There has been a dramatic shift in the BJP’s stance towards our forces post its electoral victory. After using them during campaigns, it hardly has them in the heart, mind or Budget
It is no secret that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is the darling of many media and news organisations, who treat every step and sneeze of Prime Minister Narendra Modi as an occasion for a prime-time special. Even cricket, India’s beloved sport, was a victim of this worrying obsession. Prior to India’s hard-fought loss to New Zealand in the World Cup semi-finals, a popular Hindi news channel hosted a show which asked: “Can Prime Minister Modi win us the World Cup?” Like many of us, I worry about such obsession (coupled with an unhealthy dose of compliance) manifesting itself as mainstream acceptability, certainly not good for the country. But this is a conversation (an article) for another day.
For now, let us talk about something that flashed across our television screens during the election season and was a topic of hot debate and discussion: India’s armed forces. Although hardly much time has passed since the election summer of 2019, there has been a dramatic shift in the stance the BJP has adopted towards the men in uniform. During the election season, we were often treated to the party’s dramatics, which was often obscene. For example, Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath insulted our armed forces by calling them “Modiji ki sena”, thus implying that they worked at the beck and call of only one man and not in furtherance of their duty to the entire nation. As a former police officer, who tried to serve the people of the country and whose only master was the rule of law, I found such statements appalling, especially from a Chief Minister of a BJP-ruled State.
Sometimes, the drama was nauseating: Like when BJP leader Manoj Tiwari attempted to cash in on the Pulwama attack by wearing military clothing during a political rally. I am pretty certain that such antics make a mockery of what it means to be a soldier and belittles a hallowed uniform. Prime Minister Modi, too, often piggybacked on the armed forces. For instance, in some of his rallies, there were photographs of the security forces personnel killed in the February 14 suicide bombing in Pulwama. While these were absolutely crass, there was at least enthusiasm from the BJP about the armed forces. But how do we determine if this Government actually cares about the country’s armed forces? Or does it merely aim to rely on them for political points?
One way to do so is to look at the way it has dealt with one of the most shocking tragedies on Indian soil: The Pulwama terror attack. It is obvious that the Government will make sure that no such attack happens on Indian soil in the future but why have we been kept in the dark about the intelligence failures that eventually led to such a deadly attack? In order to ensure that the lives of our soldiers are not in jeopardy, we must understand how these attacks occurred and how do we plan to avert them in the future? On this aspect, however, there have been no questions from the media and no answers from the Government.
Another relevant barometer is the number of terrorist attacks that have taken place in India since 2014. In a written reply by Minister of State for Home Affairs, it was stated that the number of terrorist incidents in Jammu & Kashmir alone jumped 177 per cent in the past five years. This is a frightening number.
I may be trolled and many may say that this proves that the armed forces need more backing and focus from our Government, which Modiji has done. To this, I say that I wholeheartedly agree with the first part but disagree with the second. While there is a need for India to focus more on its defence forces by upgrading its machinery and ensuring a better life for its soldiers, I disagree that the BJP has any intention to actually do something to change the current scenario.
A clear indication of this and of where the Government’s priorities do not lie was when Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced the first Union Budget for the new term of the BJP-led Government. While the entire session was extremely underwhelming, as evidenced by the 1,000 point fall in the Sensex, the Defence Budget was especially disconcerting. This because as part of the latest allocation, only 1.45 per cent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product, was given to defence expenditure, which may be the lowest since the 1962 war.
This is especially distressing because in the previous fiscal year (2018-19), a shortfall of close toRs 1.12 lakh crore was projected by the three wings of the armed forces (excluding the Defence Research and Development Organisation).
When asked about the inadequate funds, the Ministry of Defence stated: “This Ministry is bound by the budgetary ceilings conveyed by the Ministry of Finance. The reduced allocations were passed on uniformly to all the services.” As wonderfully put by my colleague, Shashi Tharoor, with this Government, “defence is favoured when it comes to rhetoric, and treated as badly as other ministries when cost-cutting is done.”
For all its rhetoric, the BJP would do well to remember that India has fought four wars since independence (comprehensively winning three), but no political leader has previously attempted to take advantage of the victories until it changed the way politicians view and deal with our forces.
All of this posturing would still be okay if the BJP actually showed some action. However, as is evident from the party’s actions, the relationship between it and the armed forces is: Out of sight and out of mind. When elections are out of sight, our armed forces, unfortunately, do not find any place in their hearts or minds.
(The author is president of Jharkhand Pradesh Congress Committee)
Writer: Ajoy Kumar
Courtesy: The Pioneer
The Modi Government will build six more submarines. But the 20-year saga of Project 75 is a telling aspect
As India marks the 20th anniversary of the action in Kargil, we are coming close to a decision taken in the aftermath of that war, the final phase of the Project 75 submarine acquisition. The Cabinet recently announced a tender for expressions of interest from Indian ship-builders for the Rs 45,000 crore project to build six submarines under the Project 75-I class. India currently has 15 submarines in service, several of whom are old Russian Kilo-class, over three decades old, and called the Sindhughosh-class in Indian Navy.
India recently inducted Kalvari, the lead boat of the Project 75, over two decades after the initial requirements were drawn up, while three are undergoing sea trials. The proposed Project 75-I submarines will be even more advanced with the capability to launch land and ship attack cruise missiles but those ships are over a decade away from even entering the sea. These, in addition to the Arhant-class of nuclear submarines, of which we will end up with four for the time being, will put India’s submarine fleet size by 2030 at around 20-25 boats. Just for context, China developed and built its Type 39 and Type 39A submarines in the same period of time, building over 30 of those boats. And these are just China’s conventional diesel-powered submarine force. It has six new nuclear-powered attack submarines, along with three old ones. Its new Type-94 J in-class of ballistic missile submarine is a clear and present danger to India. The Cabinet’s decision to go ahead with the Project 75-I is commendable but that does not discount from the fact that India is losing the submarine-building race to China by a country mile. China is out-producing India by massive margins even when it comes to fleet strength and the Indian Navy’s obsession with aircraft carriers has led to poor decision-making when it comes to building a large number of ships to counter China’s Indian Ocean strategy. China’s ship-building abilities are so far ahead now that it is easily able to export submarines and ships to countries like Pakistan. India needs to up its defence acquisition game just to remain in the same competitive atmosphere as China and this will need us to become far more capable of making our own defensive equipment as well as working with friendly nations from across the world. But crucially, it means we get serious about our defence. For years, we have sat back and pondered, straitjacketed by the fear of scams and auditors, and it is ironic that this assertive India that we are sold by politicians has just a creaking military force. This decision by the Government should be the first of many and unshackled from the wild allegations thrown about by Rahul Gandhi during the Rafale purchase. Narendra Modi has to deliver.
Writer & Courtesy: The Pioneer
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has his task cut out. Major challenges include modernisation of the three services besides increasing their squadron strength
One of the biggest challenges that Defence Minister Rajnath Singh is faced with is the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) depleting war machinery — aircraft/fighters. The depletion of fighters has indeed been a worrisome trend as the IAF squadrons’ strength is down to 32 from the 42 minimum required for a two-front scenario. The situation of transport aircraft, too, is no better because age-old aircraft have been meeting with accidents and replacements are not coming through fast because of resource crunch and bureaucratic hurdles.
The IAF recently lost its fifth Russian-origin Antonov AN-32 military transport aircraft launched in 1984. The twin-engine plane went missing on June 3 after taking off from Jorhat in Assam with 13 Air Force personnel on board. It was flying to an Advanced Landing Ground (ALG) in Menchuka, Arunachal Pradesh, near the Chinese border. Strangely, on three occasions, including this time, the aircraft has disappeared without any trace.
A search-and-rescue (SAR) operation launched has been pressed into service for an aerial and ground search — two Sukhoi Su-30 multirole fighter aircraft, a C-130J, AN-32, two Mi-17 helicopters and one Advance Light Helicopter (ALH) — have been carrying out sorties in the areas around Siang district. A P8i long-range reconnaissance aircraft of the Indian Navy took off from Tamil Nadu to join the search operations. Indian Space Research Organisation’s (ISRO) CARTOSAT and RISAT satellites are taking images of the area. Ground parties of the Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) as well as locals and district administration officials are also searching the area. However, no wreckage has been sighted so far.
The AN-32s have a spotty safety record. The plane and its variants have been involved in more than 15 incidents since 1986, according to the Aviation Safety Network. In 1986, an AN-32 disappeared over the Arabian Sea on a delivery flight from the Soviet Union via Oman. No trace was found of the aircraft or the people on board. In 2016, another AN-32 having 29 personnel flying from Chennai to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands went missing above the Bay of Bengal. In between these two incidents, there were two crashes — in 1989 and 2009 — that resulted in the deaths of the 13 crewmembers.
The IAF has over 100 AN-32s, which play a critical role in equipping India’s frontline forces. The IAF supplies nearly 40,000 tonnes of material, including food and kerosene, every year to far-off places. People believe that transport aircraft is only for carrying passengers but that isn’t its only role — the AN-32 has done a fantastic job for the Air Force and the country. Almost 15 years back, it was used to transport Meat on the Hoof, including sheep and lambs to Ladakh, Siachen and Arunachal bases. It hasn’t just been called a workhorse.
The Ukrainian manufacturer of the AN-32 transport aircraft, Antonov Aeronautical Scientific/Technical Complex, had been awarded a $400 million order to upgrade the entire AN-32 fleet. The AN-32s were fast approaching the end of their “total technical life” of 25 years by the end of 2019, which prompted the Ministry of Defence to issue one of its largest upgrade contract till date. Under the contract, an estimated 100 AN-32s will get an upgrade and life extension overhaul over a period of five years, with an initial lot being sent to Ukraine and the rest undergoing it at Kanpur depot of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The project was executed in 2009-2013. It will include life extension of both the engines and airframe, improved avionics suite, communication equipment and landing aids”. Surprisingly, the upgrade did not include the engines or the air-frame.
The twin-turboprop AN-32s, which ferry troops and supplies to forward areas, has suffered from poor serviceability, tardy maintenance, delays in overhauls and shortage of spares, resulting in a high Aircraft On Ground (AOG) percentage.
Unfortunately, this non-upgraded aircraft was operating in such a hostile and rugged terrain. As a result, there could be no significant life extension. Yet the fact, as recorded in a Comptroller and Auditor-General of India (CAG) report tabled in 2015, is that the upgrade programmes “was neither completely successful nor comprehensive”. Defence Minister Rajnath must ensure that some heads fall for such a serious lapse.
Of the 28 IAF fighters crashed between April 2012 and March 2016, more than one-fourth (eight) involved the MiG-21, six of which were the upgraded MiG-21 Bison variant, the Government told the Parliament in March 2016. From 1971 to April 2012 as many as 482 MiG aircraft accidents took place, killing 171 pilots, 39 civilians, eight service personnel and one aircrew, the Government told the Parliament in May 2012.
From 1993 to 2013, 198 MiG-21s specifically — often dubbed “flying coffins” by pilots — of different variants have crashed, killing 151 pilots. By 2022, these aircraft will have reached the end of their lifetime and the MiG-21s along with the MiG-23 and MiG-27 will be phased out. To overcome its depleting fighter strength, the IAF will have to acquire the aircraft as soon as possible. Over 10 squadrons of MiG-21 Bisons and MiG-27 Floggers will be retiring by the end of 2019.
To hold up against today’s fighter-jets, an aircraft needs the latest technology such as advanced avionics and radar, greater weapon-load capacity, stealth technology, electronic warfare capability, precision weaponry and other such features, which the MiG-21 does not have. To arrest the drawdown, the Air Force will induct Sukhoi-20, Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) and Rafale jets, the IAF told the parliamentary committee.
In April 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, side-stepping a three-year negotiation for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) competition, also known as the MRCA tender to supply 126 multi-role combat aircraft to the IAF tender, announced the purchase of 36 Rafale fighter aircraft after a deal struck directly with the French Government. While the acquisition of 36 Rafale, which will be delivered during the time frame 2019-23, will ameliorate the situation somewhat, the squadron strength will still be alarmingly worrisome.
There is indeed a dire need for a spirit of inquiry in a country where year after year an ever-increasing Defence Budget (Rs 418,000 crore for the FY 2019-2020) gets passed in the Parliament without any discussion or debate, even as India’s security challenges continue to mount. Yet, despite this huge allocation, the capital outlay remains both inadequate and sometimes even under-spent due to bureaucratic interference.
The depletion of IAF squadrons is a matter of great concern. How can a nation afford to lose highly trained brave lives (IAF pilots) and billions of dollars war equipment besides plummeting combat efficiency? Rajnath Singh has to also uproot this lackadaisical attitude of bureaucracy by integrating military leadership in MoD. Now that the fresh Budget will be presented in the Parliament in July, the Defence Minister must raise the meagre Defence Budget on the whole and ensure immediate measures to build up around 10 deficient fighter squadrons for improving IAF’s combat efficiency.
(The writer is a retired Professor in international trade)
Writer: PK Vasudeva
Courtesy: The Pioneer
We must have the ability to use our vast range of assets in a coordinated manner to provide the synergy required to realise our foreign policy, security and economic objectives
After years of speculation, the Government has finally bitten the bullet and formally named the heads of the Armed Forces Special Operations Division (AFSOD) and the Defence Cyber Agency (DCA). The head for the Defence Space Agency (DSA) is expected to follow soon. These three tri-service divisions will function under the Integrated Defence Staff supposedly to foster “integration, synergy and economy” among elements of the three services. By standardising and integrating their training, equipping and logistics, it is hoped that their utilisation can be optimised, thus providing maximum bang for bucks.
All of this is meant to convince us that our military hierarchy understands modern warfare in all its complexities and is taking the necessary steps needed to ensure that it has the tools at its disposal to deal with a full-spectrum of conflict — from operations other than war to a nuclear conflagration. While one cannot speak about the capabilities that either the DCA or the DSA may plan to possess, there is little doubt that the establishment of AFSOD in its present form leaves much to be desired. In fact, if one were to be brutally honest, its establishment is nothing but a poorly concealed effort to pull the wool over the eyes of our political leadership, unless they were in on it and the tax-paying public.
While the need for establishing a Special Operations Command, as suggested by the Naresh Chandra Committee in 2012, may well be debatable, it is a given that our strategic ambitions are constrained by the fact that we face two nuclear armed adversaries with disputed borders. Given that one of these nations is an economic and military powerhouse, it implies that the primary focus of our security establishment must remain on our immediate neighbourhood. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that as we rapidly develop, PricewaterhouseCoopers considered India to be the third largest economy in PPP terms in its February 2015 report, ‘The World in 2050’. Further, our sphere of influence is also likely to expand beyond the regional.
A growing Indian diaspora and increasing economic interests world-wide make it necessary for the Government to look at enhancing its capabilities to protect its interests abroad. We must have the ability to utilise our vast range of assets in a coordinated manner that would provide the necessary synergy required to ensure that we can successfully meet our foreign policy, security and economic objectives in our areas of interest and influence. This requires tri-service special operations capability grounded in the reality of our circumstances that will enable focussed capacity-building and the establishment of linkages within the security establishment and other Ministries towards their employment at the strategic and operational level, especially with regard to the conduct of ‘Out of Area’ contingencies.
Sadly, the AFSOD is hardly in a position to do anything of the sort, given the meagre resources that have been placed at its disposal. The very fact that it is being established outside of the National Capital Region ensures that its General Officer Commanding can never become the single point advisor on the conduct of special operations to either the Chiefs of Staff Committee or the Cabinet Committee on Security, which is required for the type of tasks envisaged to be undertaken. However, all this apart, what is truly despicable and astounding is the blatant attempt to use bureaucratese to stall logical development in order to protect vested interests. All of this will, in the end, be at the cost of lives because special operations are not only inherently risky and dangerous but also have very little margin for error.
One cannot help but notice the similarity in the manner in which the United States military went about establishing its joint special operations capability. As most may know, the disaster of ‘Operation Eagle Claw’ in 1980 — the failed mission to rescue American hostages held in Iran — was attributed to the lack of jointmanship and a convoluted command and control set-up, among other things. In order to correct the situation, the Army first tried to consolidate all Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) under 1st Special Operations Command in 1982. The lack of a unified structure led to concern within the Senate Armed Services Committee, which resulted in the Department of Defence, creating the joint special operations agency in January 1984.
This agency was, however, flawed as it had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF. In 1986, the The Goldwater–Nichols Department of the Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986 was passed, which appointed the chairman chiefs of staff committee as the single point advisor to the Secretary of Defence and the President. In addition, they also forced the establishment of joint theatre commands, with the commanders-in-chief also having direct access to the Defence Secretary and the President. Despite stiff opposition, the Nunn-Cohen Bill was passed in 1987 and amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act to establish the United States Special Operations Command under a four star C-in-C as a separate command, which supported other theatre commands. In 2014, it was re-designated as a combatant command.
Clearly, it is not in our interest to undertake such a torturous process for developing our SOF capability. Given our limitations in terms of resources and employability, we must play smart and establish an agile and flexible architecture that ensures we meet all our operational requirements, while at the same time avoiding establishing bureaucratic silos and duplication of capabilities, visible elsewhere. While military reorganisations tend to be carried out incrementally, given the nature of operational commitments, in the context of our SOF, the necessity for transformative changes is inescapable.
History tells us that our political leadership and bureaucracy, both civilian and military, are extremely averse to change as we are inclined to aggressively protect our own turf. However, as SOF will play an increasingly vital role in protecting our national interests in the future, it will be logical to reorganise them in the manner that they not only meet our future needs without the need for additional changes, but also show the way forward in enhancing tri-service jointness.
This will only be feasible, given the entrenched views that exist, if it is a top-driven exercise initiated at the highest level. The military leadership has choices to make. It can either remain wedded to age-old perceptions and ignore the need for change or it can take the initiative and turn it into a modern military that we deserve and can be proud of. That we are fated to repeat our follies, till we are willing to learn from history, is an old adage that’s best not forgotten. A repeat of 1962 is the last thing that our political, military and bureaucratic leadership would wish upon themselves.
(The writer, a military veteran, a consultant with the Observer Research Foundation and a Senior Visiting Fellow with The Peninsula Foundation, Chennai)
Writer: Deepak Sinha
Courtesy: The Pioneer
BG Deshmukh’s revelations in his book, A Cabinet Secretary Looks Back, shows how security protocols in the Rajiv era weren’t entirely above board
There is much talk of how Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister took his Italian relatives on a holiday to Lakshadweep and compromised national security by misusing the aircraft carrier INS Viraat and other Navy assets and also had naval officers in attendance to cater to the needs of the holiday-makers.
But there is an even greater scandal concerning the wholly illegal involvement of his Italian brother-in-law in the so-called training of the Special Protection Group (SPG) that managed the proximate security of the Prime Minister — a matter which would have certainly compromised the protocols of the special force and exposed it to foreign agencies.
Former Cabinet Secretary BG Deshmukh narrated the story of how the SPG became vulnerable to unknown and unauthorised foreigners in his autobiography, A Cabinet Secretary Looks Back. He said that as Cabinet Secretary, the special force was under his charge and one day in October 1986, he was told by an officer of this force posted in the Prime Minister’s residence that a few of them were going to Italy for “special training.” He immediately checked with Rajiv Gandhi and the latter said this was being arranged by the “Prime Minister’s House.” Deshmukh was not at all happy with this arrangement because the special force was a force that protected the Prime Minister of India, not Rajiv Gandhi, the individual. Therefore, he said the expenses must be borne by the Government. He also told Rajiv Gandhi that the Intelligence Bureau could handle it but later suggested that the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) be entrusted with the job and the payments be made from the secret funds.
Rajiv Gandhi asked him to speak to Capt Satish Sharma, his close friend. Sharma told Deshmukh that Joshi, Director, RAW, should speak to a certain Italian (whom he named) “and settle the details.” When Deshmukh asked Sharma who this Italian was, the latter “had a hearty laugh” and said Joshi would know. “Joshi …said, it might have escaped my memory that this person was Rajiv Gandhi’s brother-in-law.” Later, Deshmukh said, Joshi came back to him after a week and said when RAW’s Geneva office asked the Italian to pick up the amount in US dollars, the Italian said Joshi should himself “make arrangements to bring the amount in Italian currency and deliver it in Italy.”
Deshmukh recounted what happened next: “Joshi was not at all happy with this as it would entail carrying about a quarter of a million dollars in Italian currency in a big suitcase, which was sure to invite trouble.” The Cabinet Secretary told Rajiv Gandhi that the arrangement was not acceptable, “specially because the amount was so large. He (Rajiv Gandhi) flushed and told me to forget the whole affair.” Later, Deshmukh learnt that officers did not go to Italy but an Italian expert came to India — “of course, he became rather unpopular with the SPG for he would throw his weight around.” Deshmukh also realised that thereafter instructions had gone out to keep him out of the loop on all such “sensitive (read family) matters!”
In other words, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi wanted RAW to pay a quarter of a million dollars to his brother-in-law in Italian currency supposedly to train the SPG. And what were the qualifications of this brother-in-law with regard to proximate security of a Prime Minister? No one had a clue!
Deshmukh concluded his narration of this shocking incident by saying that “in the Mughal-darbar-like functioning of the Gandhis, he had committed the cardinal sin of checking with the king himself, the message he conveyed to me through his aides.”
Deshmukh is a credible and reliable witness to the Rajiv Gandhi era in national politics. He belonged to the Maharashtra cadre of the IAS. He was called by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Delhi in 1986 and appointed Cabinet Secretary. A year later, the Prime Minister was coping with the Bofors scandal. In 1989, he was appointed Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister. Therefore, when the Bofors kickbacks allegation became public in April 1987, he was in the thick of it, participating in key meetings and advising Rajiv Gandhi on the way forward when the Opposition mounted an attack on the Prime Minister and accused him of taking bribes for the Swedish company.
The senior civil servant said he became aware of the fact that the Prime Minister’s House had access to funds from abroad when the question of hiring Rajiv Gandhi’s Italian relative to “train” the SPG came up. There were two sources for these funds — money stashed away by the family in foreign banks consequent to garnering commissions on foreign deals and the other being the secret funds of the Government of India. The secret funds are deployed for such purposes because they are not subject to inquisitive probes by the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India.
Hailing as he did from Maharashtra, Deshmukh was aware of how the Congress collected funds in the state. In the initial years of her prime ministership, Indira Gandhi depended heavily on Maharashtrian leaders like Rajni Patil and Vasantrao Naik. Later, when she gained complete control of the party and the Government, she decided that it was far better to collect funds for the party by “claiming cuts from foreign deals.”
Consequently, trusted officers were posted in key Ministries like defence production. Also, Deshmukh said the practice of taking kickbacks earned India notoriety in foreign countries. So much so that when India decided to buy submarines from West Germany, the German Defence Ministry told the supplier the amount of commission that it would have to pay. The general talk in international circles was that in Latin American and African countries, the commission was above 10 per cent. India was placed in the five to 10 per cent bracket.
So, the scandal about commission payments by Bofors was no surprise. Deshmukh said that although he did not believe Rajiv Gandhi took the money, he said there was strong circumstantial evidence that he (Rajiv Gandhi) knew the names of the recipients but was reluctant to expose them. One could only surmise that the beneficiaries could be the Congress “or a close relative or friend of the Prime Minister’s family”, Deshmukh concluded. Indeed, he says a lot here without taking names. It appears, the dramatis personae of L’Affaire SPG were once again the same! For the sake of our Prime Minister’s security, all this needs to be probed.
(The writer is an author specialising in democracy studies. Views expressed are personal)
Writer: A Surya Prakash
Courtesy: The Pioneer
Sail supplied special quality forging steel from its Durgapur based alloy plants which went into the development of one home grown, state-of-the-art gun —Dhanush. The Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) has supplied steel for India’s first indigenous and biggest artillery gun — ‘Dhanush’, which has been inducted into the Indian Army recently. With this, SAIL has once again established its commitment to fulfill the country’s every requirement to strengthen India’s defence systems.
SAIL’s special alloy steel, produced by SAIL-Alloy Steels Plant based at Durgapur, has been used for making this artillery gun. ‘Dhanush’ has been indigenously designed and developed by the Gun Factory in Jabalpur where it was handed over to the Indian Army.
The organisation, which is in its 60th year of production, has contributed in creating a strong foundation for modern India and at the same time meeting every requirement of special quality steel for Indian defence. SAIL steel has been used in the country’s various defence programs including the INS Vikrant, INS Kiltan, INS Kamorta, MBT Arju and so on.
The company’s Rourkela Steel Plant has also been supplying special grade steel to Jabalpur’s Gun Factory to meet its various technical requirements related to development and repair.
SAIL chairman, Anil Kumar Chaudhary said, “It is matter of great pride for us that SAIL steel is being used in India’s various defence programs along with being used for building the country’s infrastructure. The company is ready to meet and supply special grade steels for technical requirement of the country’s defence programs.”
In the financial year 2018-19, SAIL produced 16.3 Million Tonnes (MT) crude steel in FY19, registering a growth of eight per cent over the corresponding period last year and clocking the best ever saleable steel production during the year. The production from new mills of the company’s plants recorded a marked improvement in FY19, giving an enriched product basket. The total steel despatch from SAIL was the highest ever at 14.86 MT during FY19 due to a dedicated logistics setup created by the organisation.
It is important to note that the FY19 ended with a robust performance during Q4 with a growth of 10 per cent, 8 per cent, 14 per cent and 13 per cent in respect of production of hot metal, crude steel, saleable steel and sales respectively. Also, SAIL had the highest ever production of 9.85 lakh tonnes of UTS 90 Rail. The production of Rails got momentum in the second half of FY19 with around 5.66 lakh tonnes of production and 35 per cent higher than the H1 figure. In line with this improved performance, the company has managed to improve its turnover by 16 per cent which now stands at Rs 66,100 crore.
However, he feels that the challenge for the next year is much higher with a plan of 21 per cent increase in production of crude steel and similar growth in sales to catch on with the fast growing domestic steel consumption backed by an increased demand from infrastructure and construction segments.
Writer & Courtesy: The Pioneer
The proposal by Russia’s to sell India MiG-29 aircraft is a clear illustration of the breakdown in our defense acquisition.
The Mikoyan Gurevich 29 fighter jet is an example of brilliant 1970’s technology; it is a fighter that is capable of extreme aerobatics and was highly effective as a weapon in its time. It was still regarded as a modern fighter even when India began to induct the plane in the late 1980s. But as the wrangling over the acquisition of 36 Dassault Rafale jets continues, India finds itself in a position where it does not have enough fighters to protect its airspace or the capacity to develop and build its own warplanes. And on this front, successive governments should take the blame than passing the buck.
Russia’s offer of 21 MiG-29 aircraft built anew on unused old airframes is a way for the Putin government to dispose of old assets. And given the critical situation of India’s air force fighter capacity, this ought to be taken up. But it should not be forgotten that India’s main requirement is for new fifth-generation fighter aircraft and these have to be acquired quickly. The crashes of a Mirage-2000 and MiG-27 aircraft in just a couple of weeks highlight how critical the situation is for this country that has two well-armed enemies on either side. Besides, we cannot afford to lose any more pilots during something as routine as test runs.
India remains one of the largest military forces in the world without adequate home-grown technology or manufacturing capacity and while new defence acquisition processes try to redress that problem, it will take years if not decades to change. In the meantime, the row over defence deals, which may or may not be manufactured due to political expediency, is continuing and unless a bipartisan approach to acquire new hardware is taken, this will not change. On this front, adapting Indian parliamentary committees to be more similar to those in the United States will be a good move. Public committee hearings on big defence deals will help allay fears of corruption. In the Rafale case, for example, some accuse Congress president Rahul Gandhi of manufacturing a scam while others accuse Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his government of being arrogant. And in the last two years, this slanging match seems to have brought India’s acquisition process to a standstill while soldiers, aviators and sailors continue to deal with old, often dilapidated equipment that often lead to needless accidents.
As this newspaper has noted, even some of the most advanced military forces in the world use old equipment, the United States being a case in point. Often for economic reasons and also the fact that old weapons systems are the best suited for modern post-Cold War warfare. But they are modified extensively to keep up with modern technology. So even if we accept the Russian offer to boost our fighting force, we should ensure that what we get is not a throwback to the past but as modern as it can be. At the same time, come May, the future government of this country has to ensure that new defence acquisition deals are concluded fast and India’s home-grown abilities are bolstered.
Writer & Courtesy: Pioneer
The chairman of the Offshore Security Co-ordination Committee (OSCC) and the Director General Indian Coast Guard (DGICG), DG Rajendra Singh, PTM, TM, underlined the importance of oil exploration and the maritime sector in India’s march towards a ‘bhavya and divya Bharat’. He also stressed upon the need for a safe and secure environment for exploration and production activities to aid India’s quest for energy which extends farther and deeper. He was speaking at the 131st meeting of the OSCC, held recently in Mumbai.
The chairman highlighted the impact of climate change and stated, “With 14 depressions and seven cyclones, the previous year had been a challenging one. All the security forces and other agencies have worked in cohesion to avert any major disaster during these natural calamities.” Singh further emphasised the need to adapt equipment, systems, operations and doctrines for climate change and natural disasters. Recalling the incident of listing of the drilling rig Olinda Star off Kakinada and the grounding of dredger Veera Prem off Karaikal, the chairman stressed on the importance of preemptive measures and coordination amongst various agencies during disasters.
Drawing attention to the trans-boundary and the dynamic nature of maritime threats, that pose typical challenges, Singh impressed upon the stakeholders for a collective thinking and a co-ordinated approach for achieving the aims of offshore security. He reviewed the progress on various ongoing projects and deliberated on various issues pertaining to offshore security, inter-agency coordination, surveillance around ODAs and so on. He urged the stakeholders to address the pending issues in a time bound manner with urgency, so as to arrive at a logical end. He added, “While offshore exploration is a national demand for growing energy security, securing the offshore areas is equally vital. Hence, as an economically progressive peninsular nation, with probabilities of maritime asymmetric threats, an optimum balance has to be brought out between the economics, productivity and security to ensure meeting the nation’s demand for both energy as well as security.”
Writer: The Pioneer
Source: The Pioneer
Globally, ‘veterans’ naturally gravitate towards conservative parties as the Centrist and Left-of-Centre parties are traditionally perceived to be ‘soft on security’. The Republican Party in the US and the Conservative Party (the Tories) in the UK usually garner more support than the Democratic Party or the Labour Party, respectively. With politics assuming more nationalistic undertones, political appropriation and positing of the ‘soldiers’ and their ostensibly-related causes has become more blatant and commonplace. UK Prime Minister Theresa May had slammed FIFA’s decision to disallow English football players from wearing ‘poppy’ lapels (in remembrance of soldiers who died in wars) as “utterly outrageous”; whereas US President Donald Trump came back from the Bastille Day military parade in Paris, wanting to replicate and top the same with his own version of a grand military parade. Clearly, centering the ‘soldier’ makes for good politics.
However, beyond the immediate traction, overplaying the symbolic hand on this tact without doing anything concrete or meaningful has diminishing returns. Already, the unprecedented cuts in the UK’s Department for Work and Pensions, affecting the ‘veterans’, have made ‘ex-service personnel account for one in 10 rough sleepers across the UK’. Indeed, in the US, Trump’s shocking mock of the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)-affected soldiers or the ‘privatisation’ of the veteran health services, militate against the professed concerns for the uniformed fraternity. The lazy perception that these men and women of honour could join the Administration of the ruling political dispensations as ‘trophy-candidates’ and loyal ‘yes-men’, to project militaristic muscularity, patriotism and decisiveness on the bankrolling party, is slowly coming undone. It is true that the institutional ethos and regimental/corps spirit bequeaths these combatants with certain outwardly machismo, steel and heroic ‘branding’, but beyond the razzmatazz of their medals, uniforms and swagger, lie decades of hands-on experience, blood-sweat-toil in disturbed areas and years of training and reflection that make these people amongst the most balanced and nuanced individuals who do not suffer from knee-jerk reactions.
Usually, what comes as a surprise to the politicos is the latent gravitas, inherent sense of self-respect and the undying spirit of speaking the truth (gently but surely), that ultimately make the political masters uncomfortable in their midst. The retired Marine Corps General James Mattis (who recently quit as the US Secretary of Defence) is famous for telling his troops: “You are part of the world’s most feared and trusted force. Engage your brain before your weapon.”
The healthy institutional diversity within the ‘barracks’ and the societal bonhomie under the most trying of circumstances make these veterans life-long believers in plurality and ‘inclusiveness’ that is above the regressive divides that beset and define partisan politics.
Combatants are also hardwired into believing “dissent is not disloyalty”, albeit, expressed in a certain form with the requisite context, form and dignity. Thus, the unmalleable spirit of ‘brothers-in-arms’ that swears only to the hallowed Constitutional spirit of the nation, riles against the political necessities, compromises and bigotry that usually accompany partisan politics.
Contrary to some caricaturised perceptions, soldiers are not war-mongering or blood-lusting cadres, as the nobility of the soldiers code ensures a more professional, rationale and reasonable instinct that differentiates a soldier from a mercenary. The legendary General Douglas MacArthur famously said: “The soldier above all prays for peace, for it is the soldier who must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war”.
The recent case of a similar realisation dawned on the draft-evader, Trump, who, in order to inject some testosterone of muscularity that befitted his contours of ‘America First’, got carried over by the Captain America-like superhero image of the iconic, four-star General, James Mattis (popularly known as ‘mad dog’ and ‘warrior monk’), and inducted him as the Secretary of Defence.
Perhaps, unknown to Trump was the erudition, sagacity and profundity that also came along with the Pattonesque-persona, whose real-time combat experience was enhanced by the scholarship that came with a personal library of over 7,000 books, unlike the empty rhetoric and vacuous bluster of a Donald Trump. The officer-like conduct in Mattis had insisted on a certain decorum and dignity in engaging with the allies, and not in the fanciful flights of temperamental rants that define Trump. Mattis’ exit and inability to get along with Trump mirrored the similar fate that beset other veterans, like the previous National Security Advisor, Lt Gen McMaster.
Historically, in India, too, veterans-turned-politicians have been amongst the most respected, well-read and responsible leaders like the classic cavalier Jaswant Singh, Maj Gen Khanduri and Rajesh Pilot — each of who did imminent justice and service to their respective political parties and administrative responsibilities. However, in the last few years, a new phenomenon emerged of newsroom-warriors plumed in their regimental regalia, thundering political invectives and positions dominating the prime-time slots. Thankfully, time and tide forced some into introspection, reflection and realisation that the politicos appropriated and misused the imagery of the ‘soldier’ for their own partisan purposes and basically the institutional interests and concerns remained unanswered, as before.
Election time is always fraught with the risk of such tactical propping of veterans as ‘show-horses’ for posturing patriotism and political muscularity. Care must be taken to ensure that the apolitical-construct and wiring of the Armed Forces is respected, and no ‘firing from the shoulders’ of these veterans is done to justify political pettiness, nefarious designs and selfish electoral objectives.
Like the veterans of yore, no implied extension of their military service should be encouraged to suggest an ‘institutional’ preference towards any political party — the veterans should propagate their partisan preferences in their individual capacity and certainly not on behalf of the ‘institution. A delicate line must be maintained. Irrespective of the political parties, matters concerning the ‘soldier’ have remained unaddressed and in crunch situations, the discomfort of politicians with the perspective and concerns of the ‘soldiers’ — be it in the US, UK or India — has led to the steady diminishment of the ‘institution’ in the national narrative.
(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry)
Writer: Bhupinder Singh
Courtesy: The Pioneer
The Supreme Court’s recent judgement on a slew of petitions vis-à-vis the Rafale deal, envisaging the purchase of 36 of these aircraft from a French company, will hopefully alert the people about the reckless sloganeering that is currently on and the silly attempts being made in some quarters to equate Rafale with Bofors.
At the moment, there is nothing in common between the two, except that they both relate to defence procurement from foreign companies. There, the similarities end. In the case of Bofors, there were specific allegations that this Swedish company paid kickbacks to win the contract and the payments were fully established in respect of certain entities, including Ottavio Quattrocchi, a dear friend of UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi and her late husband Rajiv Gandhi. In respect to Rafale, there are no such allegations of kickbacks or corruption; although the choice of the offset partner has been raised. In any case, the Supreme Court has categorically dismissed the petitions filed before it for several reasons, one of which is the vagueness of accusations.
On the other hand, just take a look at the kind of evidence of kickbacks that emerged in Bofors. Some part of these payments have been meticulously documented by the Delhi Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) comprising RP Tolani and RC Sharma. The tribunal tracked the money trail with clinical precision and presented its findings in its order many years ago. Unlike the humming and hawing and the vagueness of the allegations that are being hurled against the Government vis-à-vis the Rafale deal, there was clinching evidence of payoffs by Bofors.
The tribunal noted that Ottavio Quattrocchi, the Italian friend of Sonia Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, remained in India from February 28, 1965, to July 29, 1993, except for a brief interval from March 4, 1966, to June 12, 1968. He was a certified Chartered Accountant by profession, working with Snamprogetti, an Italian multinational company, but “neither Snamprogetti nor Quattrocchi had any experience of guns, gun-systems or any related defence equipment.” Further, although the Rajiv Gandhi Government declared that suppliers should not have agents, it entered into a consultancy agreement with a company called AE Services Limited in the UK on November 15, 1985.
This was done at the behest of Quattrocchi. The most intriguing aspect of this contract was that Bofors agreed to pay three per cent of the total value of the contract to this company if it won the India contract by March 31, 1986 (that is within 137 days of the signing of the contract on November 15, 1985). And, lo and behold, the Rajiv Gandhi Government signed the contract on March 24, 1986 — just a week before the deadline set by Bofors expired.
Once the contract was signed, the Indian Government released the first tranche of payments to Bofors on May 2, 1986, which was equivalent to 20 per cent of the contract.
Bofors promptly remitted $7.343 million on September 03, 1986, to A/c No: 18051-53 of AE Services Limited at Nordfinanz Bank, Zurich, which was three per cent of the advance paid. The tribunal found that this remittance to AE Services was transferred in September 29, 1986, to Account No: 254.561.60W of Colbar Investments Limited in the Union Bank of Switzerland, Geneva. On July 25, 1988, again, these funds were moved to Account No: 488.320.60 X of a company called Wetelsen Overseas, SA, in the same bank. Thereafter, on May 21, 1990, the money was further transferred to Account No: 123983 of International Investments Development Company in Guernsey (Channel Islands). The ITAT said: “These accounts of Colbar Investments as well as Wetelsen Overseas were being controlled by Ottavio Quattrocchi and his wife Maria Quattrocchi.”
But the most extraordinary development was that AE Services unilaterally announced that it would forego the rest of the commission due to it from Bofors, after the bribery scandal broke out in April 1987, and the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi struggled to explain the dubious payoffs by Bofors.
In the final analysis, the ITAT said 243 million Swedish Kroners was pocketed by Quattrocchi and Win Chadha. But the most clinching link between Quattrocchi, who got the kickbacks, and the Nehru-Gandhis came when former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh got the UK Government to lift the freeze on Quattrocchi’s bank account which had been imposed at the behest of the Atal Bihari Vajpayee Government. This enabled Quattrocchi to run away with the loot.
As against this unimpeachable evidence of kickbacks received by a close family friend of the Nehru-Gandhis, when India bought field guns for its Army, the allegations regarding the Rafale deal do not seem to have any legs to stand on. The Supreme Court has found it necessary to comment on the inadequacy of the petitions and on the excessive reliance on Press reports.
The court has said, “We find no reason for any intervention by this Court on the sensitive issue of purchase of 36 defence aircraft. Perception of individuals cannot be the basis of a fishing and roving enquiry by this Court, especially in such matters.” Again, while discussing the allegations regarding choice of the offset partner, the court said, “mere Press interviews or suggestions cannot form the basis for judicial review by this Court…We do not find any substantial material on record to show that this is a case of commercial favouritism to any party by the Indian Government….”
A critical issue raised in the writ petitions related to the pricing of the aircraft. The Chief of Air Staff was opposed to disclosure of price. Yet, the court noted that “despite this reluctance, the material has still been placed before the Court to satisfy its conscience”. The court said it had “examined closely” the price details and said it would not carry out a comparison of price details “in matters like the present” and that there was need to maintain confidentiality in the matter.
Significantly, the court observed that “adequate military strength and capability to discourage and withstand external aggression and to protect the sovereignty and integrity of India, undoubtedly, is a matter of utmost concern for the nation. The empowerment of defence forces with adequate technology and material support is, therefore, a matter of vital importance”. Therefore, the court felt that the parameters of judicial scrutiny in such matters of defence procurement cannot be the same as in judicial scrutiny of tenders and contracts.
Those who are making reckless and unsubstantiated allegations about the Rafale deal need to absorb these lessons. This writer has elaborated on the Quattrocchi money trail just to emphasise the kind of investigation that is needed to make an allegation stick. Therefore, the attempt by some political parties to claim that the Rafale deal is Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Bofors moment’ is laughable. Sloganeering is no substitute for evidence.
Writer: A Surya Prakash
Source: The Pioneer
Dragging the names of war heroes in coup conspiracies, assassination plots and contrived misdemeanours for political reasons maybe the reason why Sri Lanka’s military isn’t healthy.
With no effective Government in Sri Lanka after the soft coup by President Maithripala Sirisena on October 26, a floor test for the two prime ministerial claimants scheduled on November 14, and an insecure President presiding over the shambles, is it surprising that the Colombo Fort Magistrate Ranga Dissanayaka has ordered the arrest of the country’s top military officer, Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Ravindra Wijegunaratne before November 9. This is not the first time such a remand has been ordered — it was twice earlier too including once when CDS was in Mexico, though Sirisena intervened as Defence Minister and Commander-in-Chief to close the case after Wijegunaratne’s statement had been recorded. Apparently, the case did not close.
There is no National Security Advisor (NSA) in Sri Lanka, only a CDS, appointed under an Act approved in Parliament two years ago. It is suspected that the old regime is behind the plot to oust Wijegunaratne. The court has alleged that the Admiral had protected one Lt Commander Prasad Hettiarachchi, who is the main suspect in killing of 11 Tamil youths between 2008-09.
The officer has been playing truant — caught in March 2017 and escaped in June 2018. According to reports, there is little substance in the alleged charge given there are some 572 Lt Commanders in the Navy across the country and monitoring their movements is not easy. Front page allegations and arrest orders against the CDS are not good for the morale of the Sri Lankan armed forces.
The case highlights how divisive domestic politics can undermine military stature in a country where many senior officers are committed to one or the other party. Sri Lanka Freedom Party’s (SLFP) Sirisena is thought to have appointed former President Mahinda Rajapaksa as Prime Minister mainly because the name of Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, a UNP Minister in the National Unity Government (NUG) of Sirisena and Ranil Wickremesinghe, had figured in a CID enquiry in an alleged plot to assassinate Sirisena and Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, Mahinda’s younger brother. In the 2015 presidential elections, Sirisena had accused his rival Mahinda of trying to kill him. And now he has made him Prime Minister.
Fonseka has been through this charade before. On February 8, 2010, he was detained, court-martialed, stripped off General rank and jailed. As a former Army Chief, he had dared to contest the presidential election against Mahinda Rajapaksa, which he lost. He was charged with plotting to assassinate Rajapaksa and allegations of attempting a coup with help of India/R&AW were also hurled against him. Despite being one of the pivotal players in the extermination of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), he was disgraced, the main driver for this being his arch rival in the Army, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. The Army was divided between Gotabhaya’s people and Fonseka supporters and also along party lines.
Alongside Fonseka’s sacking, 30 officers were cashiered, including five Major Generals and two Brigadiers. One of the sacked Generals is the present Army Chief, General Mahesh Senanayake, who had left for Dubai and later worked in Afghanistan. During the civil war, he excelled as a security force commander in Jaffna. Though he was an Engineer officer, he outdid himself in the Special Forces. He is a tough, no-nonsense military leader who was on wrong side of the fence.
After Rajapaksa was defeated in 2015, Sirisena reinstated Fonseka and promoted him as Field Marshal and made him a minister. The political victimization of Fonseka supporters was rectified to some extent by the reinstatement five years on of Senanayaka as Army Chief. On taking over as President on January 8, 2015, Sirisena announced that he would investigate the alleged coup plot by Rajapaksa after the latter had lost the election.
It is said that Rajapaksa tried to get Army and police chiefs to help him stay in power but they did not oblige; Rajapaksa’s days were over. Not that the Army had not toyed with plots and coups earlier. In 1962, was the famous Colonels’ Coup at midnight January 27 against Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike. At the time, the officer corps was majority Christians, Tamils and Burghers. The Sinhalese push in the composition of the officer corps by Bandaranaike triggered off the abortive coup.
Yoshita Rajapaksa, son of Mahinda Rajapaksa was commissioned in the Sri Lankan Navy a decade ago and he was trained in Dartmouth, UK. His maternal grandfather was Captain EP Wickremesinghe, winner of Burma Cross in World War II for ferrying logistics along the Irrawaddy river. The Captain never made it to Commander of the Navy, who at the time was a Commodore, because he was a Catholic and victim of the 1962 coup. What his grandfather was deprived of, the family, especially his mother Shiranthi, hoped Yoshita would achieve — Commander of Navy. At Dartmouth, he was pampered as son of a head of state and grandson of a Burma Cross winner. As a shareholder of a television company he was allegedly investigated by Financial Crime Department and suspended from the Navy.
Bandaranaike’s unwritten law was that only Sinhala Buddhists would be made commanders of the three armed services. Many officers were obliged to change their religion. Recently, a Tamil Christian became a Navy commander but only for two months. The 1966 coup followed Bandaranaike’s defeat in elections when her successor Dudley Senanayake began to undo pro-Sinhala reforms of his predecessor. The Army Commander was arrested but later acquitted by court.
The suspension of legendary then Maj Denzil Kobbekaduwa, who later became Lieutenant General and a war hero and was sent to Royal College of Defence Studies, London by one Government, recalled by another Government and sent back again, was to become LTTE’s nemesis. But Prabhakaran got him on a landmine when he was planning a big operation against the LTTE.
After these two abortive coups, the Government created the Special Branch of the Ceylon Police to obtain early warning of uprisings and insurrections. Unfortunately, on returning to power in 1970, Bandaranaike dismantled the organization resulting in her Government being surprised by the JVP revolt in 1971, in suppressing which the Indian Army played a significant role.
Sri Lanka’s military has been transformed under the dynamic leadership of the likes of Fonseka, Senanayake and Wijegunaratne from a ‘funk’ force to an elite war-winning machine which destroyed the invincible Prabhakaran-led LTTE. In the year 2000, I did a study of the military after its debacle at Elephant Pass and discovered how brittle it was. Implicating war heroes in coup conspiracies, assassination plots and contrived misdemeanours for political compulsions will certainly undermine the health of Sri Lanka’s military.
(The writer is a retired Major General of the Indian Army and founder member of the Defence Planning Staff, currently the revamped Integrated Defence Staff)
Writer: Ashok K Mehta
Source: The Pioneer
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