The absorption of jobless migrant workers in newer fiscal activities with dignity would significantly depend on the nature and type of Government policies put in place to jumpstart economies of cities
Symmetric to global trends, COVID-19 has had multi-dimensional impacts on the Indian economy and society. Amid rising concerns over the lives and livelihoods of the poorer sections of the population due to the nationwide lockdown, the Government announced seemingly bold economic packages. However, with a few exceptions, lack of coordination in the official sphere at the ground level has had appalling consequences, especially on the millions of “city makers”, the urban informal workers, who represent a significant share of the workforce and contribute in multiple ways to the economy.
Employed mostly in the unorganised sector and living in informal settlements in cities, they have borne the major brunt of the lockdown. They have no job contracts, no regular work, are often employed casually and are without any social safety nets to support them and their families during exigencies. Moreover, their livelihood opportunities are constrained by multiple barriers that include deplorable housing conditions, inadequacies of urban services, in-built socio-economic disparities relating to caste and gender and also the policies and practices of governments.
The challenges during the lockdown: An IMPRI survey to understand the impact of the lockdown on the lives of migrant workers revealed that almost three-fourth of the 3,121 respondents from over 50 cities of India were engaged in informal employment, i.e. daily wage work, petty trades/business and as temporary workers without any social security benefits. It was found that six out of 10 workers had lost their jobs during the lockdown, with unemployment being highest among the casual labourers and self-employed respondents. A whopping 74 per cent of the casual labourers lost their jobs while 67 per cent of the self-employed workers could not pursue their economic activities due to the lockdown.
The workers, who had no other option but to remain confined within their houses without any work, could neither realistically practise social distancing, nor could they afford it. The inability to earn during the shutdown translated into 54 per cent of the people being unable to pay rent for their accommodation.
The loss of jobs had a spillover impact on the education of children, too, as most city-makers send their offspring to Government schools. In the prevailing new normal of online teaching methods and reliance on digital modes of learning, education has become a distant dream for the children of migrant labourers because they have no smartphones for accessing such education, forget about computers.
With 88 per cent of the city makers depending on household income, savings, financial help from relatives and friends and so on, for meeting their health-related expenditure, this temporary job loss has added to their anxieties that any kind of health emergency, including COVID-19, would exacerbate.
What they want: Quite understandably, most people want to return to work and almost three-fourth of the respondents said that they would join the same job in which they were engaged prior to the lockdown, if possible. In other words, this loss of jobs or livelihood options was considered as a temporary phenomenon.
However, the absorption of jobless migrant workers in newer fiscal activities with dignity would significantly depend on the nature and type of Government policies put in place to jumpstart economies of cities. This can mostly be done by providing boosts to local businesses and small and micro-enterprises.
The challenges: A defining challenge for devising appropriate mitigating policies for the city makers is the lack of data about them both prior to and during any kind of emergency. So, preparedness and early action by the communities are essential. To benefit from any Central and State Government relief measures — both cash and non-cash — people must possess Government documents (ration card, Aadhaar card), bank account and be enrolled in different Government welfare schemes and so on.
The survey revealed that coverage of and eligibility for Government support programmes was a major concern, as evident from the possession status of various important documents by the respondents.
About 23 per cent of the respondents did not have ration cards, 32 per cent did not have zero-balance Jan Dhan bank accounts and on an average only one out of 10 respondents were covered under the Government of India’s flagship public health as well as life insurance schemes — Ayushman Bharat, PM Jeevan Jyoti Bima and PM Suraksha Bima Yojna.
About 65 per cent of the surveyed respondents were aware of the AarogyaSetu App and among them 62 per cent reported use of the app. Only 38 per cent respondents were aware of State WhatsApp helplines. For other apps and e-initiatives, the awareness levels of the respondents were very poor. Roughly about 20-30 per cent of the respondents were aware of State e-coupons for rations, State e-pass or other different State apps and use of these apps among them turned out to be even more pathetic.
Lack of access to smartphones and unstable internet connectivity were the major impediments in using the apps and portals.
Regarding their awareness on eligibility for Government support programmes, only 37 per cent of the respondents thought that they were eligible for benefits under the Pradhan Mantri Gareeb Kalyan Yojana (having an outlay of `20 lakh crore for the COVID-19 response). However, only 34 per cent of the respondents could avail benefits like cash transfers and free ration under this scheme.
The solutions: In the light of the above evidence, it becomes extremely important to think of precise policy improvements to tide over the crisis. To start with, the stringent Aadhaar-requirements for accessing different schemes must be relaxed for at least the next six months. Another option could be a job assurance programme that would give needy households livelihood security during health crises.
Essentially, the COVID-19 crisis requires extremely localised and coordinated responses. So, city governments and their elected representatives should decide on vigorous delivery of basic urban services that might be the most effective in their contexts. Financially-empowered city governments with clear functional domain and adequate institutional capacity can respond rapidly and contain the outbreak of COVID-19.
It is equally important to improve and expand the coverage of the Public Distribution System (PDS). Bridging the awareness gap regarding available Government support programmes, especially the PDS, through timely and reliable information and expanding the coverage of such programmes to the needy but non-registered segments via certain temporary forms of authentication as alternatives, can be very useful.
The last Economic Survey (2019-20) spoke of “Thalinomics”, which says that a good vegetarian and non-vegetarian platter costs a minimum of `25 minimum and `40, respectively. Therefore, in order to ensure that the poorest sections of the population are able to fulfil their dietary requirements, each identified needy person must be provided with a dollar a day (around `2,000 per month).
Further, for everyone to be vigilant about the spread of COVID-19, digital literacy for children belonging to poor families, and smooth transfer of digital payment of welfare schemes, poor households should be provided an Android phone either for free or at a subsidised rate through PDS shops. In addition, the private sector (under the CSR component) should come forward and provide free sim and data coupons to Below Poverty Line households. It is the most opportune time to ensure digital literacy among the people.
In the US, $300-$400 are being given weekly to the unemployed as an allowance. Therefore, to ensure a dignified assistance to the poor, the Government of India can afford to give $1 (about `75) a day to each poor person. If we give `2,000 per month assistance to 12 crore people (the bottom quartile population in the urban economic ladder), it will translate to `24,000 crore a month and `72,000 crore for three months. This is certainly doable.
Moreover, if we can give an Android phone in a graded manner to around five crore people (prioritising the elderly, women and children going to Government schools) in the cities, it would amount to around `30,000 crore (cost per handset around `6,000). Overall, this would amount to `100,000 crore and would be crucial as India moves into the “unlock” phase. Such provisioning is certainly doable and would just need a reorientation of the Budget 2020-21. And to this, the `35 lakh crore worth of forex reserves could be rightly utilised to pay for the war against COVID-19, as it would help distribute the pain similar to the Keynesian tenets during World War-II and create a better society.
(Writer: Arjun Kumar; Courtesy: The Pioneer)
Party loses more MLAs before Rajya Sabha polls, a steady slide since it won 81 Assembly seats in 2017
The Congress, for all its attempts to appear as a responsible Opposition, is not quite being able to hold on to its own members and convince them of its leadership or its political capital. Just as the party was recovering from the exit of Gandhi loyalist and aspirant leader Jyotiraditya Scindia over a Rajya Sabha ticket, its MLAs in Gujarat have resigned in quick succession days before the Rajya Sabha polls. Two legislators, Akshay Patel and Jitu Chaudhary, resigned on Wednesday. And yesterday, it was Brijesh Merja, the MLA from Morbi constituency. The latter even gave up primary membership of the Congress. With this, a total of eight Congress MLAs have resigned since March. Before the polls were announced, the Congress had 73 MLAs in the Gujarat Assembly and was looking to win two of the four seats. Now that looks remote. The ruling BJP, which has 103 MLAs in the Assembly, is now eyeing a third seat. What is sad is the Congress had put up a determined show against an ascendant BJP, winning 81 seats in the 2017 Assembly elections, notching up its best performance in the State in years. Although the BJP had won, the Congress did deliver a psychological blow back then. It was expected to consolidate after this booster shot but since then the party has only seen a steady stream of exits, losing 16 MLAs. It is all too easy to blame the BJP for poaching MLAs but then the ruling party has made no bones about Operation Lotus or its attempt to avenge and wrest the psychological edge the Congress had in 2017. Knowing this full well, the Congress should have been vigilant and proactive, considering it wanted to make Gujarat, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s home State, a prestige issue. Instead it rested easy on the verdict without realising that the BJP’s mammoth Lok Sabha showing and its near decimation would require more groundwork in State units and at least holding on to them. The rural vote did work for the Gujarat Congress then but it didn’t build on it by breaking into Thakor voters for instance or work on the aspirations of its MLAs.
Congress leader Rahul Gandhi may be crafting an image change in the middle of a pandemic, appearing to contribute to the national revival effort by holding conversations and dialogues with eminent men friendly to him, but it’s not reaping results on the ground. Particularly at a time when capable leaders of the Congress have proved their mettle as Chief Ministers in the battle against the disease spiral, be it Rajasthan’s Ashok Gehlot or Punjab’s Amarinder Singh. It would have worked had he focussed on COVID-19 management in Gujarat, one of the worst-hit States, and done more on-the-grounds, like he did with migrants. Even his think tank-like advisories seem too tutored and self-serving than well-meaning. He may want to rebrand himself as a serious ideologue but webinars and conversations with public intellectuals will not help him if he wants to stay relevant in electoral politics. It is not that Gandhi hasn’t tried to strip down his dynastic entitlements but he needs to be seen as a leader who has a grasp on issues. More importantly, he must make himself available to local units. Both the Scindia and Gujarat fiascos have shown that he needs to keep the party herd immune from political inducements. What Rahul and his strategists must do is to diminish the trust deficit in him as a deliverable leader, build on his natural strengths like when he did padayatras and entered people’s homes and localise his appeal. The Congress is not short of advisors, he needs to show that he can be a leader of the masses, not of the podium.
(Courtesy: The Pioneer)
The changes announced in the rules of agriculture marketing might provide women and vulnerable sections easier access to markets but we need a wider social security net and modernization
Given the agrarian crisis that the country had been going through, which got exacerbated by the pandemic, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced 11 measures to boost the farm sector, ranging from the amendment to the Essential Commodities Act to a Rs 1 lakh crore fund to boost agriculture infrastructure. The changes announced in the rules of agriculture marketing might provide women and vulnerable sections easier access to markets.
The existing Agricultural Produce Market Committee or APMC Act was planned to protect the interests of the British Government, which wanted to ensure the supply of pure cotton at reasonable prices to the textile mills of Manchester. The first regulated market (Karanja) under the ‘Hyderabad Residency Order’ was established in 1886 and the first legislation was the Berar Cotton and Grain Market Act of 1887, which empowered a British Resident to declare any place in the assigned district as a market, for the sale and purchase of agricultural produce and constitute a committee to supervise the regulated markets. In 1928, the Royal Commission on Agriculture proposed a regulation of marketing practices and the establishment of regulated markets. The Government of India prepared a ‘Model Bill’ in 1938 and circulated it to all the Indian States. It became the guiding force for our APMC Act. So, it is not difficult to infer why the spirit of the APMC Act favours buyers rather than farmers. Of course, some would argue that it allows States to protect the farmers, as procurement is done under the supervision and surveillance of the State. But many mechanisms are available to protect the interests of farmers rather than being discriminatory against them.
The APMC Act designates a few patches as formal procurement centres. Currently, there are only 6,746 pockets in a vast country like ours and this allows limited buyers to purchase from farmers. This is a classic case of a State-backed oligopsonistic market structure, in which the number of buyers is small while the number of sellers is large. This gives enough power to buyers to pay the minimum price to farmers. Ironically, the maximum distance between a farmer and the mandi is five kilometres (km) but our field information suggests a minimum of 30-40 km travel for a farmer out to sell his produce. This means the APMC Act not only gives oligopsonistic power to buyers but also creates a geographical monopoly for them.
Further, the small number of APMCs and traders poses a challenge for farmers to sell their produce as they have to wait for days for their turn. This makes some sense for big farmers but not for small producers. Field data from Maharashtra, Karnataka and Telangana shows a minimum of three to five man-day loss for small farmers.
How the proposed changes will help: An independent country should favour the marginalised and protect their interests. This proposed change in agri-marketing rules is a step in that direction. Hopefully, new rules will encourage big-aggregators and start-ups to use technology in a better way to procure directly from farmers. These channels may be existent in pockets but operate informally due to stringent market rules (procurement and cross-border trade). A big push is necessary to bring the changes on the ground.
The pandemic is an opportunity to deregulate agri-marketing effectively to ensure social distancing. A perfect model of social distancing could be doorstep collection of agri-produce or at least at the village/cluster level. As an experiment, local collection centres were set up in parts of Vidarbha region of Maharashtra to procure agri-produce at the doorstep. These also acted as local storage and sorting facilities. All procurement activities were done by women farmers who were otherwise absent in post-harvest management. The process was iterated with tur daal. Calculations show that through this process small farmers save about Rs 175 per 50 kg of tur or approximately 10 per cent of its price; which means a marginal farmer can gain up to 10 per cent from doorstep collection. A similar experiment was done in other parts of Maharashtra and other States like Telangana and Karnataka. The outcome in those areas was also on a similar line; of course with a little variation.
Farmers can also minimise wastage in the direct procurement system. For example, a year ago the India Development Foundation (IDF) studied a vegetable value chain in Siddipet in Telangana and found big savings when Big Basket and Reliance Fresh started procuring vegetables directly from the farmers for their shops in Hyderabad. Farmers used to get the order one-day in advance and usually pluck the exact amount and quality of vegetable demanded. These are some out-of-the-box experiments that reveal huge benefits for small and marginal farmers through local collection. New marketing rules should encourage such initiatives which are resilient in the current context, efficient and pro-farmer.
Gender aspect: The rising participation of women in farm work in India — a phenomenon commonly referred to as the feminisation of agriculture — is a huge reality now. According to OXFAM 2018, the agriculture sector employs 80 per cent of all economically productive women in India. They comprise 33 per cent of the agricultural labour force and 48 per cent of self-employed farmers. Despite their large contribution, women continue to remain invisible in the rural economy of India. Our critical evaluation suggests that women are acting as non-paid workers in agriculture or any other traditional sector; be it handicraft or weaving. Men are in control when it comes to selling their products to mandis/APMCs or handicrafts to local traders.
A vast majority of women, particularly in rural areas, are engaged in the informal sector and derive their livelihood from activities relating to agriculture, handlooms and artisanal products. Unfortunately, these women remain at the lowest end of the value chain, with their share in earnings being low out of margins, which are even otherwise very minuscule. In this context, there is scope to increase their income by continuing in the existing activity and becoming organised as a collective, so as to pool their output. Others can be helped by getting them involved in some productive activity that is or can be popularised in the locality, and then selling the output as a group of women producers.
Doorstep selling/localised procurement will be liberating for women farmers. It will open up an opportunity for women farmers to participate in the selling activity and directly deal with the buyers. Our experience shows that exposure to agri-marketing made women aware of the information inputs and upgrades that could make their work more gainful. It made them receptive to new skills and knowledge on good agriculture practices and agri-markets. Communities witnessed that the traditionally-gendered division of agricultural work has changed. Women farmers are more confident, deciding on crop-related activities like the choice of crop, selection of fertiliser, taking loans or even children’s education.
Putting Women Self-Help Groups at the forefront: SHGs are a great way of empowering women in villages. However, the sustainability of such groups is a challenge as limited contribution from women and frequent defaults make them fragile. SHGs are formed and get dissolved in a few years. Connecting these SHGs to value chains is a great way to sustain them in the long-run. With the changed law, the SHGs now can participate in selling activities effectively, directly contact end-buyers and get a five per cent hike in the value of their produce. This amount is enough to sustain them for most of the year. And more importantly, it will increase activities in SHGs, encouraging women to meet others regularly. It has been observed that once the SHGs are linked to value chains, beneficiaries actively participate in entrepreneurial activities and have a much better understanding of their profits and savings.
In the end, one must understand that changing marking laws is not a panacea to all of our farm woes. Agriculture is a delicate area which needs continuous attention and care. Reforming a colonial-era marketing practice will definitely help the disadvantaged section of farmers but a wider social security and modernisation of agriculture is needed.
(Writer: Arijit Das; Courtesy: The Pioneer)
The Government deserves some credit for at least putting on the table long-pending reforms in agri-marketing, which if carried through, will be truly revolutionary
Heralding a new chapter in agricultural market reforms in India, on May 15 Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman made three major announcements under the “Atma Nirbhar Bharat Abhiyan.” The first announcement was about the Centre’s decision to enact a legislation to enable direct purchase of specified commodities — under entry 42 of the Union List and entry 33 of the Concurrent List — from farmers outside the designated Agricultural Produce Market Committees (APMCs). Next was the move to enact a Central law on contract farming to provide a legal framework for farmers to engage with processors, aggregators, large retailers and exporters in a fair and transparent manner. Third was the decision to amend the Essential Commodities Act (ECA), 1954 and take off pulses, cereals, edible oil, oil seeds, onions and potatoes from the purview of this archaic law.
To understand the full ramifications of the proposed enactments, at the outset, let us take a look at the existing regulations. At present, trade in agri-commodities is governed by a highly-restrictive legislation viz. the APMC Act. This empowers State Governments to specify market areas — where farmers bring their produce for sale. These are operated and regulated by market committees. There are a total of about 5,000 such markets or mandis across the country.
The stated objective of the APMCs is to promote organised marketing of farm commodities to ensure fair play, achieve an efficient system of buying and selling of commodities, protect farmers from intermediaries and traders and to ensure better prices and timely payment for the produce. Far from achieving these objectives, farmers are being exploited by a network of licenced traders and middlemen, who have a complete stranglehold over these platforms.
While on one hand, farmers don’t get to sell their entire produce at the Minimum Support Price (MSP), on the other, no alternative platforms are available where they could sell. Even Government agencies don’t come forward to buy when the market price dips below the MSP. Actually, the problem is much deeper.
This has to do with a cozy nexus between politicians and grain traders that has existed and flourished for decades. A grain trader has a fundamental interest in ensuring that he minimises his payout to the farmer for the grains he buys. He can succeed in this gameplan if the farmer is left high and dry by State agencies. So, he collaborates with the politicians in the ruling establishment to ensure that State agencies remain weak and de-motivated.
This nexus has also come in the way of amending the APMC Act to make way for alternative channels of selling, such as direct purchase by bulk buyers, processors, exporters and so on (the revenue State Governments get from levy of market fee on transactions at the mandis has proved to be another major deterrent. In 2017, the Modi Government had passed a Model Agricultural Produce and Livestock Marketing [Promotion and Facilitation] Law containing provisions to give more options to farmers for selling their crop and greater flexibility to traders such as ‘single pan-State licence’ for buying from anywhere in the State).
True to its nomenclature, the model law is a mere showpiece as until hitherto (prior to the Covid–19 crisis, to be specific), a majority of the States showed no interest in amending their laws. In a daring move, the then BJP Government, led by Devendra Fadnavis, had approved in August 2018, an amendment to the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 1963, in sync with the Centre’s model law. That was done through the ordinance route. But Fadnavis was forced to withdraw the Bill on November 28, 2018 from the legislative council, a day after it was passed.
The continued writ of the APMCs has meant that there is no free movement of farm products even within the State, forget free inter-State trade. With several pieces of State legislation creating impregnable zones, even the much-trumpeted electronic national agriculture market (e-NAM) has failed to take off. The processors, exporters and other large buyers have no incentive to invest in agri-infrastructure. The archaic ECA (1954) with its draconian provisions, especially with regard to stock limits, acts as a further disincentive.
All this boils down to farmers not getting a remunerative price for their produce on the one hand and consumers having to pay a high price on the other — even as a number of intermediaries in the supply chain appropriate a major slice of what the latter pays. Needless to say, that the resulting low income not only keeps farmers poor but also boomerangs on overall economic growth through reduction in rural purchasing power. The extant state of affairs is not good for boosting exports on a sustainable basis either.
The Covid-19 crisis may have come as a blessing in disguise. It gripped India at a time when the Rabi crop, mostly the winter staple wheat, was ready for harvest. April–May is the period when farmers congregate at the mandis. Being the only platform where farmers could sell their produce, this would have led to overcrowding at the markets which comes in conflict with “social distancing” — a pre-requisite for preventing the spread of the deadly virus.
Due to the dire need for adhering to “social distancing”, Modi asked the States to suspend certain provisions of their respective APMC laws for three months to make way for purchase of farmers’ produce directly from their doorsteps by large farmers’ producers organisations (FPOs), large buyers such as processors, millers, exporters, cooperatives, individual traders and so on.
Some States like Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Karnataka responded by making amendments in their APMC laws (using the ordinance route as none of the State Assemblies are in session, courtesy the prevailing emergency). As per the amendment, the entire State is declared as a “single market” wherein a trader can get a single licence for purchase of agricultural produce from any mandi within it. Further, it allows trade in all farm commodities, including livestock, outside the regulated APMC markets.
This has not only kept Covid–19 at bay (as the traders went to the farmers’ doorstep instead of the latter having to go all the way to the mandi) but also fetched a remunerative price for their produce by offering more choice, resulting in higher income. No wonder, amid the gloom and doom in most other sectors of the economy, agriculture is expected to show a positive growth rate of over three per cent during the current year (of course, this will be helped by normal monsoon predicted by the meteorological department).
In retrospect, there is some reason to rejoice over the changes in APMC laws by the aforementioned States, which has enabled private trade to complement efforts of State agencies in ensuring record procurement from the farmers. While Modi had asked for suspension of the relevant provisions for three months, these States have gone a step further by bringing an element of permanence. That serves as the icing on the cake. But some doubts remain.
For one, most States continue to turn a deaf ear to the Centre’s wish. Even in the four States, where the changes have been brought about, these will have to be passed by the State Assemblies in the end. Given the deep-rooted vested interest, a Maharashtra-type fiasco can’t be ruled out. In this backdrop, the Centre’s decision to enact a Central law, wielding the rarely-used power under the Constitution to regulate inter-State trade and intra-State trade, makes major sense. The law will enable an entity to buy farm produce from farmers directly anywhere in the country, even outside the regulated market yards.
At the same time, the amendment in the ECA to remove fetters such as stock limits (these limits will be imposed only in exceptional circumstances) will enable large buyers viz. processors, millers, exporters and so on, to scale up purchases, thus providing sustained support to farmers. The proposed Contract Law —enforceable in all States — will clearly lay down rules of the game for a processor/large retailer that it must follow to ensure that farmers are not taken for a ride.
These farm reforms are intended to create a parallel arrangement for selling farm produce and can co-exist with the APMCs. These aim at breaking the monopoly of a few licenced traders at mandis, create competition and thus help both farmers and consumers. Whether or not these actually see the light of the day remains to be seen. For now, the Government deserves some accolades for at least putting on the table long-pending reforms in agri-marketing, which if carried through, will be truly revolutionary.
(Writer: Uttam Gupta; Courtesy: The Pioneer)
Amid border tensions, India must beat China at its own game by playing to its strengths, lowering rhetoric, strengthening its military-economic muscle and posturing peace
The crest and trough of the Sino-Indian relationship has been witnessing its lowest ebb ever since the Doklam standoff of 2017. Now, an expected reportage of counter-narratives is ensuing on both sides. Hard facts have become a casualty. The primary driver for the present jingoistic fervour is the cold reality of extreme “political vulnerability” following mismanagement of the COVID pandemic and its accompanying impact both in Beijing and New Delhi. Thus, the common urge for some societal distraction. The ability to spin the situation (however severe) towards their own advantage has been the hallmark of both regimes.
While this is certainly not the sort of distraction that would appeal to New Delhi’s sensibilities, it is clearly up the Chinese path of circumstantial preference. The Xi regime is legitimised and galvanised by the hegemonic “Chinese Dream” and the sudden undoing of the same due to the socio-economic cost of COVID-19. Alongside came the trade war with the US, implosive tendencies flaring up in Hong Kong, Tibet and with the Uighurs. The re-election of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen, who has brazenly slammed the door on the Chinese offer of “one country, two systems,” dealt a further blow. Chinese President Xi Jinping is desperately looking for distraction and is showcasing some “wins.” He is punting on the tried and tested formula of patriotism to “manufacture” distraction.
In such times, the media becomes the foremost weapon for subterfuge and inflaming passions that tend to divert passions from real issues. It is in this backdrop that a rather bizarre, loaded and factually questionable goad was made by Xi when he said, “It is necessary to explore ways of training and preparing for war because epidemic control efforts have been normalised.” The supposed “enemy” was not named. It could be anyone — Taiwan, the US or India — given the prevailing dissonance. The Indian media does no service in biting the bait with its own proclivity for war-mongering and provoking the citizenry to adopt their own diversionary views. Uber-nationalism is also fodder for TRPs. Besides, it also ostensibly projects a “positive” outlook of Indian capabilities.
Amid the media din, the official dispensation has maintained an unusual silence, unlike the fuming free-for-all against Pakistan. Somewhere, the chinks in our foreign policy (especially with our neighbours) are getting embarrassingly exposed with traditional allies like Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, too, rolling their eyes gently at China. Indian diplomacy seems to have got carried away with its own supposed stridency and circumstantial “pivot” with an ultimately fickle US ignoring the virtues of quiet diplomacy and humility.
The fact is that China has an expansionist agenda while India does not. This is reflected in Chinese realpolitik and its chessboard moves. Denial and deception are a standard feature of Chinese diplomacy and no amount of serving tea on a swing can undo that basic instinct. When Xi was being personally charmed in Ahmedabad, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was engaged in a border fracas at that very moment. The same China, which selectively posits a “Dragon-Elephant tango,” will have no qualms to veto India in favour of an international terrorist like Masood Azhar.
To get carried away by “hometown diplomacy” is reminiscent of Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai (India and China are brothers) naivety. Border issues between India and China date back to decades but a consensus on delinking the same was established by way of improving bilateral relations. Today, a breakdown of that diplomatic understanding is apparent. Rhetoric on both sides needs to be lowered and not escalated. Beyond a point, the Chinese themselves cannot afford to open yet another “front” in these trying times.
So when the dust settles, both sides will claim to have “bloodied each other’s nose,” their cadres will be electrified and then, the leadership on both sides will move on to the next set of distraction after having “won” this round. But the essential point of “tripping diplomacy” is well-nigh forgotten.
Reality is that 2020 is not 1962 even though the Indian armed forces are numerically and materially lesser than the PLA. However, the Chinese would know better than most that numeric superiority is not enough. Limited combat operations against India in 1967 at Nathu La and Cho La or the more expansive war against the Vietnamese forces in 1979 would validate this but the Chinese did get a bloody nose, both times.
Worse for the Chinese, today’s PLA is also the largest military to have never partaken in any tangible combat experience whereas Indian soldiers are combat-experienced and tested. The Chinese are masters of knowing when to bargain as also just how much. They will limit their activism to the levels already established and keep the kettle boiling with existing and new-found proxies in the sub-continent. They just found a convenient opening for limited distraction as the Indian diplomacy and the Government inadvertently afforded the chance.
The foremost lesson for India is to not be taken in by its own charm offensives and instead strengthen its “core” in defence and economy. As it is, the diplomatic dice is loaded and we make it worse with thundering blusters that unsettle smaller neighbours and send them scurrying into the willing arms of China. Uber-nationalism that is seen and heard in political rallies need to be inked where it matters, that is in defence budgets. All talk of mass exodus of US firms from China to India is more social media fantasy, like the cadre call for boycotting Chinese products. A bulk of this lopsided trade with China is done by the Indian Government itself.
Instead, the citizenry has to put pressure on the Government to revert to old-fashioned and professional diplomacy that is not necessarily conducted under the glare of the media lens or with one eye permanently fixated on electoral prospects. China fears India as a “moral idea” which intrinsically resonates across global capitals. We cannot look and sound like China. Xi’s “thought on diplomacy” is unapologetic about its hegemonic intent. India needs to “manage” the same by lowering rhetoric, strengthening military-economic muscle and yet posturing peace and reason. Basically, beat China at its own game by playing to its strengths. The elephant needs to remain calm, wise and powerful. It must never forget the ignoble fire-spewing instincts of the dragon.
(Writer: Bhopinder Singh; Courtesy: The Pioneer)
India-Nepal relations are too precious to be damaged by territorial nationalism. It’s time for New Delhi to break the ice
Some back-channeling and rethinking between Nepal’s ruling party and the Opposition (despite the Nepali Congress agreeing to support the amendments) has deferred the Constitutional Amendment Bill to sanctify the country’s new map. This has created an opportunity for it to return to diplomacy. It’s for the first time that Nepal has altered the geography of its map. Its Foreign Minister “summoned” the Indian Ambassador and its Prime Minister even used unkind words for us. New Delhi, too, was high-handed: It dragged its feet in giving a date for talks, announced a tarmac road to Lipulekh Pass while the Army Chief, who is the honorary General of the Nepal Army, made unwarranted comments on Nepal’s internal affairs, too. This certainly is not the civilisational bonding that defined relations between India and Nepal. The Kalapani dispute has to be settled politically, too. Any further delay will only widen the trust deficit.
In my 60th and counting treks from Mahakali to Mechi since 1959, I have come across scintillating names of villages and places: Chisopani, Tatopani, Ratopani, Jumlepani, Pokhripani and also the contested Kalapani, not Kalopani. In India, Kalapani is a curse and is associated with banishment, jail or exile. Still, it has been the bone of contention between India and Nepal for many years and for Kathmandu, it denotes an area of 335 sq km, encompassing Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh Pass and Kalapani. For it, the source of the Mahakali river, which delineates its western boundary, is Limpiyadhura.
For India, Kalapani is the origin of the river near where military posts have existed since the mid-1960s and from where the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) patrols regularly up to the Lipulekh Pass. When King Tribhuvan invited the Indian Military Mission in 1952 to Nepal, besides training the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), it had established, according to border expert on Nepal, BN Shreshta, 18 border check-posts on the Tibet border starting from Tinker Pass in the west to Chhayangthap in the east. These posts were vacated in 1969 under pressure from the communist lobby in the palace. Conspicuously, Kalapani and Lipulekh Pass were not part of the border surveillance scheme and, therefore, there was no question of India vacating them. Trade between India and China across Lipulekh Pass started in 1954 and an agreement in 2015 ratified the border trade.
Kalapani has a spiritual and strategic value since it is the gateway to Kailash Mansarovar, dominates Lipulekh Pass and can monitor the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) camp at Taklakot. It appears in Nepal’s official and tourist maps and its adverse military possession is a highly emotive issue. Twenty-six years of field reconnaissance by a joint technical boundary committee and negotiations since 1997 have failed to find a mutually-acceptable solution. Protests in Nepal over Kalapani started in the mid-1990s when a communist Government was in power. It has since become a political football.
India’s new map in November last year, after the nullification of Article 370 in Jammu & Kashmir, showed Kalapani in Uttarakhand without any change in the boundary with Nepal. It was very much similar to the old map. But this triggered countrywide protests and exchange of diplomatic notes. India announcing the black-topping of the road to Lipulekh Pass in May reignited protests at a time when the power struggle in the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) peaked.
It was only with Chinese intervention that Prime Minister KP Oli was able to retain his seat. Adept at using ultra-nationalism for India-bashing and reviving his political stock, Oli published a new map of Nepal, incorporating claimed areas. He wants a national consensus on the legitimacy of the new map through a Constitutional amendment. The Bill should pass muster as the Government needs just nine lawmakers to secure a two-third majority but that will damage irreparably India-Nepal relations, which have been on the mend since 2015 following the economic blockade.
Nepal has deployed its armed police force on the western border near Kalapani with the Nepal Army building a new road to Tinker Pass. These developments, coupled with a parliamentary resolution to reclaim all land and the Constitutional Amendment Bill are likely to escalate tension. The beneficiary from this diplomatic stand-off will only be a third country with whom troubles along the India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) are mounting. Nepal’s political class must realise that the move to unilaterally alter, validate and internationalise the new map, especially at the height of a pandemic, is unwise. Both sides need to cool off.
Any adverse and escalatory steps will also undermine the long-standing and embedded Army-to-Army relations, which were initiated by King Tribhuvan and his son, King Mahendra, for modernising the RNA. The Chiefs of the two Armies are honorary Generals in each other’s armies, an unprecedented exchange of military honour started by the legendary Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw in 1969. Gorkha soldiers from Nepal have served the Indian Army with valour during all the wars post-independence, winning high gallantry awards. More than 40,000 Gorkha soldiers serve the Indian Army and another 1,50,000 ex-servicemen are privileged by unique welfare services in Nepal that are not available to other soldiers in India. These are 22 district soldier boards, two pension paying offices along with the Ex-servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS), Kendriya Vidyalayas and numerous other assistance and grants projects. Gorkha remittances are upwards of Rs 15,000 crore (NC), almost one-third of Nepal’s total remittances of $8 billion.
India-Nepal relations are at a tipping point due to map-making and the political row it has generated is at the height of a pandemic. Nepal’s new map has broken the agreement between the two countries to maintain status quo till negotiations help resolve the border dispute. India had initially said it would resume Foreign Secretary-level dialogue mechanism after the COVID-19 emergency. After Nepal issued its new map and Oli’s intemperate reference to India in Parliament, New Delhi has urged Kathmandu to create a positive atmosphere for dialogue. After deferment of the Bill, New Delhi says it is open to engaging to solve border row.
The media on both sides should call a truce. On Wednesday afternoon, Nepali TV channels were playing patriotic music centred on Kalapani and showing clips of its legendary military prowess that extended the Himalayan Kingdom from the rivers Chenab to Teesta, inducing fears of “Greater Nepal.” Nepal’s decision to put on hold the second Constitutional Amendment Bill is a prudent step welcomed by India that has averted a showdown. Already, strained India-Nepal relations are too precious to be damaged by territorial nationalism. Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla must call up his counterpart Shankar Das Bairagi and break the ice.
(Writer: Ashok K Mehta; Courtesy: The Pioneer)
Maybe India should look at this period as an enforced de-addiction time
While Kerala might have the most number of confirmed cases of the SARS-CoV-2 virus strain that has put the entire nation under a lockdown mode, there has only been one confirmed death due to respiratory illness associated with the virus at the time of writing. However, according to a news story, ever since the lockdown came into effect, seven people have reportedly committed suicide due to the non-availability of alcohol in this State. This led to Kerala Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan allowing the sale of limited alcohol to those people having withdrawal syndrome though they must provide a doctor’s prescription. One wonders how those, who want liquor in the State, will find the doctors to issue them prescriptions when the medical fraternity itself is overwhelmed treating Coronavirus patients. Moreover, it is questionable if a medical practitioner is allowed to prescribe alcohol as a medicine to treat de-addiction. It is not just Kerala, alcohol shops are shut down across the country with only some people lucky enough to have stocked up before the nation went into complete lockdown. The situation is similar elsewhere, too, with paan and cigarette shops shut in most places. Once a flourishing trade for recreational purposes, the sale of addictive drugs is also in lockdown with other vice trades equally badly hit. But not getting your daily dose of whatever your vice is should not be an opportunity to mope or moan. Whether it is not having your daily pack of smokes or two pegs of whisky, maybe people with an addiction should use the coming couple of weeks constructively and try and wean themselves off them. One would not make an argument to quit but attempts must be made to reduce consumption. It should not become the case that the day the lockdown ends, everybody rushes to the liquor store to get themselves some beer.
This newspaper understands that some individuals would have built up a physical addiction to drugs or alcohol. Such people must be helped in such times but the system, just like that for being out in public, must not be abused. And that is for the addictive substances available legally; the illegal drugs must be flushed out of India. Now with the borders closed and flights effectively banned, the inflow of such harmful substances has come to an end. Of course, this will not stay the case forever. The moment things open up, people will go back to their old ways. But even then, consuming a bit less may not be a bad thing for all involved. If people can take this time to quit, all the better.
(Courtesy: The Pioneer)
India was quick to brush off US mediation on Ladakh. Besides, we can’t afford to rub China the wrong way in the pandemic era
India finds itself in a peculiar situation, caught between the US and China over border tensions in Ladakh. While its strategic proximity to the first is a source of deep discontent for a hegemonic Asian power, the maverick support from US President Donald Trump, who offered to mediate in the crisis, has meant double trouble. Trump has made many mediation efforts on India’s behalf at international fora before but the timing of this one in a post-pandemic world is different. More than India, it is a message to China. The US, which has made no bones about China fudging the scale and potency of the Wuhan contagion and is in a punishing mood, threatening to boycott it economically, is building an international coalition of opinion against the Middle Kingdom. It is, therefore, drawing India to be a part of this anti-China narrative, knowing full well that we could end up being among the top worst-hit nations and would have much to be suspicious about our eastern neighbour. In that sense, the US is feeding off India’s weakened position, courtesy its plunging economy and a soaring public health crisis, as much as China is. The heightened tension at Ladakh is China’s way of reminding India that it could light up the Himalayan border easily if we fell into the US trap of building a global campaign against it or block trade and investment here. In fact, given that we cannot end our import dependence on China overnight considering its manufacturing edge over ours, particularly when the pandemic has paralysed our economy, we just have to engage with China one on one. India, therefore, has rightly distanced itself, maintaining that it would solve issues with its neighbours through dialogue and diplomatic mechanisms rather than external intervention. China, too, which is used to speaking in a forked tongue, has already indicated diplomacy as a way around the impasse. India is well familiar with this blow-hot-blow-cold intimidatory tactic though the escalation this time is in sync with Chinese depredations in the region against neighbours. Clearly, Xi Jinping wants to justify the need for his muscular leadership by positing the world as an enemy out to finish China as he faces a fall in GDP, about 25 per cent unemployment, a plunging economy and the suppressed rage of a people, who will never know the damage the virus has done to them.
So what should India do? As Doklam has taught us, standing down is not always the way. Indian troops are now favourably placed in many positions and border infrastructure has been fairly ramped up over the last decade. Improved road corridors mean that we can now service requirements and replenish supplies even better. This is what has been exasperating the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which realises that its edge in the region is gradually being blunted and thinks that India might have ambitions in the Aksai Chin. So India should remain firm on legitimate positions. At the same time, it must step up diplomacy and keep at it rather than diverting itself to scaled up military conflicts as China is still a powerful neighbour. In fact, diplomacy, though requiring high-level intervention, may just work as the tussle this time is over areas that are not really disputed since 1962 and quite distant from the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Of course, this doesn’t mean that China won’t attempt transgressions and territorial intimidation to armtwist us during crises. At the same time, if China rakes up the long Himalayan boundaries, we should pose a counter-weight by tying up with Southeast Asian nations and build pressure against Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea. We should discuss shared threats in the Indian Ocean region with Vietnam, Philippines, Australia, Indonesia and Malaysia. Diplomatically, we could circle China by galvanising the threat perception from it in the region and strengthening a security alliance. One can do this with increased diplomatic engagement without appearing too aggressive and risking a Chinese hitback. In fact, we must be prepared for more hostilities as India builds self-sufficiencies. India has stalled it from ambushing our economy by amending its foreign direct investment (FDI) rules to mandate Government approval for all investments from “border” countries and prevent hostile takeovers. We have already cancelled orders for Chinese test kits as they were faulty and have switched to South Korea and other nations. We are supporting a global impartial probe into the Wuhan contagion and though “vocal for local” may not have any scale now, China will not sit easy with the discomfort over 5G trials and a future shrinkage of its market in India.
(Courtesy: The Pioneer)
While States are redistributing returnee workers, in the long run we need a national database and a pan-India social security net
The reverse exodus of migrants, which according to the Government’s admission in the Supreme Court has seen 91 lakh daily wagers and service personnel move out of cities to their home States, may change the labour market forever. Shunted out overnight by contractors and factories following the lockdown and with no savings, quarters or interim relief coming from either their employers or the Government, they trudged back home, risking their lives in the process, exposing themselves to the disease and starvation. And though they may return to the subsistence economy that they once escaped, they are not coming back soon. Rejected by the big cities that they helped build and mistreated like intruders by the Governments they voted for, they would much rather find work in their home States under MGNREGA and infrastructure projects. The vacuum in big cities is already being felt as daily needs servicemen like drivers, cleaners, electricians, handymen, carpenters, plumbers, house helps, gardeners and bricklayers have all fled. And now with several States compiling a data base of returnees with their skill sets, these people are most likely to be rehabilitated in services vacated by migrants from elsewhere. In other words, local sourcing, something that political parties have promised in their manifestoes for a while, may soon become the new rule of engagement in the labour market. Except that the traditional labour-exporting States may be flooded with returnees seeking newer pastures and fall short of accommodating them. Sensing the new labour map, the first off the mark has been Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath. With the State having already received 23 lakh migrants by the end of last week, he has fast-tracked moves to absorb returnee workers according to their skill sets and allocate them work zones. Fifteen lakh are already on the database and industrial units have sought contracts for five lakh among them. He has further drawn up a migrant commission to list all workers in the State, provide jobs and issue them a card that would ensure their social security during a crisis. An insurance scheme to secure their lives, too, is on the cards. And though he is reconsidering it, his controversial suggestion that other States hiring labourers from UP would have to go via his Government points to a new trading tool that may just take off unofficially as everybody tries to leverage strengths in a pandemic-hit economy. Such a move is downright unconstitutional as every citizen has a right to migrate to any part of the country in the quest for better prospects. But new regional labour cartels could emerge, peddling a skilled pool of workers and quoting higher prices now in labour-starved zones. Rajasthan has started collecting data of both skilled and unskilled workers from all 33 districts and will release them to factory owners in 18 industrial clusters soon. It has already collected details of 1.2 million unemployed people and will soon launch a portal that will help devise programmes for the labourers, generate quick employment and also meet the demand-supply gap. It will also help design training programmes for workers as per their qualifications and requirements of industries. Meanwhile, Madhya Pradesh has restarted the Sambal Yojana, which will now cover returnee migrants and provide social security to their family members, including school fees of children and insurance. A workers’ database is almost ready. Bihar and Jharkhand are also working on an internal reorganisation map. Punjab and Haryana, States without too much of local labour, were among the first to set up migrant portals to rehire and redirect displaced labour to their various work sites.
While the “vocal for local” mantra has taken a new meaning in the labour market, this could well be short-term. For wages and capacities are lower in States. For example, even if Uttar Pradesh manages to provide jobs to its returning migrants, its per capita income is a little over Rs 70,000. Comparatively, it is over Rs 2 lakh in Maharashtra and Rs 4 lakh in Delhi. So the osmosis will happen once the threat of the pandemic weakens. Besides what do you do with States like Uttarakhand, which do not have enough opportunities to absorb highly-skilled labour? So far over 1.54 lakh migrants have returned to the State and under the Mukhyamantri Swarojgar Yojana, they will get heavily subsidised loans to set up small businesses or shops. Many returnees are from the IT, hospitality and BPO sectors with a particular skill set and experience of working in big cities and are not keen on the entrepreneurial mode. They wouldn’t want to erode their revenue-earning ability for the safety of a home that they won’t have to pay for. Labour is needed across industries and communities and perhaps a national database and a pan-India social security net should be set up to streamline our demographic edge than pass this on to States as their responsibility. Besides, this protection based on geography will never substitute competence.
(Courtesy: The Pioneer)
The Chinese behaviour along the LAC points to a familiar pattern vis-a-vis India. However, it’s time for New Delhi to turn a new page in dealing with Beijing
After some intense physical showdown between the Indian and Chinese soldiers at the Line of Control (LAC), attempts are now being made by Beijing to dial down the conflict. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said recently that the situation at the border with India is “overall stable and controllable” and that both countries have “proper mechanisms and communication channels” to resolve the issues through “dialogue” and “consultation.” China’s apparent attempt to de-escalate tensions at the border is as quintessential a leaf from its strategic playbook as its attempt to escalate it in the first place. A few familiar patterns apropos earlier such endeavours cannot be missed.
The timing of the flare-up is, perhaps, the most predictable one. A pandemic-stricken world has been brought down to its knees and India has surpassed China’s Coronavirus tally. It has now climbed into the top 10 countries worst-hit by the pandemic. To recall, in 2014, when Chinese troops intruded deep into the Indian territory even as Premier Xi Jinping was on a State visit to India, it baffled many. Why would Beijing do that? If anything, it only harmed the purpose of the ongoing bilateral talks. By now, China’s strategic charade of mixing wrong signals with publicly-perceptible good intentions is all too known. Physical assertion with an intention to send a political message that points south, deliberate obfuscation to prevent perception build-up, international grandstanding and the choice of an opportune time — all of this collectively constitute the Middle Kingdom’s new approach to heighten tensions. But there is a marked similarity that runs across modern China’s strategic behaviour.
In its strategic playbook, it avoids “strength” and attacks “weakness.” As the world reels under the Corona pandemic, China seems to have controlled the spread of the virus and has now resorted to practising aggressive behaviour, thus rattling other countries. It has waged conflicts on multiple fronts. Border tension with India along the LAC has escalated; two new municipal districts to control the disputed Paracel and Spratly islands has been declared; military confrontation with Malaysia and Vietnam in the South China Sea, too, has been launched. Besides, China has approved a controversial legislation in Hong Kong to undermine its autonomy. This, in clear violation of the initial terms of agreement between Britain and China that the former’s autonomy shall be preserved until at least 50 years.
Furthermore, there’s an obvious cold war 2.0 on with the US. Wolf warrior diplomacy has been launched world over as a pre-emptive effort to counter criticism and questions of accountability. It is also resisting a global call for an unbiased probe into the origin of the Coronavirus. Above all, Xi has called upon the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to “prepare for war.” All such instances have come to test China’s strategic transition into a “great power.” As countries look inward to deal with their economic, political and strategic problems arising due to the spread of the virus, China considers this as its moment to test the limits of “power transition hypothesis.” But in many ways, how China acts during the pandemic will define its future course as a “great power.”
In the ongoing standoff with India, too, traits clearly point to the aforementioned test-of-its-power transition. China has opened multiple fronts of conflict along the LAC; at least one of them is a hitherto uncontested region, the Naku La Pass in north Sikkim. There are a few other peculiarities that set the ongoing border flare-up apart from earlier skirmishes. The number of PLA troops camped near the LAC is estimated to be somewhere in between 5,000 and 10,000.
Although India has matched Chinese encampments and numbers, this is perhaps a new high of troop build-up by the latter in the absence of any unilateral aggression by the former. The military build-up and China’s refusal to recede is geared towards “political signalling” than to “protect” an apparent incursion into India. This subtle packaging comes at a time when India is scrambling to improve border infrastructure and connectivity in border areas. In the current context, the strategic importance of the Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road, that brings India within an eight kilometre range of the strategically important Karakoram Pass, cannot be overstated.
Steps from either side point to a long-drawn confrontation. While the two sides match in troop numbers that mirror each other, certain factors suggest that neither side will be too quick to withdraw from strategic positions. Chinese troops remain entrenched in bunkers along with a fleet of heavy vehicles and monitoring equipment. Helicopter movement close to the LAC has also been monitored by the Indian side. India, too, scrambled two fighter jets along the LAC in Ladakh. Besides, Army Chief MM Naravane paid a visit to Leh, the headquarters of 14 Corps in Ladakh, for a security review of the sensitive sector amid tensions. Perhaps this suggests that the best way to resolve the present standoff is through established mechanism at the military and governmental level, howsoever ineffective these mechanisms may be.
Chinese behaviour along the LAC points to a familiar pattern vis-a-vis India. Just like its traditional medical practice acupuncture, it is pressing certain points. Its assertions may often be intended to solve a deeper or a different issue. In the present case, unprovoked assertions along the LAC can be linked to a few decisions taken by India in recent times, which may have perturbed China. Among them is the Indian Government’s decision to implement three important recommendations relating to border infrastructure that was made by the Shekatkar Committee in 2016. Specifically, the work on the Sela tunnel (connecting Tezpur in Assam to Tawang) is in full swing. Once completed, it will provide all-weather connectivity to an important frontier with China in the Kameng sector. Such projects are also on to connect Zanskar Valley and Ladakh. The Nimu-Padam-Darcha road being constructed across the Sinkunla Pass could have have been points of concern for China, too.
Other factors that could have perturbed Beijing include New Delhi’s decision to change FDI norms for countries sharing land border with India. This could potentially impact how China invests in India. The virtual presence of two BJP MPs at the swearing-in ceremony of the Taiwanese leader has also irked Beijing. Lastly, India’s support to the global call for a WHO-led probe into the origin of the Coronavirus is a cause, too.
From India’s point of view, the transgressions, including ones at previously uncontested patrol areas, like the Naku La Pass, point towards a wider conflicting arc. To that end, Chinese strategy along the LAC has preferred horizontal to vertical escalation, where scaling up of conflict at the local level has been the preferred strategy.
India’s options in the current standoff are limited. First, and perhaps the most likely way to resolve the tension, is by repeating the Doklam strategy. It should resolutely wait until both sides decide to de-escalate. However, under no circumstances should India negotiate on settled areas like the Naku La Pass. This will not only increase the possibility for China to horizontally escalate against India but would also dilute India’s sacrosanct nature of “sovereignty” apropos a modern state. This is precisely what makes the current standoff different and more fraught than previous ones. Since both sides have laid claim to a new area as their “sovereign part”, possibilities of de-escalation are high. India can press other weak points of China to compel desired State behaviour if LAC is too sensitive a matter. Adopting the Indo-Pacific strategy to chart a future strategy in Asia as an emerging global power is a low-hanging fruit. Among other steps, raising a global pitch on China’s other interests or decisions that run counter to Indian interests can be considered. It is, perhaps, time to turn a new page in dealing with China.
(Writer: Vivek Mishra; Courtesy: The Pioneer)
India has strengthened its position not only militarily but strategically as well. Therefore, it needs to stand firm and retain its control over the LAC
In the ongoing battle for supremacy between the US and China, the latter let loose its “wolf-warriors”, signifying Beijing’s new and aggressive diplomatic response to countries blaming it for the Coronavirus pandemic. “Wolf-warrior diplomacy,” named after two Chinese movies, describes offensives by its diplomats to defend China’s national interests, often in confrontational ways. However, the global anger against Beijing was so much that anti-China sentiments gained momentum and the “wolf-warrior diplomacy” failed to make an impact. Saner voices at home began to call for restraint but they went unheeded as China today is ruled by the all-powerful Xi Jinping and his diktat prevails.
So China displayed its aggressiveness in South China Sea (SCS) by sinking a Vietnamese fishing trawler near the Paracel Islands in early April. In mid-April, the Chinese Ministry of Natural Resources and Ministry of Civil Affairs jointly announced the naming of 80 islands, reefs, seamounts, shoals and ridges in the SCS, triggering angry protests from other claimants. China was using the global fight against the Corona to pursue its territorial ambitions as part of its traditional expansionist policy.
The Chinese actions in SCS were checkmated by US intervention as India continued to pursue its strategy of balance. But was the Chinese belligerence in the SCS a warning to India which it failed to read? India’s change in FDI rules to stem Chinese predatory trade practices didn’t go down well with Beijing. Neither was China happy with India joining the comity of nations backing a draft resolution at the World Health Organisation (WHO), nor was it happy with the likely shift of global companies from China to India. The final straw for China was the chairmanship of the executive board of the World Health Assembly by way of which India could take to task both Beijing and the WHO. China felt threatened by India though New Delhi made it clear that it wants to avoid power politics.
So China soon made India the target of its “wolf warrior-diplomacy” too. First through Press statements, harsh articles and accusations of unfair trade practices. Then it decided to shift the scene to the Sino-Indian border.
Two of the three incursion points chosen had traditionally been undisputed in the past. China once again dared India but knew very well that it was not the same India of 1962. It was trying its usual technique of messaging and signalling to coerce New Delhi, least realising that India had learnt its lessons well at Doklam. China’s recent provocations on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have strategic messaging rather than tactical. These are not the usual summer time intrusions and are almost simultaneous. Naku La in North Sikkim, Galwan Valley in Sub-Sector North (SSN) and Pangong Tso (PTSO) in the Middle Sector of Eastern Ladakh.
The scuffles had very little to do with border disputes because both Naku La and Galwan were never disputed by the Chinese earlier. It wanted to send signals to India that it wants negotiations, maybe to get out of the global mess it finds itself in, a leverage against the global pandemic inquiry. China is scared of losing its status as the “global factory.” China has also tried to provoke Nepal by asking it to raise a boundary dispute with India in the Lipulekh and Kalapani sectors. China is using Nepal as a pressure point as part of its coercive strategy.
While the incursion in North Sikkim was resolved using the existing border management protocols, the same failed to resolve the tension in Eastern Ladakh. In fact, China is reported to be strengthening its positions and also some movement has been reported opposite Demchock in Sub-Sector South (SSS). The tactical dimension of these moves revolves around China’s assertive and coercive policies to maintain dominance over adversaries in the areas of conflict.
As part of its War Zone Campaign (WZC) doctrine, China has rapidly developed infrastructure right up to the forward posts, to create military asymmetry to gain advantage over the adversary in a short or localised conflict. However, it objects strongly and reacts with force to India’s attempts to do the same on its side of the LAC. In the current scenario, too, the bone of contention is the newly-constructed Leh-Shyok-DBO Highway, which has not only removed the asymmetry but placed Indian troops at an advantage.
Coupled with this is the activation of a number of Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs) by the Indian Air Force (IAF). The Chinese sensitivities in the area lie in Aksai Chin and Karakoram Pass, both of which have become easily accessible to Indian troops.
That is the reason the Chinese side is focussing on the Galwan stand-off, painting India as the aggressor. In an article, its official Global Times newspaper accused Indian troops of crossing over into Chinese territory. In typical Chinese style, they predicted India would regret its actions. “The Galwan Valley is not like Doklam because it is in the Aksai Chin region in southern Xinjiang of China, where the Chinese military has an advantage and mature infrastructure. So, if India escalates the friction, the Indian military force could pay a heavy price”, it says.
To understand the Chinese belligerence, one needs to understand the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Unlike the Indian Army, the PLA is not a national army. It is the military wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with the primary role of ensuring supremacy of the CCP. Unlike a national army dedicated to the defence of a State and its people, the Chinese military’s purpose is to create political power for the party. The PLA is guided by the “political warfare” doctrine of the CCP which includes “Three Warfares” or “3Ws” encompassing, public opinion warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare.
The first of the “3Ws,” media or public opinion warfare, attempts to shape public opinion both domestically and internationally. If the domestic element sounds odd, it is because the PLA believes that energising or mobilising the Chinese public is useful for signalling resolve and deterring foreign incursions on Chinese interests. The second warfare attempts to influence foreign decision-makers and how they approach China policy. The third seeks to shape the legal context for Chinese actions, including building the legal justification for Beijing’s actions and using domestic laws to signal Chinese intentions. All of these fall under the broader umbrella of political warfare. The party leads and the PLA follows.
It would be of interest to note that both Doklam and the current stand-off were synchronised with the important political meetings of the CCP, which are held periodically to critically examine the efficacy of the Government, Xi Jinping in the instant case.
The military strategy of the PLA is based on the famous concept of “winning without fighting.” Even today CCP believes in the famous quote of Sun Tzu, “To win hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” Coercion remains the basic philosophy for resolving political differences. In military terms it’s called “shi”, calibrated power display with limited forces on the borders in order to seek Sino-centric solutions. China believes in coercing the adversaries to submit to its will or face consequences. Psychological warfare is an important component of Chinese war fighting doctrine. It also believes in creating adverse political pressure through a disturbed neighbourhood. Nepal’s recent hostile attitude and Pakistan are the two examples of the same. Another terminology often used to explain Chinese warfare doctrine is “Unrestricted Warfare.” The ultimate aim of all these is to secure victory over the adversary through aggression and coercion without the need to fight a war. Exaggerated figures of troop deployment, pitching of dummy tents, deployment of heavy machinery, verbal aggression, propaganda, a no holds barred hate campaign, threatening statements through State-controlled media, cyber-attacks, misquoting laws and interpreting them to its own advantage are all the tricks of the trade employed by China.
India understands the Chinese brinkmanship very well. India’s stand till now has been not only politically and militarily correct but aggressive as well. China also understands that its international image is at the lowest in the contemporary era. It would not be able to browbeat India so easily. China is scared that with changed military equations in the sector, India may become aggressive about Aksai Chin like it has done in the case of Gilgit-Baltistan. In geo-strategic terms China today has many vulnerabilities like Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang and the SCS to name a few.
India has strengthened its position not only militarily but strategically as well. Therefore, India needs to stand firm and retain its control over the LAC. The dragon has made a mistake this time by daring the tiger. India’s dominant location in the Indo-Pacific bestows upon it a strategic advantage which it must not lose. The fact remains that both sides need to negotiate an exit strategy and a beleaguered China — if thinking to use this as a bargaining strategy to strengthen the geopolitical image of the CCP at home — may have to concede more than India.
The best way to face the dragon is to tame it. That is exactly what India is doing. The proverbial Chinese dragon is supposed to be peaceful unlike its fire-spitting version.
(Writer: Anil Gupta; Courtesy: The Pioneer)
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