There have been many lectures in schools around the world on the tale of Doctor Faust. The story of a man who sold his soul to the devil in exchange for untold wealth and power. It is an allegorical tale that casts light on the dangers of giving up on one’s principles and values in a head-long rush to achieve success. Of course, almost every politician anywhere in the world drives a Faustian bargain because they never expect the pigeons will come home to roost, and Imran Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, is possibly the best example of a man who has made such a deal. While he achieved immense success on the cricket field, notably leading his men to the famous victory in the Cricket World Cup in 1992, he entered Pakistani politics in an attempt to clean up the dire state of that country. Yet, as everyone knows, for years, he was but a minor irritant in the Pakistani political arena, dominated as it was by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (PML) in the periods the military was not in power. Seeing himself being sidelined by almost everyone, Imran Khan clearly dealt with the devil, the Pakistani military and its terror factories. Indeed, when Talibani terrorists killed 132 children in a devastating attack, Khan did not outrightly condemn the incident. In retrospect, everyone should have seen the writing on the wall. Khan was propelled to power last year on the back of terrorist factions, including those led by Masood Azhar, and indirectly by the military, the latter going out of its way to hobble Nawaz Sharif’s PML from putting up a fair fight. And even though in his first address after becoming the Prime Minister, Khan sounded conciliatory towards India, that was just a ruse. He had made his deal with the military and the Pakistani deep state and that was made evident by the recent Pulwana attack where several of our jawans paid with their lives.

Khan demanded proof from India for the attack even though Azhar and his terror cohorts had taken responsibility. As we know, India has consistently shared details of Pakistani involvement in terror acts, including the horrific incidents in Mumbai a decade ago. Those ‘dossiers’ must be gathering dust after having being read with some amusement by Pakistan’s terror handlers. Khan has “warned” India against any military adventurism. Although it would not be appropriate for India to go to war just now, it can and must respond to this attack by Pakistan. How it does so will remain to be seen, although Pakistan does a fairly good job of strangling itself. But we should not expect Khan to take any action, no matter how damning the proof we provide. Khan has decided to sleep with the devil and he has made his own bed; announcements of huge planned investments will barely change that nation, which has now been eclipsed by its erstwhile eastern half, Bangladesh, economically. At the end of The tragical History of Doctor Faustus, written by English playwright John Marlowe, Faust was dragged into hell when the devil came to take what is due to him. It would do Imran Khan well to remember this tale.

Courtesy & Writer: The Pioneer

With its economy on a southwards journey and given its failed inter-provincial relationship, Pakistan has no alternative but to spill out, and India seems to be the only destination.

Every week, this is news about how Pakistan is moving towards bankruptcy. While the buzz stands true, several countries such as China and Saudi Arabia have shown sympathy and extended financial aid to the country. However, if Karl Marx were around today, he might have said that loans are the opium of the classes. What could be true of the classes would be true of countries, too. It is too early yet to forget that in 1990, the Reserve Bank of India was sending gold to banks in London as pledge for loans in foreign exchange. The Pakistani crisis is far more serious because not only is there a financial paucity but also an impending economic collapse. The country is still essentially agrarian and feudal, and there has been little development since the British departed in 1947. In the meantime, the population has multiplied to reach nearly 180 million. Moreover, Islam commands a great deal of devotion from its followers but in turn, it does not encourage economic attention in contrast to the Protestant work ethic.

Since the advent of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and SEATO in 1954, Pakistan has been the beneficiary of American military and other such aid, which helped the economy in general and imports in particular. That aid is drying up because of the country’s active association with terrorism, the Taliban and others. Cereals and other basic food items are not a problem yet, but Pakistan has run out of red meat. Way back in the days of Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s presidentship, it could be foreseen that the supply of beef would become a problem. He had, during his time in the mid-sixties, declared one-day a week meatless. Now with the shortage of foreign exchange, how can imports be sustained? All these developments and more are a concern for India, too, not merely out of human sympathy but also on account of self-interest. How? We must anticipate this to plan ahead.

Another grave weakness of Pakistan is its inter-provincial relationship. All the three other Provinces, namely Balochistan, North-West Frontier Province and Sind, resent Punjab, which holds two-third  of the population. Punjab dominates, if not monopolises the Army and the bureaucracy. There have been separatist movements in all three smaller Provinces. The Pathans or Pashtuns look to the Afghans as their brothers. Jio Sindh is not active at present but sentiments are alive. Balochs openly say they want to separate and killings take place frequently. Disunity does not augur well for Pakistan. Hence, Islamabad tries to divert everyone’s attention by stoking Kashmir as a daily issue.

India was partitioned in 1947 on demand of most Muslims of the sub-continent, who aspired that their new homeland would become a New Medina. The old Medina was the first Islamic state, founded by Prophet Muhammad in 622 CE after his hijrat or migration from Mecca. When he ascended to heaven, his representatives or Caliphs took over one by one. They were conceptually the spiritual as well as temporal heads of all Islam, effectively the Sunnis, who comprise 90 per cent of the world community, called the ummah. In 1924, Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, the new unquestioned head of Turkey, abolished the Caliphate and exiled the incumbent. That was the end of the symbolic head of all Islam. Muslims everywhere would like that institution to be recreated. The dream of the pre-1947 Muslims of India was that Pakistan would be the cradle of this recreated Medina.

The same sentiment in Arabia is reflected in the Islamic State (IS), which fought in Iraq against Baghdad and against the Syrian Government in the ghastly civil war that has just ended. Sentiment was so strong and widespread in India that Pakistan became a reality even with its two wings, 1,600 kilometres apart. Bangladesh broke away in 1971 and exploded the myth that Islam alone can bind any country together.

The same fissiparousness spread inside the western wing of Pakistan to emphasise that Islam cannot alone be the binding factor of any country or its parts. Followers have been too ambitious to expect religion to be a total prescription for life and not merely a spiritual path to connect man and God.

There must be leaders in Pakistan, who now realise this truth as well as recognise that but unfortunately, no other ideology or political basis has been allowed to sprout and grow. In short, Pakistan has allowed itself to get trapped in a blind alley.

The only way out is to explode and that holds a grave danger for India. If the people have no alternative but to spill out, India is the only destination. What Bangladeshis did to India in yesteryears, Pakistan could do in the years to come. To be deceived once is ignorance but to be deceived again is lunacy. Fencing one’s border is a wise measure. US President Donald Trump is building a wall across the southern border of America against the wishes of the Congress, which refuses to grant him a big enough budget. But how can one fence the sea shores?

Migrations by boat people are legendary, whether in Asia out of Vietnam, into Europe via sea or America from Haiti.

Over and above, to fence the land borders, there has to be alert by internal security who must be helped by watchtowers on the entire border, sea or land. The Aadhaar card is alright as a negative check but all adult citizens must be issued domestic passports to be okayed only after strict inquiries, much stricter than before giving out passports to travel abroad. With a passport, a person can settle in permanently. With India’s diversity, there would be no alternative but comprehensive vigil. Sooner or later, surreptitious infiltration is inevitable in large, medium or small measure.

Hence, above all, supreme deterrence is needed. Remember, Pakistanis would have friends and relatives who have been in India since time immemorial. Very few Bangladeshis had this advantage; their allies were politicians with their eyes on building vote banks.

Further help to the agonised and otherwise helpless people of Sindh, as well as Balochistan, should be contemplated. Remember, Sindhi locals hardly played any part in driving out the Hindus. That unfortunate role was played by the Mohajirs after they landed in Karachi and had to either live in camps or sleep on the streets. In fact, Sindhis were nowhere near the forefront of the demand for Pakistan, and their leadership had wondered as to how their economy could function efficiently without Hindu Amil officials and Bhaiband businessmen.

Balochistan, until late in 1948, had an Embassy in Karachi, which clearly showed that in terms of British tradition, the region had a distinct status and did not need an accession to either dominion, India or Pakistan. Nevertheless, the Khan of Kalat came to Delhi and officially called on Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and requested for Balochistan to be taken over as a part of India. Nehru politely declined. If either or both of these Provinces can release themselves from Islamabad’s clutches and become autonomous again,  they can be of much help to New Delhi.

Courtesy: The Pioneer

Writer: Prafull Goradia, a well-known columnist and an author

Before making any outrageous claims on border issues, Chinese officials are better advised to do their homework well about history and geography

Hua Chunying, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, once again exhibited poor knowledge of history and even geography. She repeated her claims that Arunachal Pradesh is a part of Chinese territory. Soon after the Indian Prime Minister visited Arunachal Pradesh, she affirmed: “The Chinese Government has never recognised the so-called Arunachal Pradesh and is firmly opposed to the Indian leader’s visit to the East Section of the China-India boundary.”

True to form, South Block issued a weak rebuttal. One wonders why can’t New Delhi speak of the “so-called Tibetan Autonomous Region” or lodge a strong protest each time China does repair work on the road cutting across the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh? Indian diplomats are probably too shy for this. But we should learn from China to defend our interests more vociferously.  Hua’s sharp tongue expressed hopes that “India will cherish the momentum of warming bilateral ties and not take any provocative action.” What provocative action? Just the Prime Minister’s visit to an Indian state? Hua may not be aware but China’s refusal to acknowledge the McMahon Line is a relatively new phenomenon.

Let us go back to 1956. As India prepared to celebrate the 2,500th anniversary of the birth of Buddha, communist China was extremely nervous; eastern Tibet was on fire with the Khampa rebellion, while central Tibet was slowly getting contaminated by the revolt. After months of prevarication, Beijing finally allowed the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama to visit India for the celebrations. But Chinese premier Zhou Enlai was really febrile, he was aware that many Tibetans wanted the Dalai Lama to stay on in India; as a result, he visited Delhi thrice in a period of two months.

During one of his numerous encounters with Zhou, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru asked him: “But I do not quite understand what you meant when you said that Tibet in the past had not become a province of China?” The premier answered: “That Tibet is part of China is a fact but it has never [been] an administrative province of China and has kept an autonomous character.” For Beijing, the autonomous character would remain on paper only. Zhou even admitted that India knew more about Tibet’s past history: “For example, I knew nothing about McMahon Line until recently when we came to study the border problem after the liberation of China.”

Hua would be surprised to learn that China’s premier did not know about the line delineating the border between Indian and Tibet till the early 1950s. Nehru unnecessarily asserted that historical knowledge was not important: “History is gone.” He, however, added: “My impression was that whatever it may be in theory, for all practical purposes, Tibet has all along been autonomous.”

The clever Zhou repeated that though people like him never knew about the McMahon Line till recently, the Kuomintang regime knew about it. Referring to the McMahon Line, he spoke of a “secret” pact between British India and Tibet at the time of the Simla conference.

The Chinese do not like to remember that the Tibetans sat on an equal footing with them during the Simla conference between October 1913 and July 1914. To give an example, the proceedings of the third meeting of the Tibet conference held on January 12, 1914, mentioned the presence of Sir Henry McMahon, GOVO, KCIE, CSI, British Plenipotentiary and staff; Monsieur Ivan Chen, Chinese Plenipotentiary and staff and Kusho Lonchen Shatra, Tibetan Plenipotentiary and staff. They officially sat together for nine months; China suffers from selective amnesia today.

To come back to the Nehru-Zhou meeting, the Premier continued on the McMahon Line: “And now that it is an accomplished fact, we should accept it. But we have not consulted Tibet so far. In the last agreement, which we signed about Tibet [in 1954], the Tibetans wanted us to reject this Line but we told them that the question should be temporarily put aside.”

The Chinese Premier bluffed: “But now we think that we should try to persuade and convince Tibetans to accept it.”

Then, Nehru went on his favorite argument: “The border is a high mountain and sparsely populated.” He further asserted: “Apart from the major question, there are also small queries about two miles here and two miles there. But if we agree on some principle, namely, the principle of previous normal practice or the principle of watershed, we can also settle these other small points.”

It is a fact that it is the nationalist government which made the communists realise the extent of the Chinese territory in the area. It is Ren Naiqiang, an influential scholar during the Republican era, who first included parts of the north-eastern borders of India into the Chinese territory. In 1926, long before the beginning of the Japanese war, Ren had started wandering through Kham. In 1936, as the Nationalist Government formally established the new province Xikang (corresponding to Kham province of Tibet), Ren Naiqiang was encouraged by Liu Wenhui, the Governor of the new province, to produce a map of the area. Though the Chinese had never set a foot in the area, the new map included the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in China.

At the end of 1949, Ren Naiqiang met Marshal He Long, one of the seniormost generals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and explained why his map was dependable; the Marshal was convinced and ordered the distribution of copies. On January 10, 1950, He Long sent his report to Mao Zedong strongly recommending that Ren’s map should be accepted and circulated amongst the PLA. It is after this encounter that China started “claiming” India’s NEFA (today Arunachal Pradesh). Before making outrageous claims, Hua should do her homework and know her country’s history. China has not always claimed NEFA.

(The author is an expert on India-China relations.)

Writer: Claude Arpi

Courtesy: Pioneer

The words and actions of the US have increasingly come under question owing to that intrigues, complexities and accompanying civilian atrocities in conflicts in Afghanistan and Vietnam.

The genesis, proceedings and the ultimate fate of the US involvement in both Vietnam and Afghanistan are plagued with eerie similarities. First, both — the Vietnamese and the Afghans — pride themselves on their fierce history of resistance to foreign invaders for centuries. In the case of the Vietnamese, it was the valiant repulsion of the Chinese, Mongols, French and the Japanese forces; whereas, the unforgiving battlefields of the Afghan swathes have been bloodied with forces of Alexander, Arab caliphates, Genghis Khan, Timur, Persians, Mughals, Sikhs, British empire and to the communist forces of the erstwhile USSR. Both races have a heightened sense of history and destiny that militates instinctively against any notion of a foreign “invader.” Both these lands have been at the forefront of the US’ efforts to counter the topical “ism” that threatened American interests. In the case of Vietnam, in the 50s and 60s, it was the Cold War fear of “communism” that drove US interest; whereas in the case of Afghanistan (post 2001), “religious extremism” replaced “communism” as the greatest security threat.

In both these conflicts, the US had played a covert, tactical and surreptitious role in inflaming the combustible ground situation. Insidious military and financial support was extended to the French forces in the 50s to re-colonise Vietnam, which later morphed into a full-fledged US military intervention by the 60s. Similarly, the less-than-covert military operations of the Central Intelligence Agency-Islamic State (IS), along with the Afghan mujahideen in the 80s, had lit the flames of religious extremism that ultimately morphed into the phenomenon of the Taliban. The pattern of sudden US disinterest is also common to both places as Vietnam would face in the mid-70s when the forces of Ho Chi Minh overran Saigon, as also in the essential US disinterest in the 90s as Pakistan-supported Taliban entered and butchered their way into Kabul. The genesis of both conflicts had unmistakable fingerprints of the US handiwork prior to the full escalation of the crisis. In both cases, the US had erred in its initial judgement as it had twice spurned appeals by the nationalist, Ho Chi Minh, before he turned a staunch communist; whereas, the American desperation to dislodge the communist Najibullah regime in Kabul had led them to honour and fete the Afghan mujahideen in the White House, who later turned on their original benefactors.

Signs of American “shock-and-awe” military tactics to bludgeon enemy lines were visible in the killing fields of Vietnam, where the Americans dropped more than three times the tonnage of bombs that the entire allied forces dropped in World War II. Today, Afghanistan has replaced Vietnam as its longest war and a record high number of bombs dropped in a year were registered in 2018. The definitive imagery of 388,000 tonnes of napalm bombs dropped in Vietnam was mirrored with the unabashed dropping of the GBU-43/B (also known as “Mother of all Bombs”) in Afghanistan — the most powerful non-nuclear weapon in American arsenal. However, despite the colossal commitment of weaponry and military might, the Afghan extremist groups today control more territory than at any point ever since the removal of their regime 17 years ago. The Vietnam War had led to over 58,000 American military casualties and the technology-enhanced Afghan war to yet another 2,400 American military casualties. The “cost of war” to the locals (civilians, soldiers and insurgents) was an unprecedented three million in the Vietnam War and over 111,000 in Afghanistan. From the official start date of the Vietnam War (November 1, 1955) to the signing of the peace treaty in January 1973 for facilitating the withdrawal of American troops, the realisation of an unsustainable “no-win” stalemate took 18 years. Today, nearly 18 years into the Afghan War (started in 2001, following 9/11), the Americans are walking the talk of another American withdrawal, this time from Afghanistan, following yet another stalemate.

Unfortunately, the looming fears of the imminent future are also similarly aligned as the Americans are negotiating with the Afghan Taliban (under the nudge and aegis of the equally unreliable ally, Pakistan) to facilitate the American troops’ withdrawal. In 1973, a similar face-saving treaty was signed by the representatives of the US, South Vietnam, North Vietnam and Viet Cong to ‘reunite’ Vietnam peacefully – even though the signatory north Vietnamese were knowingly violating the terms of ceasefire and agreement and by 1975, the entire South Vietnam territory had fallen to a full-scale invasion by the North. It is this doomsday scenario that has fuelled concerns in the Ashraf Ghani-led Afghan Government in Kabul as they fear the impact of an emboldened Taliban. From 1,50,000 foreign troops defending the beleaguered Afghan Government till 2016, to just about 7,000 (after the current US withdrawal plans), along with the well-known aspiration of “strategic depth” in Afghanistan for the Pakistani state – the military ability of the current Afghan Government in Kabul to withstand the IS-Taliban combined onslaught is extremely suspicious. The sudden vacuum following the US withdrawal in Vietnam in 1973 had led to the ultimate fall of the South Vietnam defences; the US “withdrawal” from Afghanistan in 1991 had led to the creation of the Taliban; and now the insecurity in Kabul is one of history repeating itself.

While history is yet to record its final verdict and victor in Afghanistan, in Vietnam, the Americans can technically claim to have “withdrawn.” However, objectively, the anti-US side overran the US protectorate and they rule till date. Thousands of insurgents were killed in US military operations and multiple more of the same were borne out of the sense of revenge, hatred and retribution against the US. In both cases the human, economic, military and the political “cost of war” became unsustainable and the common feature of “stalemate” wore out the largest military in the world. The intrigues, complexities and accompanying civilian atrocities in both conflicts have also led to serious questions on the morality, trust and confidence on the US’ words and actions. Afghanistan is still an unfolding saga, yet portents of a possible repeat of a Vietnam stare in the face.

(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry.)

Writer: Bhopinder Singh

Bibi Aasia Noreen, the Pakistani Christian woman who was on death row for blasphemy, is finally out of the woods. The Supreme Court of Pakistan recently rejected the final appeal against her acquittal. But she might still have to relocate to the West, as living in Pakistan could prove perilous for her. India could have set an example by inviting her to live in this country.

Imagine if Aasia Bibi were a Christian woman in India, working in an agricultural field alongside Hindu women. Consider a hypothetical scenario. Thirsty after working under the hot sun, she fetches a pail of water for fellow workers, but first drinks some herself from the metal mug lying beside the well. The other women,  suddenly realising that she is a Christian, wonder whether Aasia Bibi had “polluted” their well and “diluted” their religion. And then, angered and hurt, Aasia Bibi reacts by telling some horrible things about Hindu deities as though she had been reading BR Ambedkar’s Riddles in Hinduism: The Annotated Critical Selection the previous night.

What options would Hindu women have against Aasia Bibi? First, a cat-fight to teach her a lesson on the spot. Second, tell the owner of the land to dismiss her from services. Third, to complain to their respective husbands about the defilement. Fourth, to tell the priest about a local temple. Fifth, go to Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) karyakartas. Sixth, to go to the law enforcing authorities like police and court.

The third and fourth options would have been treated as nothing more than gossip-mongering. Also, since Aasia Bibi  is not a Bible-thumping Christian missionary, there would be little to excite the RSS and VHP karyakartas. The fifth option of approaching the law enforcing authorities would be positively dangerous for them as they would be hauled up under Section 3 of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, to enforce religious disabilities (denying access to water sources). Thus, rather than doing any harm to Aasia Bibi, they themselves would have ended up in prison for  up to six months besides depositing a penalty.

But on June 14, 2009, Aasia Bibi was unfortunately in an alternate universe called Pakistan. She was arrested on charges of making derogatory remarks about Prophet Mohammed, based on the evidence of Mafia Bibi and Asma Bibi. Qari Mohammed Salam, a local cleric, filed a case of blasphemy with the police, based on hearsay. The case spiralled in importance with a local court awarding death sentence to Aasia Bibi   for denigrating Prophet Mohammed in 2010, and later a Lahore court upholding its judgement in 2016.

The Pakistan Penal Code has several controversial sections (and sub sections thereof) ranging from 295 to 298-C under offences related to religion, commonly called “blasphemy laws” that are discriminatory against non-Muslims. The most dangerous of them are 295-C (use of derogatory remarks with respect to Prophet Mohammed) and 295-B (defiling the Holy Quran) which carry a punishment of mandatory death sentence and life imprisonment respectively.

Some of these deadly provisions were inserted in Pakistan’s Penal Code not when the Islamic Republic was founded but in the 1980s, when the rest of the world was seized with the idea of progress. Pakistan had inherited some blasphemy laws from the British period but those were religion-neutral. Their basic purpose was not to defend religious principles but maintain communal peace.

In three decades between 1947 and 1977, there were only 10 reported court judgements in Pakistan pertaining to offences against religion. The complaints were made mostly by Muslims against other Muslims, by non-Muslims against Muslims. No case was registered by a Muslim against non-Muslims for committing an act of blasphemy against Prophet Mohammed or “defiling” the Quran. But all these was about to change soon.

In 1974, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the Prime Minister, the first amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, was carried out to exclude the Ahmediyas from the legal definition of being a Muslim. The language of the amendment had a theological overtone incompatible with modern constitutions. It says that a person, who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of the prophethood of the Mohammed, is not a Muslim for the purpose of the Constitution or law.

In 1977, General Zia-ul Haq came to power through a coup d’état. The ensuing 11 years saw increased Islamisation of Pakistan in various spheres. These included insertion of five provisions relating to blasphemy in the Pakistan Penal Code between 1980 and 1986. Close to 1,500 people have been charged under those sections till date though none were actually hanged.

A Federal Shariat Court (FSC) was established in 1980, with the power to “examine and decide the question whether any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam”. The FSC’s decisions are binding upon the Government unless the latter successfully appeals to the Shariat bench of the Supreme Court.

When Section 295-C was introduced in 1986, it had a provision of life imprisonment as an alternative to capital punishment. But in 1990, the FSC recommended the removal of alternative provision of life imprisonment. Since the Pakistan Government did not appeal against this recommendation in the Supreme Court by the deadline of April 30, 1991, the capital punishment without an alternative attained finality.

A judgement of Peshawar High Court in 2006 expressed serious concern that whenever a person was charged with such an offence, the media gave extensive coverage and the accused person was abused by the society/people at large. Even under Islamic injunctions, the court added, it is for the Qazi alone to decide the guilt or innocence of the accused and none could be allowed to forejudge and condemn any person accused of such offence without facing proper and fair trial.

Right to fair trial is what the Supreme Court based its case upon in its judgements (dated October 7, 2015, and January, 28, 2019). But unfortunately, the court could not discard or challenge the atrocious rubric of blasphemy laws. This means there will be no end to this madness in Pakistan. The courts could not counteract blasphemy because they know it is an integral part of Islam. Its misuse though has been possibly as old as its application itself.

Nicholas Mannucci (1638-1717), the Italian adventurer to India, relates in his Storia do Mogor how a rich Jew in Aleppo (Syria) outwitted a Muslim Governor, who wanted to deprive him of his wealth,  life and religion by abetting blasphemy in the 16th century. The Governor asked the Jew, who was the greatest Prophet among Moses, Christ and Mohammed? Had the Jew said Mohammed, he would be asked to accept Islam. Had he mentioned the others, it would be considered a blasphemy and he would be put to death.

The Jew, however, proved cleverer than expected. He narrated a story of how a rich man had a precious stone, which each of his three sons wanted to inherit on his death. So he got two exact replicas made from the lapidaire; and gave away those to each son so that one had the original and the other two had replicas. But he told each to keep it a secret that he had given him the original and the false one to others. But only the father knew who got the original. So God gave three Prophetic  religions viz Judaism, Christianity and Islam to three races. While each thinks his religion is true, God alone knows the truth. The Muslim governor conceded defeat in his mission and even rewarded the Jew.

(The writer is author of recently published book, ‘The Microphone Men: How Orators created a Modern India’. Views expressed are his personal)

Writer: Priyadarshi Dutta

Courtesy: The Pioneer

Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is rapidly emerging with an ambitious global agenda to extend its economic and military influence worldwide and thereby reshape the world order. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a manifestation of China’s desire to establish economic and military hegemony over vast resource-rich regions in Asia and Africa and to dominate the European and American markets.

Though China portrays the BRI as a scheme of connectivity and economic partnerships with countries and regions, in reality it is a cover for expanding military presence in those regions through dual use infrastructure.

To achieve economic and military hegemony, China is employing the “debt trap” policy in the most effective way. In December 2017, China got the control of newly built port of Hambantota due to Sri Lanka’s inability to repay debt.

According to reports, Kenya is also facing the risk of losing control over the port of Mombasa to China under similar circumstances.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the BRI’s flagship project. Gwadar, a city of great geographic importance, is at the heart of this project. The CPEC project not only provides the shortest land route from Kashgar to Gwadar, but it also allows access to important sea routes and connects China with its bases at Djibouti, Hambantota and Mombasa.

China and Pakistan deny military use of the CPEC, but the project actually provides military bases to China at different strategic points off the Baloch coast. This is meant to ensure Chinese military hegemony over the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the most significant sea lane of the Strait of Hormuz.

In case, China and Pakistan succeed to build and make operational the roads, railway tracks and military bases under the CPEC, the former will surely be able to reshape the world order, dominate the vast resource-rich regions of Balochistan, West Asia, Central Asia, Horn of Africa and beyond. China will also be able to encircle India, the largest democracy and a large market.  China will use the Gwadar port to overshadow the ports of Dubai and Chabahar.

Land route from Kashgar to the Gwadar port will certainly reduce Chinese dependence on sea routes passing through the waters of countries which are at loggerheads with China. In case of any conflict with the South China Sea contestants, the CPEC will provide an alternative supply route to Chinese markets. Such an advantageous situation for China will obviously generate enormous threats to regional and world security, peace, prosperity, democratic values, human rights and freedoms because both China and its client state of Pakistan profess anti-democratic ideologies and support authoritarian Governments.

Despite the fact that the BRI and the CPEC pose obvious threats to the world and regional peace and order, the world powers seem reluctant to contest it seriously. The only serious opposition to the CPEC is from the Baloch people of Balochistan.

China has entered into agreements with Pakistan over Balochistan, where people see Pakistan as an unlawful occupier and exploiter. These agreements are in violation of the ownership and proprietary rights of the people of Balochistan over their land, sea and natural resources. With Chinese technology, machinery and money, the CPEC will strengthen Pakistan’s ability to continue its exploitative rule and plunder natural resources of Balochistan. China and Pakistan are already extracting gold, copper, silver and iron from Saindak and other mines in Balochistan. The CPEC will also alter the demography of coastal Balochistan rendering the Baloch people a minority in their own motherland.

Balochistan’s opposition to the CPEC is  a matter of the people’s survival as a nation, their ownership and proprietary rights over their own land, sea and natural resources.  Its freedom movement is a key check to Chinese hegemonic designs in the region. For instance, an independent Balochistan would provide a safe corridor of connectivity, trade and transit for South Asia, West Asia, Central Asia and East Africa. It would provide safe access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. An independent, secular and democratic Balochistan will possess the potential to be instrumental in the promotion and augmentation of democratic and secular values in the terrorism-affected regions of South Asia, West Asia, Central Asia and Afghanistan.

With its unique location, huge depots of mineral resources, democratic and secular values, Balochistan will become an epicentre of regional cooperation and connectivity, economic development, trade, transit and combating religious extremism and terrorism.

(The writer is former Secretary General of Baloch National Movement. He tweets at @RahimBaloch)

Writer: Rahim Baloch

Courtesy: The Pioneer

China is very fond of Silk Roads. In 2013, a year after Xi Jinping was anointed Emperor of the Middle Kingdom, he initiated a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since then, the Chinese diplomacy has been tirelessly promoting the mega project to link the country to its neighbours as well as to Central Asia, Africa and Europe. Beijing’s latest promotional move has been to confer the Silk Road Super Ambassador Awards to the Ambassadors of Pakistan, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Malta and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Pakistani Ambassador to China, Masood Khalid, told The Global Times: “Our cooperation is very broad and is expanding, so we are happy. We are confident that as we move forward, we will see more tangible progress in our cooperation.”

One may think that the BRI has opened new avenues between the people of China and Pakistan and that the route between Gilgit and Xinjiang is wide opened to Pakistanis to trade with China. But it is not the case — the BRI seems to be just a state-to-state affair, without any concern for the ‘people’ from both sides. To give an example, a few weeks ago, Reuters reported: “Pakistani businessmen, whose wives and children are trapped in China’s restive Xinjiang, are travelling to Beijing to lobby with their Embassy, with hopes that the south Asian nation’s new Government will pressure its ally for their release.”

Deutsche Welle of Germany explained: “Due to Xinjiang’s proximity to Gilgit-Baltistan, the residents of the two areas have shared long historical, cultural and family ties. Many Uighurs are married to the Gilgit-Baltistan locals and vice versa.” The pretext for closing down the border is China’s suspicion about the alleged association of Uighurs with Islamist extremists. China’s Silk Roads are clearly not for the common man, though Nepal, too, is speaking of Xi’s project in laudatory terms.

On January 9, Jameson Lamudhali Layi, the Nepali Consul General in Lhasa (Tibet), told the website China Tibet Online: “I’m really looking forward that the Qinghai-Tibet Railway would reach the city of Kyirong on the China-Nepalese border, which will connect Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, with many cities in China, including Lhasa. …This will be very beneficial and very important to our country.”

The Chinese official website continued: “As the ongoing friendship and collaborations between China and Nepal continue to develop, the extension of the Lhasa-Shigatse Railway is also a project people of both countries are looking forward to.”

Everybody does see it this way; Uddhab P Pyakurel, an Assistant Professor in the School of Arts in Kathmandu, wrote a well-researched paper pointing to the historical and proximate relationship between Nepal and Tibet before China came into the picture. The scholar analyses how this relationship has changed from a striving one to “a stage that is only formal and rhetoric.” He said that the opening of the Rasuwagadi (Kyirong) border has been welcomed by Kathmandu “as if China has shown a great sympathy for Nepalis.” Pyakurel then asserted: “But evidences show that the Chinese proposal to strengthen activities through Kyirong border was just to avoid negative impressions about China in Nepal.” Another landport where local trade was taking place has recently been closed, though “it is reported that the Chinese officials keep promising to open it but do not confirm when they would open the customs points.”

The scholar accused China of progressively eliminating “both the local trade carried on by the inhabitants of the Nepal-Tibet border and the traditional transportation trans-border pasturage-usage system under which pastures on both sides of the boundary were used at different times of the year by Nepali and Tibetan herdsmen.”

Pyakurel gave a detailed account of the successive treaties since 1956, which made it more and more difficult for local traders to deal with Tibet …while the state-to-state business bloomed. This comes at a time when China is opening another port with Nepal: The new corridor lies dangerously close to the strategic State of Sikkim.

Kimathanka is one of the smallest and  remotest hamlets in the North-eastern district of Sankhuwasabha of eastern Nepal; the village is strategically located as it lies at the border with Tibet (China). The Kathmandu Post affirmed that it is “a crucial strategic location for Nepal as the country strives to increase its connectivity with the northern neighbour.”

In April 2018, Nepal’s Foreign Minister, Pradeep Gyawali, visited Beijing, where he met Vice President of China, Wang Qishan, and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi. He spoke of “expediting past agreements, developing trans-Himalayan multi-dimensional transport networks and building a China-Nepal-India economic corridor.” Gyawali said that China is Nepal’s genuine friend and a trusted ally: “We should build on the excellent roots of civilisational, geographical and cultural affinities to further connect our countries and societies in order to achieve common prosperity in the trans-Himalayan region.”

Once the new corridor is opened, it will have serious strategic implications for India as it will open via Birarnagar, a new strategic and unwanted gate to India through Kishanganj and Siliguri. Here, too, no people-to-people exchange.

As the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to India is announced for February or March, it could be an occasion for the Government to question him about the new corridor and remind him about Demchok, the last Ladakhi village on the road to western Tibet.

For centuries, Demchok witnessed caravans from Kashmir, Ladakh or Central Asia bringing goods (delicious apricots among others) to the Roof of the World. Ironically, ‘The Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India’, remembered as the Panchsheel Agreement, signed on April 28, 1954, literally killed the age-old border trade.

Suddenly, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which had taken control over the plateau, stopped Ladakhi traders from selling their goods in Tibet; it marked the end of one of the most flourishing Silk Roads. There was a reason for it, China was building a road across the Aksai Chin, an Indian territory, and the PLA did not want witnesses to the construction.

If Beijing is serious about trans-boundary trade, it has no option but to re-open the old traditional routes, be it the Khunjerab Pass with Pakistan, the passes between Nepal and Tibet or the old routes like the Demchok caravan road. But is China ready to do this? Let us hope that Mr Modi will at least ask President Xi Jinping.

(The writer is an expert on India-China relations and an author)

Writer: Claude Arpi

Courtesy: The Pioneer

The Chinese use a term ‘xuanchuán’, which literally means propaganda — an intrinsic tact of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to legitimise various state actions and to posture a certain inevitable destiny, muscularity and invincibility among all stakeholders, domestically and externally. The Chinese leadership often teases and releases unverifiable information about its military preparedness and technological advancements. The deliberate sneak-peak of the fifth generation stealth fighter plane J-20, nuclear submarines, aircraft carrier programme and cruise missiles among others are all a part of the intimidation and muscle-flexing exercise. A carefully calibrated media environment advances a narrative of the next-generation capabilities like hypersonic weaponry, cyberwarfare and an overall security framework that entails the most advanced ‘anti-access/area-denial’ military doctrines (A2/AD). This perception of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capability (entailing ground forces, Navy, Air Force, rocket force and strategic support force) then supports the more political and diplomatic aggression that the Chinese leadership indulges on its expansionist agenda in Taiwan and South China Sea belligerence. This sense of ‘war-clouds’ was implicit in the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first order of 2019 to the PLA, where he stated, “All military units must correctly understand major national security and development trends and strengthen their sense of unexpected hardship, crisis and battle”.

Undeniably, the PLA is the largest military force in the world (two million active strength) with the second largest defence budget of $175 billion, annually. This is nearly four times that of India ($45 billion) and it grew at an unprecedented rate of eight per cent over the previous year. This generous outlay was possible due to the Chinese economic juggernaut that affords the indulgences of the interlinked diplomatic-military Chinese footprint across the globe and funds crucial investments for the PLA’s modernisation and technology development. Yet, military analysts are not entirely convinced of the PLA’s battle-preparedness.

For starters, the PLA is still technically a ‘party Army’ and is given to distractive and time-consuming indoctrination sessions at all operational levels by political officers of the CPC. While all career officers of the PLA are CPC members, the apex decision-making body for the PLA is drawn from  the communist party committees that are dominated by civilian party members and ideologues, as opposed to career military men. The state is forever paranoid about regime-change (especially after the Tiananmen Square incident), and, therefore, the top brass of the PLA is firmly reined in under the party directive that could affect serious soldiering, culture and professional efficacy.

The second major concern is the operational ‘jointsmanship’ among various serving arms of the PLA as that requires a coordinated fighting capability, responsive command system, logistical/maintenance framework and inter-service interlinkages for a seamless operation — these shortcomings have been routinely pointed out and internally accepted with concerted efforts being made to overcome the same. The days of Chinese ‘human wave attacks’ a la 1962 are passé, and the Gulf Wars of the 1990s exposed the hollowness of simple ‘numeric superiority’ and ‘ideological armies’ as opposed to professional soldiering. Islands of technological advancements and advanced weaponry need to coincide with the requisite skills, training and handling experience of effectively deploying the same under combat-stress situations by the soldiers.

Unlike most major militaries (the US, NATO, Russia and India among others) that have partaken in the invaluable and irreplaceable experience of combat operations, the Chinese PLA remains the most combat-inexperienced major military in the world. All four key elements of war — soldiering, leadership, weaponry and doctrines — are posited on conjecture and untested claims. The last major combat for PLA was 40 years ago against Vietnam, where the ostensibly inferior Vietnamese forces inflicted a serious blow to the bungled Chinese invasion.

Earlier still, and contrary to 1962, the Sino-Indian clashes at Cho La and Nathu La in 1967 had resulted in a bloody nose for the PLA. Purely from the time perspective, that leaves virtually no one in the active PLA with any battle experience. Despite breathing fire on Taiwan, Japan or incidents like Doklam, the PLA has not secured any tangible ground on the ‘enemy’. In comparison, the US has been involved in the Middle East and Afghanistan in recent times, the Indian (and Pakistani) forces have had Kargil and multiple domestic insurgencies that have consistently tested their ‘software’ and ‘hardware.’  The US has tested its prime weaponry like the GBU-43/B (‘mother of all bombs’) in Afghanistan, its F-22 Raptor stealth fighter jets in ‘combat surges’ over Syria, as reportedly have the Russians, who deployed their SU-57 stealth fighter prototypes. Vladimir Shamanov, the Russian Duma’s Defence Committee head, has claimed that Russia has tested ‘over 200 new weapons’ in Syria. Whereas, the efficacy of advanced Chinese weaponry is a matter of pure claims by Beijing.

The PLA is undoubtedly undergoing a major overhaul and investment in terms of material upgradation, training and integration. However, all these investments are predicated on the continuing ‘bull run’ of the Chinese economy — dark clouds of an economic slowdown loom and China has recorded its slowest growth rate since 1990. The inevitable US-China trade wars, too, will take their own toll and can trigger unfathomable headaches for the CPC to manage. This could usher in a revised set of priorities (for example, cuts for PLA and defence industry) for the CPC in order to keep the more important lid on its restive masses from questioning the regime during an economic downturn. The famed ‘cheque-book’ diplomacy to ‘buy out’ sovereign loyalty, for example  CPEC, Djibouti or Philippines, could also become an immediate casualty. Lastly, the recent Chinese belligerence has led to the emergence of powerful counter-opposition to checkmate China’s ambitions. The ‘Quad’ (US, Japan, Australia and India) is also symptomatic of the strategic evolution that works to the detriment of the Chinese. Perhaps like its economic juggernaut that has apparently ‘overheated’, China’s diplomatic-military assertions and bellicosity by the PLA are a lot more about posturing than it can realistically sustain or ‘bite’. It will remain the cynosure for the US, and to that extent, the saber-rattling by the Chinese PLA is here to stay. A closer analysis, however, leaves a lot of unanswered questions on its battle preparedness.

(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry)

Writer: Bhopinder Singh

Courtesy: The Pioneer

The strategy to whip up religious sentiments by harping on the issue of numerical preponderance of a particular community has helped certain terrorist organisations create and reinforce their base to indulge in proxy war with states across the globe. Central Asia is no exception to this.

The recent terror attacks in Scandinavian region, particularly in Stockholm and Istanbul, highlight the fact that the region continues to sit on a powder keg. These Central Asian nations face myriad challenges.

In addition to the question of economic aggrandisement and nation-building exercise, there have been a number of security related issues. According to recent reports, many individuals and non–state actors operating from the Central Asian Region (CAR) have been held responsible for exporting terrorism. Rampant  use of battery improvised devices, knives and cars in individual terror attacks, massacring foreign tourists and hostage takings have been some recent tactics adopted by terrorists operating from Turkey, Norway, Sweden and Uzbekistan. Recently there were attempts to export terrorism from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. On account of rapid rise in terror threats, Moscow recognised the need to set up Troika alliance in the past.

The need for a common security apparatus has exposed Central Asia’s long painful process of institution building. The recent influx of illegal migrants and spate of terrorist activities in China and Russia have shaken them off complacency and compelled them to seek cooperation for tackling the menace of transnational terrorism.

The relatively calm profile of CAR took a beating when Democratic Party, the Rastokhez Front and Islamic Revivalist Party organised the anti-government activities in Tajikistan during May 1991. This exposed simmering discontent among Muslim communities and created background for psychological ambience for the growth of Islamic militancy in the region. Besides, spate of activities in Moscow-based Islamic Renaissance Party gave a fresh impetus to Islamist groups across the entire CAR.

The influx of refugees from disturbed areas of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Iraq and Syria has added a new dimension to the existing problem. Although Russia has always acknowledged the economic and political significance of the region, its policies towards locals have been not been consistent as desired by these groups. Its policies wavered in attempts to persuade national minorities to acquiesce to or assimilate into the Russian culture.

While there is abundance of oil, natural gas resources, minerals, cotton, textile commodity in the CAR, the region still has to catch up with advanced countries with regard to job facilities, housing, consumer commodities and education.

Some critiques hold lack of economic and political will responsible for the vulnerability of the region. The people in CAR are expecting governments to accelerate plan formulations and undertake  prompt measures for improving access to the means of production, economic opportunities such as proper usage of natural resources, income and employability and developing the capability of locals to produce more.

Besides, the governments in this region need to cooperate and coordinate with regard to any security challenge posed by terrorists. Since service sector is quite impressive in CAR, particularly in Kazakhstan amounting for more than 50 per cent of the total GDP, the key to economic transformation lies in integrating it further.

The disgruntled groups have constantly expressed their dissatisfaction, many times violently. Thus, riots and bomb blasts occur at regular intermissions. The brands of distraught people have gained tremendous support from refugees who have immigrated to escape ethnic strife in neighbouring countries.

Fundamentalists have acquired sophisticated arms, training and developed a close network with rogue nations around the world.

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, then Communist leader Islam Karimov formed his Government in Uzbekistan and Sepermurad Niyazov became the President of Turkmenistan. Both these Governments were authoritative in nature and very unresponsive to the dissatisfied groups. As a result many splinters emerged within groups.

The fundamentalist Islamic factions have often lashed out at the governments in CAR. Consequently the governments expressed their concern about the separatist forces and foresaw the necessity of using force to keep the lid on the ethnic cauldron.

Although it is difficult to predict what new ideas and strategies could help CAR to improve economic situation and develop security capabilities, it is evident that to a large extent economic activities in the coming years will be influenced by the region’s capability to fight inflation and develop anti-terrorist mechanism.

Central Asia is of immense value to the world because of its strategic location and very rich oil resources. The US has already declared CAR as very crucial region for strategic purpose. In addition to the economic importance it attaches to the region, the US is apparently keen on checking the rise of Islamic militancy and Russian influence. The growing mistrust between Moscow and Washington for their respective influence in CAR has made the entire region a playground for power game. China has already started spreading its wings all over the region in order to ensure its rising hegemony. For Afghanistan, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, the region has great potential for economic and cultural exchanges. The most important link is the Islamic solidarity which is lately getting culminated in the form of sponsored agents of terror. Most European countries are concerned and worried about the possibility of increasing Muslim fundamentalism in the region.

If unchecked, fundamentalism nurturing militancy can pose serious challenges to the neighbouring countries. This is evident from the chaos in Syria and disturbances in Afghanistan. On the other hand, China is worried about the presence of Uyghur Muslim ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. There are roughly about 7.32 million Uyghurs in Xinjiang province of China. Recently there has been upsurge in the militant activities of Uyghur in Xinjiang.

The interest of the Muslim countries in the region is not limited to commerce alone. They want to influence the CAR in Islamic terms. Although more articulate and accurate efforts by intelligence and security agencies can provide more information about such groups of the region, there is still a confusion whether such mechanism is successful in dealing with these terrorists who are driven by misinterpretation of the religion. In such a situation the Troika must ensure that the fundamentalists do not operate from the bases in safe heavens of rogue countries. The best way perhaps would be to identify the areas of national and regional resilience and develop capabilities domestically and externally for combating terrorism.

Thus apart from monitoring the crucial issues of political stability and economic development of the region, the Central Asian countries should undertake issues related to strategic partnership to handle the rising tide of international monster.

(Author is Chandigarh-based Professor of Political Science and an expert on strategic affairs)

Writer: Sudhir Hindwan

Courtesy: The Pioneer

Of all the speeches, tweets and off-the-cuff remarks which together constitute President Donald J Trump’s articulation of the US’ global policy priorities and ideological positions (or lack thereof), there has never been one that defines his presidency more than his address to the United Nations in end-2017.

It was the most unambiguous speech by a world leader to the globe’s most ambiguous institution in recent history. In a sense, it was a rather effective exercise in showing the mirror to the UN. He started off by putting the cat firmly among the pigeons by reminding the gathering that President Harry S Truman was instrumental in establishing the UN as an organisation specifically for post-WW II nation-states to help build democratic institutions in their respective countries that would strengthen member-states’ sovereignty and help them serve their citizens better.

It was a timely intervention. After all, someone needed to juxtapose what was intended with what the UN has become — a sinecure for the elite of various nations which passes ineffective and often unimplementable resolutions, an illiberal club which has ended up bestowing legal rights to groups at the cost of the individual and an organisation that happily tolerates grotesque aberrations of a Libya or Sudan finding a place on its human rights council, for example.

Trump also laid out his doctrine for America’s place in the world which, over the past year and a bit since his speech, seems to have been broadly accepted by the American establishment though his style of doing things is, perfectly understandably, unacceptable to many, including the simpatico. But let us not confuse style with substance. This doctrine emphatically underlines the supremacy of the nation-state in global interaction and/or cooperation while championing sovereignty, security and prosperity for them individually.

Crucially, he was careful to emphasise the demonstration effect of robust, liberal, democracies even as he iterated that Washington was not in favour of imposing a way of life on others and was accepting of diversity in governance models across the globe which may not albeit be ideal. Where he was explicit was in calling out Iran/Yemen, as corrupt, despotic (Islamist) dictatorships and Cuba/Venezuela as corrupt, totalitarian (Socialist) dictatorships. He did, of course, take a swipe at Russia and China, without naming them, for their expansionist moves in the Ukraine and the South China Sea respectively as well. But there was a qualitative difference in the latter criticism, rooted as it was more in fighting both countries as global power competitors as opposed to the “bogus internationalism” of the so-called Islamist/Socialist countries which are ideologically committed to undermining the global order premised on nation-states or blocs thereof as the primary unit of interaction. (North Korea and Syria, also attacked by Trump, represent proxy threats for the US and are a discussion for elsewhere.)

His definition of such rogue nations as the “wicked few” and his exhortation to “decent nations not to become bystanders” were just sound and fury signifying American strategic interests, so they need not detain us here. But his frontal attack on bogus internationalism and exhortation to all UN member nation-states to put their country first just as he was putting America first provides India the opportunity it needs to recalibrate its own place in the world at a time of geo-strategic flux.

In calling for a renewal of the founding principle of the UN, which is its member-states’ sovereignty, focussing on outcomes not ideology and adhering to what may be termed principled realism, the US, if it continues down this path, has opened up space for India to attempt and secure its strategic interests in a substantial manner. To be facile, all we need is to replace Iran with Pakistan in the countries listed by Trump at the UN and we are good to go! The reality, of course, is more complicated than that; for example, Saudi Arabia should in an ideal world make it to any list of despotic Islamic regimes but it is neither in the US’ nor India’s interest to proffer such a suggestion. The situation, however, is not so complicated as to not provide New Delhi enough leverage to make space for itself at the high table, provided we keep our domestic internal security situation under control, economic growth robust and democratic institutions ticking over despite the odd setback or two. Especially, given Washington’s targeting as articulated by Trump in his UN speech of those nations which support and promote the aims of “Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Taliban and others”, the last-mentioned presumably keeping the door open for inclusion of terrorist tanzeems operating in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir in this list.

Of course, in isolating pseudo-socialist totalitarian regimes and repressive Islamic theocracies — though that does not mean one doesn’t deal with them in one’s national interest even if with a pinched nose — Trump is focussed on US interests; the trick for New Delhi to pull off is to see how far our interests align with Washington’s given this once-in-a-generation opportunity. It is not only about meta-narratives but also the smaller issues on which there is an emerging convergence of views.

For example, Trump was emphatic in telling the UN that pressure by its refugee organisation on the US to allow refugees stateside was in effect dictatorial, chipped away at sovereignty and untenable. At the cost of resettling one refugee in the US, we can help 10 make a better life in their own countries, he said. New Delhi, grappling with similar pressure despite not having the economic wherewithal of the US in regard to, say, accommodating Rohingya refugees, should obviously take note. It is the citizens of low-income neighbouring countries who bear the cost both of refugees fleeing conflict and oppression or plain economic migrants.

US emphasis on result/outcome-orientated global actions, however, does require a fundamental reform of the United Nations itself. That is where the real opportunity for India lies if it can find common ground with the US. For example, given his transactional approach, President Trump has been quick to articulate the long-standing grouse of the American conservative establishment that the US’ contribution to the UN budget is 22 per cent of the total despite the US being just one of the UN’s 193 member-states. But he was quick to add even while encouraging other members to contribute more that the investment was worth it if peace and global order could be delivered. The disproportionate military/financial contribution of the US in terms of the influence it has on the world body is a sentiment India is in a good position to exploit if it is adroit in the steps it needs to take to secure its strategic objectives.

The US President’s paean to the nation-state and advocacy of independent, strong, prosperous countries guiding the UN as the best way to secure peace in our time as opposed to letting far-off, faceless bureaucracies such as the UN have the deciding say is in consonance with the approach of the Indian deep state. It’s better to have people taking ownership of their future rather than be led by a paternalistic global elite that in the name of seeking mutual bliss-points ignores the oppressive nature of the regimes that push this line.

(The writer is an independent journalist and commentator based in New Delhi.)

Writer: Ishan Joshi

Courtesy: The Pioneer

From an Indian perspective, Afghanistan turned out to be the flavour of the fourth edition of the Raisina Dialogue at New Delhi, which, compared to other international dialogues, is still in its infancy, given that it was flagged off as one of the three or four universal concerns/hot spots. The presence of the evergreen former President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai, whose dislike for the US and Pakistan has visibly mellowed; Gen David Petraeus, the key proponent and leader of the US military surge in Afghanistan; Indian Army Chief Gen Bipin Rawat, who threw a bombshell with his advocacy of unconditional talks with the Taliban; and the Nangarhar native Pashtun, Zalmay Khalilzad, in his new role as the US’ points person on the reinvigorated peace process, threw up some interesting ideas.   Incidentally, S Khalilzad, in his book, The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My Journey Through a Turbulent World, and various presentations had recommended the ‘Richard Armitage’ treatment of Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan: Bombing them to the stone age.

For the transactional US President Donald Trump, cutting the US losses and exiting Afghanistan were pre-election promises, though he was persuaded by the likes of Gen Jim Mattis (now resigned over the issue) to stay the course. Trump’s sudden announcement to de-induct from Syria and reduce US troops in Afghanistan (later rescinded) last month is part of a cost-cutting and burden-sharing exercise. US troops are the most expensive — eight GIs for one jawan — to maintain in the world, given their tail of commodes to chewing gum. But it is also clear that even Trump will not walk out of Afghanistan, given the bilateral strategic security pact with Afghanistan, including the need for retention of bases at Bagram and Kandahar. Trump’s famous but short-lived Afghan policy enunciated in August 2017 is all but dead. From being the villain of the piece and part of the problem, Pakistan has bounced back to being the pivotal player in the peace process. After blaming Pakistan for destabilising Afghanistan, Trump was forced to seek Prime Minister Imran Khan’s help in taming the Taliban.

So where is the peace process? Khalilzad has been in the job for just five months. After three failed attempts to get the Taliban to talk to Kabul, he has returned to the drawing board. He must first convince Pakistan that peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan is in its national interest and pressing the Taliban for direct talks with Kabul is indispensable. It is understood that the option of coercion is still available and usable against Pakistan (so far unsuccessful) and against its beneficiary, the Taliban (so far unused). As Mattis failed in his coercive option, it is doubtful if Khalilzad can succeed. Still, Khalilzad has had three ‘good’ conversations with the Taliban; though they have steadfastly refused to talk to the Kabul delegation. The fourth round was postponed as the Taliban, at the behest of the Qataris, rejected Riyadh as the venue for the meeting. It will now happen as soon as Khalilzad is back from China, who, he hopes, will urge Pakistan to play the ball. Pakistan Army Chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa is understood to have told Khalilzad that “we want peace and trade with India as well as LoC as the de facto border.” And, of course, “peace in Afghanistan”.

Afghanistan’s National Security Advisor Hamdullah Mohib, who was in New Delhi just before Raisina, was sceptical about a positive outcome from talks with the Taliban. He said that the Taliban is not a monolithic organisation and is fractured down the middle. He feels an intra-Afghan dialogue, which has not been held, must be a precursor to talks with the Taliban. According to him, different groups from many factions in the Taliban have so far been sent for talks in Moscow, Abu Dhabi and Qatar. “We’ve had contacts with the Taliban, including proximity talks at Abu Dhabi”, he added. Karzai, too, endorsed Mohib’s views but emphasised the centrality of Pakistan, adding “whatever the deal with Pakistan, it should not undermine Afghan sovereignty.” “The Taliban are Pashtuns, our people, and they have to be engaged in power-sharing” said Karzai. Most countries are in contact with the Taliban. India, which is a legitimate stakeholder, must engage the Taliban because they are Afghans, noted Karzai.

The Russians and Iranians are also keen that India open lines with the Taliban who will eventually be part of the Government. But India has been unable to sidestep hesitations of history, which have made its position rigid; though it has shown some flexibility recently. It is willing to support the peace process provided the Taliban adheres to red lines: Renunciation of violence, abiding by the Constitution and ensuring the peace process is owned, led and controlled by Afghans.

On their part, the Taliban has indicated that it is prepared for power-sharing but without elections. It wants most of the East and North East of Afghanistan given to it on a platter. Its writ runs in almost half the country. This plan is similar to the one suggested by Robert Blackwill of dividing Afghanistan in the middle. The Taliban also wants changes to the Constitution.

Further, it has sought a deadline for the withdrawal of foreign forces, lifting ban on the movement of its leaders and sanctions imposed on some of them. Given the barbarity of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, which was recognised by the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, some of its leaders are liable to be charged with crimes against humanity.

Karzai admitted that the Taliban attempted to destroy Afghanistan, its culture, history, institutions and role of women in society while trying to impose Sharia’h law. But some Afghans say that the Taliban has mended its ways (doubtful) and 2019 is not 1996. They no longer destroy schools and prevent girls from  going to school. Their biggest asset is control over large swathes of territory and retention of the capacity to execute multiple suicide attacks at will. In short, they enjoy on the ground the dominant position and advantage in balance of military power. This gives them a distinct edge in bargaining at the talks table.

It is the Americans who are in a hurry to withdraw, not the Taliban. They can outwait them indefinitely. Americans may have the watches but we have the time, this is what the Taliban has been saying for a long time. Trump would like to get most of his 14,000 soldiers back home before the next elections in 2020. Key questions, though, will remain: Who will guarantee the Taliban keeps its end of the bargain once foreign forces leave Afghanistan ? UN peacekeepers? A regional compact on non-interference as endorsed by SCO? Afghans reverting to neutrality? Or a grand bargain with Pakistan? Watch this space for answers.

(The writer is a retired Major General of the Indian Army and founder member of the Defence Planning Staff, currently the revamped Integrated Defence Staff)

Writer: Ashok K Mehta

Courtesy: The Pioneer