that “India will cherish the momentum of warming bilateral ties and not take any provocative action.” What provocative action? Just the Prime Minister’s visit to an Indian state? Hua may not be aware but China’s refusal to acknowledge the McMahon Line is a relatively new phenomenon.
Let us go back to 1956. As India prepared to celebrate the 2,500th anniversary of the birth of Buddha, communist China was extremely nervous; eastern Tibet was on fire with the Khampa rebellion, while central Tibet was slowly getting contaminated by the revolt. After months of prevarication, Beijing finally allowed the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama to visit India for the celebrations. But Chinese premier Zhou Enlai was really febrile, he was aware that many Tibetans wanted the Dalai Lama to stay on in India; as a result, he visited Delhi thrice in a period of two months.
During one of his numerous encounters with Zhou, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru asked him: “But I do not quite understand what you meant when you said that Tibet in the past had not become a province of China?” The premier answered: “That Tibet is part of China is a fact but it has never [been] an administrative province of China and has kept an autonomous character.” For Beijing, the autonomous character would remain on paper only. Zhou even admitted that India knew more about Tibet’s past history: “For example, I knew nothing about McMahon Line until recently when we came to study the border problem after the liberation of China.”
Hua would be surprised to learn that China’s premier did not know about the line delineating the border between Indian and Tibet till the early 1950s. Nehru unnecessarily asserted that historical knowledge was not important: “History is gone.” He, however, added: “My impression was that whatever it may be in theory, for all practical purposes, Tibet has all along been autonomous.”
The clever Zhou repeated that though people like him never knew about the McMahon Line till recently, the Kuomintang regime knew about it. Referring to the McMahon Line, he spoke of a “secret” pact between British India and Tibet at the time of the Simla conference.
The Chinese do not like to remember that the Tibetans sat on an equal footing with them during the Simla conference between October 1913 and July 1914. To give an example, the proceedings of the third meeting of the Tibet conference held on January 12, 1914, mentioned the presence of Sir Henry McMahon, GOVO, KCIE, CSI, British Plenipotentiary and staff; Monsieur Ivan Chen, Chinese Plenipotentiary and staff and Kusho Lonchen Shatra, Tibetan Plenipotentiary and staff. They officially sat together for nine months; China suffers from selective amnesia today.
To come back to the Nehru-Zhou meeting, the Premier continued on the McMahon Line: “And now that it is an accomplished fact, we should accept it. But we have not consulted Tibet so far. In the last agreement, which we signed about Tibet [in 1954], the Tibetans wanted us to reject this Line but we told them that the question should be temporarily put aside.”
The Chinese Premier bluffed: “But now we think that we should try to persuade and convince Tibetans to accept it.”
Then, Nehru went on his favorite argument: “The border is a high mountain and sparsely populated.” He further asserted: “Apart from the major question, there are also small queries about two miles here and two miles there. But if we agree on some principle, namely, the principle of previous normal practice or the principle of watershed, we can also settle these other small points.”
It is a fact that it is the nationalist government which made the communists realise the extent of the Chinese territory in the area. It is Ren Naiqiang, an influential scholar during the Republican era, who first included parts of the north-eastern borders of India into the Chinese territory. In 1926, long before the beginning of the Japanese war, Ren had started wandering through Kham. In 1936, as the Nationalist Government formally established the new province Xikang (corresponding to Kham province of Tibet), Ren Naiqiang was encouraged by Liu Wenhui, the Governor of the new province, to produce a map of the area. Though the Chinese had never set a foot in the area, the new map included the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in China.
At the end of 1949, Ren Naiqiang met Marshal He Long, one of the seniormost generals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and explained why his map was dependable; the Marshal was convinced and ordered the distribution of copies. On January 10, 1950, He Long sent his report to Mao Zedong strongly recommending that Ren’s map should be accepted and circulated amongst the PLA. It is after this encounter that China started “claiming” India’s NEFA (today Arunachal Pradesh). Before making outrageous claims, Hua should do her homework and know her country’s history. China has not always claimed NEFA.
(The author is an expert on India-China relations.)
Writer: Claude Arpi
Courtesy: Pioneer
The words and actions of the US have increasingly come under question owing to that intrigues, complexities and accompanying civilian atrocities in conflicts in Afghanistan and Vietnam.
The genesis, proceedings and the ultimate fate of the US involvement in both Vietnam and Afghanistan are plagued with eerie similarities. First, both — the Vietnamese and the Afghans — pride themselves on their fierce history of resistance to foreign invaders for centuries. In the case of the Vietnamese, it was the valiant repulsion of the Chinese, Mongols, French and the Japanese forces; whereas, the unforgiving battlefields of the Afghan swathes have been bloodied with forces of Alexander, Arab caliphates, Genghis Khan, Timur, Persians, Mughals, Sikhs, British empire and to the communist forces of the erstwhile USSR. Both races have a heightened sense of history and destiny that militates instinctively against any notion of a foreign “invader.” Both these lands have been at the forefront of the US’ efforts to counter the topical “ism” that threatened American interests. In the case of Vietnam, in the 50s and 60s, it was the Cold War fear of “communism” that drove US interest; whereas in the case of Afghanistan (post 2001), “religious extremism” replaced “communism” as the greatest security threat.
In both these conflicts, the US had played a covert, tactical and surreptitious role in inflaming the combustible ground situation. Insidious military and financial support was extended to the French forces in the 50s to re-colonise Vietnam, which later morphed into a full-fledged US military intervention by the 60s. Similarly, the less-than-covert military operations of the Central Intelligence Agency-Islamic State (IS), along with the Afghan mujahideen in the 80s, had lit the flames of religious extremism that ultimately morphed into the phenomenon of the Taliban. The pattern of sudden US disinterest is also common to both places as Vietnam would face in the mid-70s when the forces of Ho Chi Minh overran Saigon, as also in the essential US disinterest in the 90s as Pakistan-supported Taliban entered and butchered their way into Kabul. The genesis of both conflicts had unmistakable fingerprints of the US handiwork prior to the full escalation of the crisis. In both cases, the US had erred in its initial judgement as it had twice spurned appeals by the nationalist, Ho Chi Minh, before he turned a staunch communist; whereas, the American desperation to dislodge the communist Najibullah regime in Kabul had led them to honour and fete the Afghan mujahideen in the White House, who later turned on their original benefactors.
Signs of American “shock-and-awe” military tactics to bludgeon enemy lines were visible in the killing fields of Vietnam, where the Americans dropped more than three times the tonnage of bombs that the entire allied forces dropped in World War II. Today, Afghanistan has replaced Vietnam as its longest war and a record high number of bombs dropped in a year were registered in 2018. The definitive imagery of 388,000 tonnes of napalm bombs dropped in Vietnam was mirrored with the unabashed dropping of the GBU-43/B (also known as “Mother of all Bombs”) in Afghanistan — the most powerful non-nuclear weapon in American arsenal. However, despite the colossal commitment of weaponry and military might, the Afghan extremist groups today control more territory than at any point ever since the removal of their regime 17 years ago. The Vietnam War had led to over 58,000 American military casualties and the technology-enhanced Afghan war to yet another 2,400 American military casualties. The “cost of war” to the locals (civilians, soldiers and insurgents) was an unprecedented three million in the Vietnam War and over 111,000 in Afghanistan. From the official start date of the Vietnam War (November 1, 1955) to the signing of the peace treaty in January 1973 for facilitating the withdrawal of American troops, the realisation of an unsustainable “no-win” stalemate took 18 years. Today, nearly 18 years into the Afghan War (started in 2001, following 9/11), the Americans are walking the talk of another American withdrawal, this time from Afghanistan, following yet another stalemate.
Unfortunately, the looming fears of the imminent future are also similarly aligned as the Americans are negotiating with the Afghan Taliban (under the nudge and aegis of the equally unreliable ally, Pakistan) to facilitate the American troops’ withdrawal. In 1973, a similar face-saving treaty was signed by the representatives of the US, South Vietnam, North Vietnam and Viet Cong to ‘reunite’ Vietnam peacefully – even though the signatory north Vietnamese were knowingly violating the terms of ceasefire and agreement and by 1975, the entire South Vietnam territory had fallen to a full-scale invasion by the North. It is this doomsday scenario that has fuelled concerns in the Ashraf Ghani-led Afghan Government in Kabul as they fear the impact of an emboldened Taliban. From 1,50,000 foreign troops defending the beleaguered Afghan Government till 2016, to just about 7,000 (after the current US withdrawal plans), along with the well-known aspiration of “strategic depth” in Afghanistan for the Pakistani state – the military ability of the current Afghan Government in Kabul to withstand the IS-Taliban combined onslaught is extremely suspicious. The sudden vacuum following the US withdrawal in Vietnam in 1973 had led to the ultimate fall of the South Vietnam defences; the US “withdrawal” from Afghanistan in 1991 had led to the creation of the Taliban; and now the insecurity in Kabul is one of history repeating itself.
While history is yet to record its final verdict and victor in Afghanistan, in Vietnam, the Americans can technically claim to have “withdrawn.” However, objectively, the anti-US side overran the US protectorate and they rule till date. Thousands of insurgents were killed in US military operations and multiple more of the same were borne out of the sense of revenge, hatred and retribution against the US. In both cases the human, economic, military and the political “cost of war” became unsustainable and the common feature of “stalemate” wore out the largest military in the world. The intrigues, complexities and accompanying civilian atrocities in both conflicts have also led to serious questions on the morality, trust and confidence on the US’ words and actions. Afghanistan is still an unfolding saga, yet portents of a possible repeat of a Vietnam stare in the face.
(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry.)
Writer: Bhopinder Singh
Bibi Aasia Noreen, the Pakistani Christian woman who was on death row for blasphemy, is finally out of the woods. The Supreme Court of Pakistan recently rejected the final appeal against her acquittal. But she might still have to relocate to the West, as living in Pakistan could prove perilous for her. India could have set an example by inviting her to live in this country.
Imagine if Aasia Bibi were a Christian woman in India, working in an agricultural field alongside Hindu women. Consider a hypothetical scenario. Thirsty after working under the hot sun, she fetches a pail of water for fellow workers, but first drinks some herself from the metal mug lying beside the well. The other women, suddenly realising that she is a Christian, wonder whether Aasia Bibi had “polluted” their well and “diluted” their religion. And then, angered and hurt, Aasia Bibi reacts by telling some horrible things about Hindu deities as though she had been reading BR Ambedkar’s Riddles in Hinduism: The Annotated Critical Selection the previous night.
What options would Hindu women have against Aasia Bibi? First, a cat-fight to teach her a lesson on the spot. Second, tell the owner of the land to dismiss her from services. Third, to complain to their respective husbands about the defilement. Fourth, to tell the priest about a local temple. Fifth, go to Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) karyakartas. Sixth, to go to the law enforcing authorities like police and court.
The third and fourth options would have been treated as nothing more than gossip-mongering. Also, since Aasia Bibi is not a Bible-thumping Christian missionary, there would be little to excite the RSS and VHP karyakartas. The fifth option of approaching the law enforcing authorities would be positively dangerous for them as they would be hauled up under Section 3 of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, to enforce religious disabilities (denying access to water sources). Thus, rather than doing any harm to Aasia Bibi, they themselves would have ended up in prison for up to six months besides depositing a penalty.
But on June 14, 2009, Aasia Bibi was unfortunately in an alternate universe called Pakistan. She was arrested on charges of making derogatory remarks about Prophet Mohammed, based on the evidence of Mafia Bibi and Asma Bibi. Qari Mohammed Salam, a local cleric, filed a case of blasphemy with the police, based on hearsay. The case spiralled in importance with a local court awarding death sentence to Aasia Bibi for denigrating Prophet Mohammed in 2010, and later a Lahore court upholding its judgement in 2016.
The Pakistan Penal Code has several controversial sections (and sub sections thereof) ranging from 295 to 298-C under offences related to religion, commonly called “blasphemy laws” that are discriminatory against non-Muslims. The most dangerous of them are 295-C (use of derogatory remarks with respect to Prophet Mohammed) and 295-B (defiling the Holy Quran) which carry a punishment of mandatory death sentence and life imprisonment respectively.
Some of these deadly provisions were inserted in Pakistan’s Penal Code not when the Islamic Republic was founded but in the 1980s, when the rest of the world was seized with the idea of progress. Pakistan had inherited some blasphemy laws from the British period but those were religion-neutral. Their basic purpose was not to defend religious principles but maintain communal peace.
In three decades between 1947 and 1977, there were only 10 reported court judgements in Pakistan pertaining to offences against religion. The complaints were made mostly by Muslims against other Muslims, by non-Muslims against Muslims. No case was registered by a Muslim against non-Muslims for committing an act of blasphemy against Prophet Mohammed or “defiling” the Quran. But all these was about to change soon.
In 1974, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the Prime Minister, the first amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, was carried out to exclude the Ahmediyas from the legal definition of being a Muslim. The language of the amendment had a theological overtone incompatible with modern constitutions. It says that a person, who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of the prophethood of the Mohammed, is not a Muslim for the purpose of the Constitution or law.
In 1977, General Zia-ul Haq came to power through a coup d’état. The ensuing 11 years saw increased Islamisation of Pakistan in various spheres. These included insertion of five provisions relating to blasphemy in the Pakistan Penal Code between 1980 and 1986. Close to 1,500 people have been charged under those sections till date though none were actually hanged.
A Federal Shariat Court (FSC) was established in 1980, with the power to “examine and decide the question whether any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam”. The FSC’s decisions are binding upon the Government unless the latter successfully appeals to the Shariat bench of the Supreme Court.
When Section 295-C was introduced in 1986, it had a provision of life imprisonment as an alternative to capital punishment. But in 1990, the FSC recommended the removal of alternative provision of life imprisonment. Since the Pakistan Government did not appeal against this recommendation in the Supreme Court by the deadline of April 30, 1991, the capital punishment without an alternative attained finality.
A judgement of Peshawar High Court in 2006 expressed serious concern that whenever a person was charged with such an offence, the media gave extensive coverage and the accused person was abused by the society/people at large. Even under Islamic injunctions, the court added, it is for the Qazi alone to decide the guilt or innocence of the accused and none could be allowed to forejudge and condemn any person accused of such offence without facing proper and fair trial.
Right to fair trial is what the Supreme Court based its case upon in its judgements (dated October 7, 2015, and January, 28, 2019). But unfortunately, the court could not discard or challenge the atrocious rubric of blasphemy laws. This means there will be no end to this madness in Pakistan. The courts could not counteract blasphemy because they know it is an integral part of Islam. Its misuse though has been possibly as old as its application itself.
Nicholas Mannucci (1638-1717), the Italian adventurer to India, relates in his Storia do Mogor how a rich Jew in Aleppo (Syria) outwitted a Muslim Governor, who wanted to deprive him of his wealth, life and religion by abetting blasphemy in the 16th century. The Governor asked the Jew, who was the greatest Prophet among Moses, Christ and Mohammed? Had the Jew said Mohammed, he would be asked to accept Islam. Had he mentioned the others, it would be considered a blasphemy and he would be put to death.
The Jew, however, proved cleverer than expected. He narrated a story of how a rich man had a precious stone, which each of his three sons wanted to inherit on his death. So he got two exact replicas made from the lapidaire; and gave away those to each son so that one had the original and the other two had replicas. But he told each to keep it a secret that he had given him the original and the false one to others. But only the father knew who got the original. So God gave three Prophetic religions viz Judaism, Christianity and Islam to three races. While each thinks his religion is true, God alone knows the truth. The Muslim governor conceded defeat in his mission and even rewarded the Jew.
(The writer is author of recently published book, ‘The Microphone Men: How Orators created a Modern India’. Views expressed are his personal)
Writer: Priyadarshi Dutta
Courtesy: The Pioneer
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